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     Much of the historiography on the October Crisis has centred around whether the War Measures Act 
(WMA) represented a necessary deployment of available legislation to crush a threat to national order and 
security, or an unjustified assault upon civil liberties. Explorations of the media’s presentation of the 
crisis have produced divergent conclusions, are largely quantitative rather than qualitative in nature, and 
do not account for regional differences in the media interpretations of the events. This study deploys a 
content analysis of the editorials in Canada’s most widely circulated English-language newspapers in 
October 1970 to interrogate how they framed the crisis, evaluated how the government handled 
developments, and compared to other regional interpretations. Careful attention was accorded to whether 
the civil libertarian discourse that dominates the historiography was present in contemporary evaluations 
of the crisis or is a post facto academic construction. 
     This study concluded that a national discourse existed about the crisis in some respects. English-
Canadian newspaper editors unanimously framed the FLQ as terrorists, fanatics, and a criminal “cancer” 
who threatened Canada’s societal and democratic order and whose villainy was clear in their targeting of 
such innocent and virtuous victims. Descriptions appeared frequently of a populace fearful of the group’s 
potential to escalate further and united in support of the government’s measures. Newspapers in each 
region, particularly Atlantic Canada, initially framed the government as facing a dilemma in its decision 
of whether to capitulate to terror. The papers from Western Canada, Eastern Canada, and Montreal soon 
shifted to advocate firmly for a hard-line and law-and-order response to terrorism, and pledged their 
support for the WMA. Although these papers demonstrated some concern about civil liberties, the 
WMA’s effectiveness, and the government’s secrecy (particularly towards the end of October), they 
continued to endorse the emergency measures as defensible and necessary. By contrast, the Toronto Daily 
Star and Globe and Mail recommended the government negotiate for the victims’ release and critically 
approached the WMA with civil liberties concerns, elucidations of the measures’ dangers, and doubts 
which outweighed their support. An “alien conspiracy” framing was more prominent in Western and 
Eastern Canada than in Central Canada, where editors concentrated their attention on identifying the 
crisis’ internal roots and offering recommendations on how they should be remedied. While anti-FLQ 
sentiments pervaded the nation, and pro-government and “alien conspiracy” framings formed a dominant 
discourse throughout much of Canada, it is clear that the historiographical debate on the WMA bore its 
roots in October 1970. Revealing a more complex discourse than that noted in previous studies, this 
finding is also significant given the media’s capacity, through framing, agenda-setting, and priming, to 
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It was hardly an exaggeration when the Toronto Daily Star deemed on October 16, 1970 that Canada 
faced “one of the worst crises” it had ever known.1 By that time, a Quebec-based separatist group’s near 
decade-long spree of bombing federal targets had evolved into ghastly tactics. British trade commissioner 
James Cross and Quebec labour minister Pierre Laporte had been abducted, seized from their very 
residences, and the group claiming responsibility, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), taunted 
authorities and law enforcement officials with communiqués restating their intention to execute their 
hostages unless their demands were met. At the request of the provincial government, the Canadian 
military had descended upon Quebec. The provincial and Montreal municipal governments, anxious at the 
prospect of further escalations in the group’s tactics, pleaded with Pierre Trudeau’s federal Liberal 
government to institute the War Measures Act (WMA). Criminalizing prior or enduring involvement with 
the FLQ, suspending Canadians’ civil liberties and rights, and bequeathing enhanced capabilities upon 
law enforcement to arrest and detain, federal cabinet effected the legislation on October 16.2 
     Capitalizing upon the sensationalism of the happenings in Montreal, the news media across Canada 
reported heavily on the evolving situation, bringing the crisis and its interpretation into the homes of 
citizens across the country. In the decades since the crisis, a handful of scholars have interpreted this press 
reaction and the messages that newspapers conveyed to Canadian audiences. A more substantial focus has 
been devoted to nuancing the dialogue respecting whether the federal reaction to the crisis, exemplified in 
the invocation of the WMA, was an appropriate response to the urgent need to crush terrorist forces 
threatening the social and political fabric of Canadian society, or a blatant and iniquitous assault on 
Canadians’ civil rights and liberties. To determine whether this dialogue existed in contemporary recounts 
and examinations of the crisis, I conducted a content analysis of the most widely circulated English-
language dailies throughout Canada, between October 5 and October 31, 1970, analyzing how they 
framed the developing crisis for readers.3 
     An examination of these newspapers reveals that readers of the twelve dailies were exposed to a 
national framing of the FLQ and October Crisis in several respects. From coast to coast, the vast majority 
of editors framed the crisis in terms which, from the crisis’ commencement, emphasized a stern, “law and 
																																																								
1 “Trudeau proclaims War Measures Act: FLQ Outlawed, 238 Arrested - Raids launched in 5 cities in search for 
kidnappers,” Toronto Daily Star (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970. 
2 Michael D. Behiels and Matthew Hayday, “Introduction to Section 5: The FLQ Crisis,” in Contemporary Quebec: 
Selected Readings & Commentaries, ed. Michael D. Behiels and Matthew Hayday (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2011), 197. 
3 This segment of the introduction, with amendments, is excerpted from Corah Lynn Hodgson, “The October Crisis - 
Deconstructing the Narrative Presented to English Canadians Through the Toronto Daily Star and The Globe and 




order” perspective, endorsing and defending a hard-line stance against terror. This framework affirmed 
the villainy and dangers of the terrorist FLQ, asserting the gravity and perils of the situation, the group’s 
capacity to inflict further terror, and the government’s urgent duty to crush a terrorist organization that 
was actively seeking to dismantle Canada’s societal and democratic institutions and structure. Appeals for 
political and national unity in opposition to this foe appeared with frequency throughout English Canada. 
Throughout October, however, the editorial staffs increasingly juxtaposed this “pro-hard-line” narrative 
with demands that the government exercise greater caution to avoid the increasingly conspicuous 
infringements of civil rights. Accompanying these concerns were demands that the federal government 
offer a more thorough defence or rationalization of its emergency measures, as well as an explanation of 
the police’s apparent failure to exercise exceptional powers with any notable or significant success. 
Nonetheless, most newspapers across English Canada saw these concerns as secondary to and bookended 
within the papers’ enduring defence of the government’s response to the crisis and implementation of the 
WMA. Even as concerns arose about the government’s conduct, thus framing a discourse and debate 
regarding the necessity and appropriateness of this exceptional measure, the papers remained firm in 
constructing the WMA as entirely justifiable and defensible throughout October. 
     This narrative framing of the crisis dominated all the papers examined with the notable exception of 
Ontario’s two leading publications: the Globe and Mail and Toronto Daily Star. While concurring with 
the framing of the FLQ as a terrorist, perilous, and legitimate menace to Quebeckers, Canadians, and their 
societal and political foundations, the two Toronto publications were alone in initially advocating that the 
federal government negotiate with the FLQ. Once the government implemented the WMA and affirmed 
that it had no intent to pursue such a course, the Globe and Mail and Toronto Daily Star only briefly and 
tenuously voiced their support for the measures. These expressions of support were far surpassed, in 
quantity and detail, by an unparalleled concern for civil liberties, emphasis on the WMA’s dangers, 
apparent police ineptitude, and concerted demands that the government offer more details on what 
justification it had for invoking the act. The Toronto publications represented the only papers to explicitly 
argue in opposition to authorities’ approach to the FLQ’s program of terror. In so doing, the publications 
demonstrate that the historiographical debate on the WMA’s necessity and effectiveness had emerged in 
the public discourse during the crisis itself. 
     This discourse occurred within the newspapers’ broader and overarching tendency to largely ignore the 
origins of the crisis and FLQ in terms of the economic, social, and political roots of its grievances. As 
such, editorials rarely offered any suggestions about how authorities could address legitimate grievances 
over the long-term. Instead, the editors evinced a penchant for framing the crisis as an alien conspiracy, 
indicative of tensions stemming from an international revolutionary and terrorist malaise, and adopting 




depicted a Canadian populace fervently supportive of the government’s response to the crisis, appalled by 
the manifestation of terrorism in Canada, and of whom the FLQ was merely a fringe minority 
unrepresentative of the Quebec mainstream. In this respect, editors in Ontario and Quebec offered the 
exception. With their descriptions of the crisis as being not shocking but rather foreseeable and expected, 
more numerable and detailed efforts to assess the crisis’ systemic roots, and greater attention to 
recommending long-term resolutions beyond the perpetrators’ apprehension, Central Canadian editors 
exhibited a deeper comprehension of the crisis’ origins. Even within these papers, however, the framing 
of the FLQ as an unrepresentative and marginal minority, and depiction of the FLQ as an entity of foreign 
ideology and tactics, appeared and endured. 
     Consequently, the controversy which continues to dominate the historiography about whether the 
government’s hard-line response to the FLQ and its invocation of the WMA was an indefensible 
abrogation of civil liberties, or a justifiable and imperative attempt to squash a dangerous terrorist group, 
was initially presented by the nation’s dominant English-language publications in October 1970. 
Although all Western Canadian, Eastern Canadian, and Montreal-based papers proclaimed their support 
for the government and WMA, each contained elements of the civil liberties discourse. The editorial 
tendency to frame terrorism and revolutionary violence as an international phenomenon or ailment 
afflicting and corrupting the previously innocent Canada further enabled this discourse. With the 
exception of editorials in Ontario and Quebec, English-Canadian newspaper editors accorded minimal 
attention to the crisis’ roots or prospective long-term solutions. Hence, while Western and Eastern 
Canadian publications approached the crisis with comparable anti-FLQ, pro-government, pro-WMA, and 
alien conspiracy framings, the Montreal publications deviated from that nation-wide discourse by more 
broadly examining the provenance of the crisis. The Toronto publications presented the most notable 
divergences from this discourse in their sweeping criticism of the government and WMA, as well as their 














CHAPTER I: ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATIONS 
 
Historiographical renderings of the October Crisis 
     The predominant theme in existing historiographical renderings of the October Crisis analyzes the 
appropriateness of the government’s response to the developing situation, particularly respecting the 
October 16, 1970 proclamation of the War Measures Act.4 Historian Dominique Clément has aptly noted 
that invoking this act persists as “one of the most controversial human rights crises in Canadian history.”5 
The thrust of this scholarly debate centres around the core question of whether to frame the WMA’s 
invocation as the government’s necessary resort to an accessible legislative implement in order to squash 
a terrorist group threatening to dismantle Quebec and Canada, or an unjustified and horrifying 
infringement upon civil rights and liberties.  
     A particularly compelling (and one of the first) explorations of this question, which elucidated the 
“pro-WMA” stance, originated in Gérard Pelletier’s 1971 book The October Crisis. As the Secretary of 
State in Trudeau’s cabinet during the crisis, Pelletier insisted that the FLQ constituted a severe disruption 
of and challenge to the Canadian democratic system that would topple the existent power structure unless 
promptly crushed. By his assessment, Canadian society bore the hallmarks of democracy and British 
liberalism, of a system that grants citizens the capacity to influence the government through voting and 
their freedoms of press, speech, and the individual. Pelletier testified that the FLQ functioned in 
opposition to democracy, for − as reviewer Kevin Lee Pinkoski summed − they “ignore[d] the existing 
political tools and f[ou]nd them useless to their goals.” It similarly opposed individual freedoms, since 
Felquistes’ ignorance of the democratic process signalled their intent to only elevate their own liberty, and 
their employment of violence subjected all Canadians to potential harm. Since this violence was a “form 
of political protest” existing outside the legally-sanctioned means available in the Canadian system, 
Pelletier identified that the group had the capacity to undermine liberalism in Canada. If the FLQ were 
successful in doing so, Pelletier cautioned that the nation would have disintegrated into an “irrational 
society” in which segments of the population were consistently engaged in combat for “power, and self-
affirmation” and individual citizens rendered politically powerless.6 As such, Pelletier maintained that the 
WMA constituted “the least bad solution” to a severe and imminent crisis that urgently required 
government action, and demanded a severe response given how the group’s “ascending curve” of 
																																																								
4 See Behiels and Hayday, 197-201. 
5 Dominique Clément, Canada’s Rights Revolution: Social Movements and Social Change, 1937-82 (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2008), 105. 
6 Gérard Pelletier, The October Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 30-42, quoted in Kevin Lee 
Pinkoski, “The Historiography of the Front de Liberation du Quebec: Frameworks, ‘Identity’ and Future Study,” 





violence throughout the 1960s had produced a clear “state of emergency” and the threat of 
“uncontrollable civil disorder.”7 Acceding to the FLQ’s demands, Pelletier argued, would have only 
encouraged other cells and movements to assume similar violent tactics. As such, the WMA had been 
necessary both to prevent the “great number of conscious or unconscious FLQ sympathizers” in Quebec 
from being “drawn into violent action,” and in fulfillment of the government’s obligation to abide by 
Bourassa’s request for assistance.8 
     Dan Loomis concurred with this portrayal of the FLQ in his 1984 work Not Much Glory: Quelling the 
FLQ. By his analysis, the FLQ was “an organization which, in peace time, was dedicated to violence and 
the terrorist overthrow of government,” and was diametrically opposed to the continuation of “our value 
system, our form of democracy, our economic institutions, our social structures, our political system, and, 
ultimately, Canada.” He lauded Trudeau for preventing what “could have been a long and bloody [war] 
had it not been quenched by determined Canadian leaders [such as he] wholly prepared to meet the 
challenge.” Loomis identified the rallies of October 14 and 15 as indicative of the intensifying attempts of 
the FLQ revolutionaries “to mobilize the population,” and an inevitable prelude to the group’s 
pronouncement that “they had formed a de facto regime to replace a government that had broken down.” 
By Loomis’ assessment, insurrection had been unquestionably apprehended.9 Figures estimating the 
group’s total membership and sympathizers as being at least 2,000 to 3,000 Quebeckers, the FLQ’s steady 
escalation of activities since 1963, and its clear intent − demonstrated by the kidnappings − to follow “the 
pattern of Mao Tse-Tung’s revolutionary struggle” towards either an “attempted coup de main” or a “full-
scale civil war,” had all demonstrated the crisis’ severity.10 The WMA had become necessary given that 
numerable intellectuals in Quebec were beginning to justify the FLQ’s tactics in light of their grievances, 
and that the Montreal police were “exhausted and showing signs of serious demoralization, such as 
engaging in wildcat strikes.” Together, these had created a situation in which the populace was losing 
faith in authorities’ capacity to ensure law and order, further necessitating the WMA.11 Fortunately, in 
Loomis’s view, Lester B. Pearson and Trudeau devised appropriate means to confront the threat to 
democracy and “the rule of law” which the group posed as it sought to “destroy ... Canada as we know it.” 
He suggested that the government action had successfully “turned back and neutralized” the FLQ “in such 
																																																								
7 Gérard Pelletier, The October Crisis, trans. Joyce Marshall (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 13; 15; 81; 
83; 85. 
8 Pelletier, 97; 111; 113; 115; 135. 
9 Dan G. Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ (Toronto: Deneau, 1984), 21; 10-11; 14; 156-157. 





a fashion that Canadian democracy was preserved,” the group effectively deconstructed, and (as H. D. 
Munroe reviewed) “the threat of domestic terrorism in Canada ended for good.”12 
     Historians Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, in their 1989 book Canada Since 1945, 
also justified the Trudeau government’s response. The authors referenced the government’s understanding 
that the FLQ possessed significant caches of dynamite and arms, provided evidence for a deteriorating 
will in Quebec to “resist revolutionary violence,” and refuted popular theories that the government 
employed the crisis as an excuse to crush the nascent separatist movement and “discredit the PQ.” 
Consequently, the authors suggested that “it is difficult to understand what else, legally and politically, 
could have been done” in the face of an incipient yet mounting terrorist threat, and when accessions 
would only encourage further terror and violence. The government was obligated to “uphold the law and 
its application,” and had a “duty to try to manage conditions, including public opinion, so that danger to 
the fabric of the Canadian state is avoided or repaired.” Since complying with the terrorists’ demands 
would thus be absurd, and constitute a complete abrogation of those responsibilities, the authors 
concluded that the government’s efforts to prevent the emergence of a parallel government and “put down 
manifestations of support for revolution and terror” was the “wise” and “proper” response.13 
    In the last two decades, some authors have continued to justify and support the government’s actions in 
response to a body of terrorists intent on the eradication of Canadian democracy. In 2010, William Tetley 
(a minister in Trudeau’s cabinet during the crisis) published The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View, 
in which he constructed the FLQ, in Pinkoski’s words, as constituting “an attack on Canadian unity.”14 
Accordingly, he appraised that the government’s handling of the crisis was entirely justifiable and the 
most appropriate course of action available.15 Tetley defended the provincial decision to call in the army 
as having relieved the citizenry’s increasing anxiety and allowed the police to devote themselves purely to 
investigating the kidnappers, and supported the declaration of an “apprehended insurrection.” Given the 
evidence of an increasing possibility of insurrection, Tetley argued that not proclaiming the measures 
“would have been exceedingly unwise, if not dangerously irresponsible.”16 As such, Tetley devoted much 
of his work to justifying the invocation of the WMA. The infringements upon civil liberties were minor 
and nominal, Tetley intoned, and brought predominantly positive consequences in halting the FLQ’s 
																																																								
12 Loomis, 167; 154; Loomis, quoted in H. D. Munroe, “The October Crisis Revisited: Counterterrorism as Strategic 
Choice, Political Result, and Organizational Practice,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2 (2009): 289, doi: 
10.1080/09546550902765623. 
13 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism, 
revised edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 370-374. 
14 Pinkoski, 198. 
15 William Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 
back cover; Marcel Martel, Review of The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View, by William Tetley, Left History 
12, no. 2 (2007): 185, http://lh.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/lh/article/viewFile/14988/14035. 




program of violence and demonstrations seeking to encourage violence, producing a much-needed period 
of calm, and encouraging the press “to act with calm and discretion for the first time.”17 Furthermore, it 
represented the most suitable approach given the abduction of two politicians, the federal government’s 
general lack of information regarding the group, the media’s contribution to heightening the tension, and 
the police’s need for assistance in maintaining order.18 Tetley further identified the inappropriateness of 
the alternative courses of action, arguing that acceding to the FLQ would have “imperiled” the entire 
“basis of government and justice in the province” and encouraged further terrorism, while creating a 
legislative alternative to the WMA or amending the Criminal Code would have required time the 
government did not possess.19 While “[m]ost Canadian historians cite this event as an unjustified assault 
on civil rights and political liberty,” a book synopsis insisted that Tetley’s work “challenges this 
assumption.”20 
     Thus, there is a substantial body of historical literature that seeks to construct or frame the federal 
government’s response, and particularly its proclamation of the WMA, as a necessary and inherently 
justifiable effort to quell a prospectively destructive terrorist threat. The majority of Canadian historians 
have framed the October Crisis and the WMA with a divergent lens, however, opting to depict the 
government’s reaction as enabling the gratuitous violation of Canadian civil liberties. This viewpoint has 
dominated the discourse since the months immediately after the event. Indeed, in the same year as 
Pelletier’s defence of the government, the contributors to Abraham Rotstein’s 1971 Power Corrupted: 
The October Crisis and the Repression of Quebec were unanimous in portraying the FLQ threat in 
October 1970 as insufficiently acute to warrant the government’s authoritarian reaction. They further 
denounced Trudeau for either overreacting to the danger posed by the FLQ or manipulating the situation 
into a crisis to demolish the legitimate separatist spirit of the Quebec population.21 Pierre Vallières 
expanded upon this perspective in his 1977 book The Assassination of Pierre Laporte, in which the 
former FLQ theoretician posited that Trudeau’s government fabricated and orchestrated the October 
Crisis so that he could invoke the WMA and thereby annihilate the separatist movement and Quebec 
nationalism. That the Parti Québécois had achieved such success during the 1970 provincial election was, 
by Vallières’ theorizing, “enough ... to trigger the mobilization of the armed forces.” In the opinion of 
federal authorities, he alleged, the nationalist impulse among French-Canadians was a “conspiracy against 
																																																								
17 Tetley, 88; 91-92; 74-75; 78-79. 
18 Tetley, 91-92; 74-75. 
19 Tetley, 57-58; 84-86.	
20 Tetley, back cover. 
21 Herbert Quinn, Review of Power Corrupted: The October Crisis and the Repression of Quebec, edited by 





democracy” that necessitated crushing.22 As such, the police, military, and federal government had 
cooperated to “prepare” the crisis and manage its escalation, ensuring through its facilitation of the two 
political kidnappings that the crisis would reach sufficient height to justify the proclamation of emergency 
measures.23 Indeed, the government intended to deploy the WMA as a means by which to administer a 
sort of “political shock treatment” to Quebeckers in order to “extract from them immediately and 
unequivocally a full disclosure of their long-term political objectives.”24 The deployment of the armed 
forces into Quebec and subsequent manhunt was intended to serve “the political purpose of deterring the 
Québécois once and for all from aspiring ... to independence,” by “perfecting the repressive machinery 
across the country” and “disorganizing and dislocating as much as possible the groups promoting Quebec 
nationalism.”25 Thus, by Vallières’ conspiratorial assessment, “[t]he October crisis was not an accident of 
history, but the premeditated execution of a plan whose central purpose was to wreck the hopes of the 
Québécois for a future as a self-governing people.”26 Jean-Françoise Cardin concurred with this theory in 
his 1990 book Comprendre Octobre 1970: Le FLQ, La Crise et le Syndicalisme. Intoning that “October 
1970 provided the authorities a perfect opportunity to undertake a repression operation against the 
nationalist left of Quebec,” Cardin depicted the WMA as indicative of the government’s intent to 
reinforce the federal government’s supremacy “over a province that had become too contentious and 
nationalist for its taste.”27 
     Political scientist Denis Smith’s 1971 book Bleeding Hearts, Bleeding Country: Canada and the 
Quebec Crisis had arrived at much the same judgment. He assessed that the asperity of the happenings of 
October 1970 did not justify Trudeau’s response, as the FLQ had simply intended to liberate their 
companions from prison and “test” the authorities, not provoke (as historian Herbert Quinn wrote in a 
review of Smith’s work) a “mass revolutionary uprising.” Condemning Bourassa’s inability to free 
himself from the yoke of Ottawa’s control and Trudeau’s “inflexible” federalism, Smith concluded that 
many of the situation’s undesirable consequences could have been prevented had the authorities exercised 
more restraint and intuitiveness.28 Indeed, the ultimate futility and ineffectiveness of the WMA were 
proven in that the kidnappers were apprehended not following the “emergency police sweep” which the 
WMA permitted, but following weeks of “normal police activity.” Similarly, politicians’ inability from 
the initial days of the crisis to provide evidence sufficiently justifying their responses testified to a 
																																																								
22 Pierre Vallières, The Assassination of Pierre Laporte: Behind the October ’70 Scenario, trans. Ralph Wells 
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1977), 14; 55. 
23 Vallières, 17-18; 21-22. 
24 Vallières, 22.	
25 Vallières, 17; 31. 
26 Vallières, 173. 
27 Jean-François Cardin, Comprendre Octobre 1970: Le FLQ, La Crise et le Syndicalisme (Montreal: Éditions du 





decision-making process that lacked “a reasoned ... careful calculation of alternatives.”29 When the 
government “immorally” refused to negotiate for the lives of the hostages, despite that such negotiations 
would have been “desirable” to protect the “sanctity of life” and liberty as the government was obligated 
to do, Smith identified that the two abductees ultimately became “insignificant pawns in a much broader 
struggle to maintain the integrity of the state.”30 Their status as such was exhibited particularly in John 
Turner’s consistent assertion that the “erosion of public will” necessitated the WMA. Smith took 
significant issue with this defense, that did not describe the need for the act on the grounds of “a state of 
insecurity or panic,” but rather eroding confidence within the opposition parties who desired to confront 
the situation differently. As such, Smith identified the government’s reaction to the crisis as representing 
“[t]he use of emergency powers to suppress that political option ... [in] a partisan act directed against 
democratic opponents and the general opinion which they sought to influence. It was an act of 
intimidation rather than a responsible act of democratic authority.”31 Ultimately, the lesson Smith 
perceived as emerging from the imposition of this act, both in 1942 to evict Japanese Canadians and in 
October 1970, “was that the real danger to a democratic society when panic arises is the state’s readiness 
to appease that panic by disregarding civil liberties unjustly and unnecessarily.”32 
     Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, in their 1979 book Rumours of War, suggested that the WMA 
facilitated “abuse[s] of government power” and “arbitrary police power” that practically translated into a 
situation of internment.33 In their eyes, little evidence justified the Act’s invocation. The existing crimes 
and punishments under the Criminal Code were sufficient to prosecute the terrorists under such charges 
as criminal conspiracy, theft, and the possession of dynamite or illegal arms. The “principle of fresh 
pursuit” and the search warrant were available to the police to investigate and apprehend criminals, and 
the WMA failed to offer any practical power of arrest or search and seizure to which the police did not 
already have access. The kidnappers were eventually discovered and apprehended not as the result of the 
powers provided by the WMA but following “ordinary diligent and competent police work,” aided by the 
group’s clearly “amateur” conduct. Furthermore, FLQ terrorists were successfully prosecuted during the 
1960s, and the police conducted approximately two hundred raids daily in the five days following Cross’ 
abduction. This high rate of police activity suggested that they did not need extraordinary means to 
overstep “cumbersome legal machinery” in order to function efficiently in a time of crisis.34  
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     Even if the police had required emergency powers to address the situation, Haggart and Golden 
revealed that the original legislation was created only to be utilized in “support [of] a military action, not 
a police action,” and “was never intended as a tool to root out criminals.”35 Thus the authors discerned 
hidden motivations driving the implementation of the act − predominantly, that the chaos and divisions 
within the Quebec cabinet required a means by which “to restore political order” and address the “erosion 
of the public will to resist” by providing Bourassa with “a new reason not to negotiate.”36 According to 
these authors, “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that a major intention of the Government was precisely 
what happened, the detention of hundreds of persons who could not be accused even of advocating the 
policies of the FLQ, but who certainly could be accused of opposing the Government’s policies toward 
the FLQ.” This resulted in mass infringements upon civil liberties, in which “persons could be detained 
quite literally for being in the wrong bed at the wrong time, or for having rented the wrong apartment.”37 
Hundreds of people were arrested not for terrorism but for possessing “wrong-headed political beliefs.” 
Detainees were denied legal counsel, bail, and the capacity to communicate with their families as the 
consequence of the invocation of an act that apparently served no practical necessity but for allowing the 
government to “deal a blow to the philosophy of separatism.”38 
     Political scientist David Charters, in his 1997 analysis of the organizational structure, composition, and 
methods of the FLQ, assessed that the group suffered from a lacking “continuity of leadership or 
experience,” amateur membership, and inadequate “security and discipline” that rendered cells vulnerable 
to police infiltration and dismantling. Its impulsivity, resulting in premature and reckless action, faulty 
comprehension of “revolutionary theory,” and “lack of direction and discipline” over individual cells and 
members further weakened its potential. These organizational failures created a group “unable to translate 
their goals into the strategy, organization, action and results that would produce a successful national 
liberation war.”39 Consequently, Charters concluded that, “[g]iven what is known now about the size and 
the goals of the FLQ at the time,” the government’s identification of the situation during October as an 
“apprehended insurrection” and subsequent invocation of the WMA “seems overblown.”40 
     Dominique Clément’s “The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses under the War Measures 
Act” mounted one of the most recent and explicit condemnations of the government reaction to the crisis. 
Citing the denial of due process, suspension of habeas corpus, inability of detainees to communicate with 
counsel or family, and unjust retroactivity of the offence, Clément highlighted the small number of 
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detainees actually charged with and/or convicted of an offence − of the four hundred ninety-seven people 
detained, merely sixty-two were charged and eighteen convicted − as evidence of the danger in granting 
authorities sweeping powers.41 These flagrant abuses of civil rights were not restricted to Quebec. 
Clément intoned that, across Canada, legal authorities placed restrictions upon the content of student 
newspapers and confiscated those papers that failed to comply. Media employees were fired for 
insubordination or dismissed for “lack of objectivity.” Furthermore, Clément asserted that the federal 
government consistently pressured and intimidated the news media into reporting on the crisis in 
particular terms, thus violating freedom of the press.42 Police raided an Ottawa woman’s home following 
her engagement in a protest against the act, and bans were proposed and effected in Toronto and British 
Columbia that threatened teachers who expressed “sympathy with the FLQ” with termination, further 
limiting their freedom of speech. The Vancouver mayor even boasted “that he would use the emergency 
powers to run hippies and draft dodgers out of town.”43  
     This encroachment upon the civil liberties of Canadians was not restricted temporally to the official 
duration of the October Crisis. Clément observed that the escalation of the FLQ’s activity throughout the 
1960s occurred in parallel with an escalation in the RCMP’s response to the group. Inserting informants 
into cells, conducting mass raids, and executing preventative arrests were components of the RCMP’s 
utilization of “extreme [and increasingly abusive] tactics in their pursuit of the FLQ.” These tactics 
elicited condemnation from civil rights groups who denounced the Quebec police force and RCMP for 
“holding people for interrogation without warrant,” forcing one individual “to incriminate himself for a 
series of bomb attacks,” forcibly detaining suspects for days, and utilizing raids to confiscate membership 
lists from separatist parties.44 Not only did the WMA engender the violation of Canadians’ civil liberties, 
rights, and freedoms throughout the nation, Clément contended, but those infringements existed within 
the context of “[a] history of violent protest and police abuse of individual rights [that] preceded the 
kidnappings.”45 Accordingly, Clément’s work contributes to a long-standing debate about whether the 
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The functions of the news media 
     An emerging body of scholarship also analyzes the role of the news media during the October Crisis. 
In political and societal crises, scholars have long recognized the importance of examining the media’s 
impact on popular discourse and comprehensions of the situation.46 In his 1922 book Public Opinion, 
journalist Walter Lippmann theorized that “the real environment” or world which people occupy and in 
which they live “is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance,” and that 
humans are “not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and 
combinations.”47 Consequently, humans have to reconstruct their environment “on a simpler model before 
we can manage with it,” or develop, in essence, “a pseudo-environment” to which the individual responds 
with their behaviour.48 Such a pseudo-environment, or conceptualization and mental representation of 
their environment, is “whatever we believe to be a true picture” and what humans thus “treat as if it were 
the environment itself.”49  Therefore, an individual’s behaviour, actions, feelings, and thoughts are 
predicated, in part, “not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to 
him” and how he imagines the world to which he is to respond.50 Public opinion thus becomes definable 
as “[t]hose pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of 
groups.”51 Lippmann argued that an integral interpreter or intermediary in the construction of pseudo-
environments and public opinion is the media and press, for “the press is the chief means of contact with 
the unseen environment” and offers an image to its readers “of all [of] the outer world in which we are 
interested.”52 
     Lippmann’s understandings of the media’s instrumentality in shaping individual and public 
conceptualizations or mental maps of the world and of environments beyond their immediate reach still 
resonate. Media communications scholars continue to depict the media as “channels through which 
information is transmitted and received,” forums for public knowledge and engagement,53  and as 
“intellectual windows on the world” for citizens to perceive what is happening beyond their direct 
experience and sight.54 The media transforms or evolves social problems into “public issues” through 
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their exposure and dissemination to the public55  and, as one of society’s primary “image-making 
institutions,” influences how members of any given social system perceive the events and issues of their 
world and develop their worldviews.56  
     Arthur Siegel noted in the prelude to his groundbreaking analysis of Canadian media during the 
October Crisis that the press serves as a key medium to integrate the citizen “into the political sphere.” 
Through its emphasis on certain occasions and construction of those occasions through particular 
perspectives, “the press helps to define the political issues of the day and plays a role in fashioning the 
relevance of politics for the individual.”57 Since an individual’s awareness of the happenings of the world 
is predominantly derived from the media, an editor’s decision of what “news” will appear in their 
newspaper, and the terms in which that news is framed, have a significant influence “in shaping political 
reality.”58 This occurs through a process that media communications scholars have identified as “agenda-
setting,” which intones that the media alters citizens’ political judgments by influencing the audience’s 
assessment of an issue’s importance.59 
     Any discussion of agenda-setting necessarily commences with an understanding of agendas: “a general 
set of political controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of 
legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity,”60 or “issues or events that are viewed at a point in 
time as ranked in a hierarchy of importance.”61 As such, the media serves to inform or direct the public 
about which issues or events to consider and think,62 with the media’s designation of “increased salience” 
to an issue shaping popular weight given to that issue.63 Thus, the issues most dominant in a person’s 
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mind at a particular moment are considered reflective of those issues most dominant in the media.64 
Phrased differently, agenda-setting purports that the public learns from the media “perspectives about the 
relative importance and prominence [or salience] of the various elements in each day’s news,” and thus 
the media “direct[s] public attention to some issues and events and away from other issues and events.”65   
     The media thereby influences, through its own priorities and “agenda,” public priorities and 
preferences.66 Through decisions of how to display its news − and which news to display − newspapers 
play a fundamental role in the shaping of political reality, not merely informing readers as to the issues at 
hand but offering cues of the significance to accord those issues through the quantity of details offered 
about a story and its positioning in the newspaper.67 In so doing, the media can influence the setting of 
issues upon the public’s agenda and understanding of what societal issues are most salient, facilitate the 
establishment of a broadly sweeping popular consensus on the concerns and interests common to the 
populace, and thereby influence the creation of public opinion.68 By the same means, scholars have noted 
a “second-order agenda-setting” function, whereby the media can heighten public concern regarding a 
particular facet or element of that issue, at the expense of others, by according it particular attention.69 
Either agenda-setting function effectively “filters” or “selects” which issues and sub-issues assume a 
salient position on the public agenda, with high public attention to a matter helping to elevate that issue 
on the broader political agenda.70 
     The notion of priming also reinforces that the media’s priorities subsequently influence the public’s 
priorities, dictating which issues citizens assess and use to judge the performance of individuals in the 
public arena. According to priming, the media’s dissemination and reporting of news influences “the 
standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged ... [b]y 
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calling attention to some matters while ignoring others.”71 As such, the media compels audiences to 
typically evaluate public officials or policies in accordance with their performance respecting the issues 
which the media had made most salient at the time of judgment.72 In other words, when the media accords 
particular attention to a certain issue or domain, the public becomes increasingly primed with that issue or 
domain, rendering citizens more likely to consider and prioritize that issue or domain in their broader 
assessments of political figures.73 This reflects the human tendency, when confronting a decision or issue 
for analysis, to rely upon such heuristics as utilizing “information that is most accessible in memory, 
information that comes to mind spontaneously and effortlessly when a judgment must be made,”74 or − in 
other words − those aspects to which citizens had been primed.75 
     The media’s function is not restricted to the reporting and dissemination of the happenings of the 
public world to the private individual. It has the capacity to direct readers and audiences to certain topics 
or issues that they should consider, think about, or prioritize. Bernard Cohen proclaimed in 1963 that 
while the media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, ... it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about .... the world looks different to different 
people, depending ... on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors, and publishers of the papers 
they read.”76 The editor, through their selection of the topics about which audiences will read, is “putting 
a claim on their attention, powerfully determining what they will be thinking about, and talking about.”77  
     Media effects studies also theorize how the media can be remarkably influential upon how citizens 
perceive, interpret, and subsequently act upon world happenings, in a process which scholars call 
“framing.” Broadly speaking, framing entails the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality” which, 
through their emphasis, “make[s] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation.”78 A media frame, according to sociologists William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, is 
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“a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events,” connecting 
them and suggesting “what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.”79 Accordingly, media 
framing entails “selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others,”80 thus 
emphasizing particular “aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a 
communicating text.”81 In so doing, the media assembles “a narrative that highlights connections among 
them [the selected elements] to promote a particular interpretation” of the issue under discussion.82 This 
concept of framing prompted sociologist Todd Gitlin to describe the media as “not passive mirrors of the 
society” but “mobile spotlights” upon it, selectively highlighting certain issues or elements of an issue 
while ignoring others, adopting “a certain frame,” and rejecting or downplaying “material that is 
discrepant.”83  
     Framing thus functions not only explicitly (by invoking a particular position upon an issue or matter)84 
but also less overtly by heightening the salience or seeming importance of particular facets of an issue or 
ideas about it.85 The media’s deployment of frames thereby increases the likelihood that audiences “will 
perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory,” and thereafter 
recall it in the formulation of their own opinions or perceptions.86 As such, frames (when deployed with 
success) “encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way,”87 and influence the 
frames that readers utilize in their personal interpretations and discussions of issues and events.88 They 
facilitate and aid in the construction of social reality89 and organization of the world − for the journalists 
reporting, editorialists commenting, and public reading.90 Media frames can substantively impact how 
audiences understand, comprehend, and feel about events,91 as well as readers’ preferences, attitudes,92 
and subsequent behavioural decisions.93 
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     Through such framing, priming, and agenda-setting effects, scholars have noted the media’s potential 
to directly influence the political arena. Media actors can influence politicians in various ways: as citizens 
reliant upon the media themselves for news94 who reference the media as an indicator of the public’s 
thoughts on an issue;95 for cues on the media’s “attributions of responsibility;”96 and for proposed 
solutions to public problems.97 By shaping public opinion and the public agenda, and thereby influencing 
the political agendas and potentially policies of public figures, the media can thus possess an “agenda-
building” effect.98 This function (alongside agenda-setting, priming, and framing) gives the news media 
substantial power to shape and influence citizens’ perspectives, discourse, thought, behaviour, and public 
opinion, as well as the broader social and political climate and situation. 
 
The media in October 1970 
     The media’s power becomes strikingly apparent when one applies this framework to the October 
Crisis. The Canadian press certainly informed the public about government and FLQ activities, conferred 
further meaning on those behaviours through editorials, and offered the public an outlet for individual 
citizens to articulate their own perspectives in letters to the editor.99 Furthermore, as negotiations between 
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the government and FLQ faltered and the press became the “channel of communications between (1) the 
F.L.Q. and the authorities, (2) the F.L.Q. and the public, and (3) the authorities and the public,” the news 
media also served the function of “draw[ing citizens] into the crisis in an intimate matter.”100 Thus, 
throughout the October Crisis, the media was both a mirror and a molder, not only serving to “reflect” 
public attitudes and impressions but to “shape” them as well.101 
     Previous scholars have incorporated an awareness of the media’s functions during the October Crisis 
into their analyses of various facets and complexities of the event. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, in “The 
Terrorists’ Best Ally: The Quebec Media Coverage of the FLQ Crisis in October 1970,” recounted the 
media’s instrumentality to the terrorist cause, with democratic freedoms of speech and the press 
permitting the group to promulgate its aims and activities to the public. Terrorist groups need publicity to 
convert sensational acts into front-page news, thus forcing governments to respond by publishing “their 
own views in order to mobilize public support for their decisions.”102 As media and communications 
scholar Marc Raboy interjects, much FLQ and government behaviour during the crisis was aimed at a 
similar objective – the manipulation of the media into “serv[ing] a political purpose.” The FLQ employed 
the competition for ratings between two rival radio stations in Montreal to guarantee broadcast of its 
communiqués and to establish initial communication links with governments and the public. 
Subsequently, the federal government’s invocation of the WMA may be seen as a desperate endeavour to 
re-establish and reassert “its control over public communications.”103 
     As Ronald Crelinsten noted, the FLQ was remarkably successful in its media strategy. By utilizing the 
news media “as the sole channel of communication and refusing to name an intermediary” with which the 
government could negotiate in the early days of the crisis, “the FLQ forced the government to negotiate in 
public.” This solidified the group’s prominence in public awareness,104 seeking to reconstruct the group as 
“equal partners in a political dialogue” rather than as “marginal criminals.”105 Cohen-Almagor argued that 
particular French “organs of the media” in Quebec abused the power that this role afforded the press, 
prompting him to characterize the crisis’ coverage in Le Devoir and Quebec-Presse as “problematic and 
irresponsible.” The media exacerbated tensions by framing the FLQ in sympathetic terms, pressing the 
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government to negotiate (and attempting to engage in negotiations themselves) as well as impeding police 
investigations by publishing unsubstantiated rumours, delaying receipt of communiqués, and destroying 
fingerprints and other forms of evidence on those communiqués through incautious handling. Cohen-
Almagor thus asserted that the media’s behaviour “forced the government to contemplate possible 
procedures for monitoring the media,” and contributed to the panic that resulted in the over-arrests under 
the WMA.106 In contrast to the French-Canadian media’s tendency to voice their approval of the FLQ’s 
separatist cause and attempt to press the government into conceding to the demands, Cohen-Almagor 
suggested that English-Canadian newspapers more commonly framed the crisis with “cautious approval” 
for the WMA. Emphasizing the need to maintain Canadian unity, these papers also highlighted American 
reactions to the crisis and fixated on the “manhunt for the terrorists” rather than the French-Canadian 
concern for “civil rights issues.”107 
     Intercultural and interlingual comparisons of how English and French-Canadian newspapers presented 
the crisis are increasingly common in the historiography. Guy Lachapelle, in Claude Ryan et la violence 
du pouvoir, analyzed the digression in Le Devoir’s tone from one initially “critical of Ottawa” to one that, 
following the proclamation of the WMA, became critical of the infringements of civil liberties it 
constituted “but not in a manner that questioned the legitimacy of the Canadian or Quebec states.”108 In 
one of the most exhaustive and renowned investigations of the media response to the crisis, Arthur Siegel 
noted that themes of law and order, the invocation of the WMA, and the progress of negotiations were all 
prevalent in newspapers across Canada. Similarly frequent were the themes relating to international 
responses to the happenstances, the crisis as a situation foreign to Canada yet indicative of a larger 
worldwide trend of terrorist revolutionary movements, the need for Canadian unity, and how the crisis 
affected the Canadian political system.109 Although Siegel observed that French and English newspapers 
accorded relatively equivalent proportions of their publications to reporting and commenting upon the 
developing crisis,110 he noted significant disparities in how each framed the crisis. French papers showed 
a greater concern for exploring the reactions of international dignitaries and press, and greater resentment 
at the intrusion of external governments and authorities into what they perceived as a local matter. 
English dailies placed greater emphasis on the manhunt for the kidnappers and reprinted coverage from 
both English and French newspapers, while French-language dailies were more concerned with the 
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newspapers.111 Compared to the French dailies, the English newspapers provided less coverage of protests 
against the government’s response, more overt and unqualified hostility to the FLQ and terrorism, and a 
far less unanimous approach to negotiations than the wide support evidenced in the French newspapers.112 
     English-Canadian dailies also reported more extensively on the activities and opinions of the 
authorities in Toronto and Ottawa than the French-Canadian papers, whose predominant focus was upon 
the opinions of notable Quebec personalities.113 Placing greater emphasis on the preservation of national 
unity as opposed to the “regional perspective” adopted in French papers, English papers prioritized the 
need for law and order and pursuit of the kidnappers in contrast to the urgings for a negotiated settlement 
trumpeted by some French papers in Quebec. The English papers’ concern with American perceptions of 
the crisis contrasted with French papers’ higher interest in European responses to the crisis, and the 
English interest in the national economic implications of the crisis differed from the French propensity to 
draw attention to the “historic and contemporary economic and social injustices experienced by French 
Canadians.”114 In short, Siegel assessed that the French and English dailies differed in their framing of the 
crisis in every theme under consideration with the exception of concern for the hostages’ well-being, upon 
which there was a national consensus.115  
     Historian Christopher Hewitt concurred with these findings, noting that English papers throughout 
Canada tended to depict the FLQ unfavourably. They offered consistent support for the government’s 
uncompromising attitude towards the FLQ, particularly after Laporte’s murder, at which time initial 
concerns regarding the infringement of civil rights faded. In contrast, French publications were 
conspicuously divided, with La Presse displaying a persistently “hardline stand” against the FLQ and the 
possibility of the government capitulating to blackmail. By comparison, Le Devoir’s initial support for 
negotiating with the terrorists evolved after Laporte’s death into a horrified admission of the need to 
implement extraordinary measures, and Quebec-Presse insisted throughout the crisis that the FLQ was 
accurate in their categorization of Quebec society and its violence justified.116 
     Gérard Pierre Holdrinet’s extensive study into differing editorial reactions to the crisis concluded that 
“the single greatest determinant of how a newspaper reacted ... to the crisis was geographical location.”117 
He found that while Quebec and Ontario newspapers concentrated on the apparent need to address the 
crisis’ root causes through social reform and the peril of over-reaction on behalf of the authorities, thus 
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displaying a liberal approach to the crisis, newspapers from other provinces evidenced a greater emphasis 
on “the need for law and order.” French-language newspapers tended to include more editorial comments 
on developments, particularly after Laporte was kidnapped, while English papers increased the frequency 
and depth of their editorial analyses only after the federal government invoked the WMA. Originally 
demanding that law and order prevail, these editorials “de-emphasized that issue” with the proclamation 
of the emergency measures.118 Noting that French papers evidenced a greater concern for the social 
impacts of the crisis and minor indignation at federal involvement in a provincial affair, he concluded that 
English papers showed a greater tendency to highlight the insufficiency of the Trudeau government’s 
publicly proclaimed causes for instituting the WMA.119 Holdrinet also observed that Laporte’s abduction 
generally prompted shifts in how the media portrayed the crisis. The most pronounced shifts were in La 
Presse, Le Devoir, and the Globe and Mail, which all “de-emphasize[d] the need for law and order” and 
became “more preoccupied with the possibilities of excessive reaction by the authorities.” In contrast, the 
other newspapers that he analyzed almost unanimously emphasized law and order while downplaying the 
“need for social reform and ... concern for the safety of the kidnap victims.”120 After the invocation of the 
WMA, Holdrinet observed that most papers showed heightened concern about risks that the government 
might respond excessively.121 
     Lori Fitch’s comparison of the Toronto Daily Star and La Presse contests most of these previous 
findings. She revealed that the Toronto newspaper placed a surprisingly large emphasis on the 
transgression of civil liberties, importance of “political freedom,” and concern for the hostages’ lives 
through consistent reporting on and encouragement of the progress of the negotiations. Meanwhile, she 
suggested that the Montreal paper adopted an unexpectedly conservative leaning by reiterating the need to 
heed the “democratic social contract,” advocating for political change through elected representatives, and 
emphasizing the manhunt for the terrorists. La Presse further “stressed the importance of the protection of 
the majority, even if it meant the temporary suspension of individual liberties,” and subsequently offered 
broad support for the decisions to call in the army and invoke the WMA.122 
     The handful of studies that have critically examined the news media’s construction of the October 
Crisis of 1970 have yielded divergent findings, and largely have consisted of quantitative rather than 
qualitative analyses. Most studies to date have focused on contrasting English-language and French-
language media approaches to and depictions of the crisis, without any substantial or prolonged 
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interrogation or exploration of regional differences within linguistic groupings. As such, the extent to 
which English-language newspapers showed any regional variation in their coverage of the crisis, or 
whether there existed any significant differentiation in coverage within such regional classifications, 
remains relatively unexplored. 
 
The current study and its methodology 
     This thesis seeks to interrogate and ascertain how the most prominent and widely circulated English-
language daily newspapers prevailed upon English-Canadians, from coast to coast, to perceive and 
comprehend the October Crisis. I accord particular attention to discerning the extent to which readers 
between provinces and regions received divergent interpretations and analyses of the crisis, drawing 
particularly from the theory of framing to investigate which facets of the October Crisis received 
heightened coverage in the press, how those sub-issues were discussed, and which elements were ignored. 
How did the nation’s most dominant publications present and frame the crisis, the FLQ, and the 
governmental response for English-Canadian readers? What themes in, facets of, approaches to, and 
stances upon the crisis did the publications privilege or emphasize in their editorials? Which received 
little attention, and what impression of the governments and FLQ did these paint for readers? To what 
extent, and to what forces, did the publications seek to accredit responsibility for escalation in tensions 
during the crisis? What resolutions − if any − did they identify as necessary? What were the newspapers’ 
initial responses to the abduction of James Cross? Did, and if so how did, that construction, interpretation, 
and framing of events shift with Pierre Laporte’s abduction, the deployment of the Canadian Forces into 
Ottawa and Quebec to facilitate the maintenance of law and order, the invocation of the War Measures 
Act, and the revelation of Laporte’s murder? As it became apparent that the provincial and federal 
governments were assuming a hard-line, law-and-order stance to face the emergent terrorist threat, did 
publications endorse or decry that stand, and on what basis? When media outlets reflected upon the 
proclamation of the WMA, did their coverage of the emergency measures concentrate upon the 
abrogation of civil rights it enabled, or were the measures more predominantly constructed as a necessary 
response to quell and crush a terrorist threat? Ultimately, how do the narratives emerging in the papers 
compare to those emphasized by historians in their renderings of the crisis? Was the civil libertarian 
emphasis present in contemporary depictions of the crisis, or was it a post facto construction by historians 
temporally divorced from developments in October 1970? 
     In seeking the answers to these questions, my examination deploys a content analysis of the most 
widely circulated English-Canadian dailies, investigating the material with a framing-oriented lens. This 
predominantly qualitative approach is supplemented with informal quantitative analyses of the themes 




themes and any regional variation in that prominence. The newspapers were selected on the basis of the 
1970 Ayer Directory of Newspapers, Magazines, and Trade Publications (as well as the 1972 edition), 
using their details about “the average net paid circulation per issue [of each publication] (after deducting 
all left-over, unsold, returned, file, sample, exchange, or advertisers’ copies, and special editions).”123 
From these statistics, I selected the most broadly circulated English-language daily from each province, 
with the top two publications selected from Ontario and Quebec by virtue of those publications also 
representing several of the highest overall circulations nation-wide. 
     The following publications comprise the foundations of this analysis, and enable an exploration of the 
interpretations of the crisis most dominantly presented to Canadians across the country. Western Canada 
is represented by the Vancouver Sun (published all evenings but Sunday, with an average circulation of 
254,033 in 1968 and 225,146 in 1971),124 the Edmonton Journal (published all evenings but Sunday, with 
a circulation of 145,682 in 1968 and 152,534 in 1971),125 the Regina Leader-Post (published all evenings 
but Sunday, with a circulation of 60,369 in 1968 and a circulation of 62,133 in 1971),126 and the Winnipeg 
Free Press (published all evenings but Sunday, with a circulation of 131,919 in 1968 and 130,835 in 
1971).127 Selected from Central Canada were the Toronto Daily Star (published all evenings but Sunday, 
with a weekday circulation of 371,955 and Saturday circulation of 462,950 in 1968, and weekday 
circulation of 374,720 and Saturday circulation of 491,310 in 1971),128 the Globe and Mail (published all 
mornings but Sunday, with a weekday circulation of 255,751 and Saturday circulation of 255,647 in 
1968, and a weekday circulation of 263,622 and Saturday circulation of 263,626 in 1971),129 the Montreal 
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Star (published all evenings but Sunday, with a weekday circulation of 182,592 and Saturday circulation 
of 210,126 in 1968, and a weekday circulation of 179,266 and Saturday circulation of 209,112 in 
1971),130 and the Montreal Gazette (published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 132,738 in 
1968 and 135,323 in 1971).131 From Eastern Canada, the newspapers analyzed were the Saint John 
Telegraph-Journal (published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 28,684 in 1968 and 29,640 
in 1971),132 Saint John’s Evening Telegram (published all evenings but Saturday and Sunday, with a 
weekday circulation of 24,271 in 1968 and weekend circulation of 45,339, and a weekday circulation of 
26,296 and weekend circulation of 48,320 in 1971),133 Halifax Chronicle-Herald (published all mornings 
but Sunday, with a circulation of 69,481 in 1968 and 66,773 in 1971),134 and the Charlottetown Guardian 
(published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 16,356 in 1968 and 16,381 in 1971).135 The 
selection of the aforementioned publications enables an examination and consideration of the nation’s 
most widely circulated newspapers, the most broadly circulated dailies of each province and region, and, 
subsequently, the most extensively-circulated interpretations and framings of the October Crisis of 1970. 
     It is imperative to contextualize a study of the media’s rendering of a particular crisis in terms of the 
media’s prominence within the community in question, at the time under consideration. Nation-wide 
statistics compiled in surrounding years suggest that Canadians in October 1970 would have widely and 
rapidly consulted newspapers for updates on and interpretations of the crisis’ developments.136 Media 
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communications scholars have widely concluded that the newspaper readership, per Canadian household, 
had peaked in 1950,137 and subsequently declined in the percentage of participating households138 as the 
television supplanted it as Canadians’ predominant source of worldly and national news.139 Despite the 
gradual decline in the newspaper’s prominence and “per household readership” since the mid-20th 
century, however, data of newspaper readership and circulation indicates that newspapers continued to 
play an integral and enduring role in the Canadian social tapestry in 1970.140 Circulation statistics reveal 
that, among the estimated 5,514,000 households in Canada in 1969, the overall national circulation of 
Canadian daily newspapers was 4,549,000, producing a “circulation per household” rate of 0.825.141 By 
1971, the rate had declined slightly, but remained significant − for the estimated 5,779,000 Canadian 
households in 1971, there was a total circulation of 4,692,000, creating a “circulation per household” rate 
of 0.812.142 Nation-wide statistics which Toronto’s Communications Research Centre compiled in 1980 
and 1981 similarly reveal a reliance upon the newspaper that may certainly be considered more or less 
suggestive of the reliance a decade prior.143 In that study, 89% of Canadians had reported reading, at 
minimum, one daily newspaper each week, with the average issues read per capita totalling 6.4 per 
week.144  Approximately 54% had responded that they possessed “a strong newspaper affiliation,” 
indicating that they had firmly agreed that “newspapers are a regular part of my daily life,” while 69% 
identified themselves as “heavy” readers of at least five issues a week, and 64% documented themselves 
as “committed” readers of four to five of the weekday daily issues.145 Respondents had furthermore 
indicated allotting an average of fifty-three minutes each weekday and sixty-six minutes each weekend to 
reading dailies.146 Given newspapers’ significant role in 1970 Canada, an analysis of the print news 
media’s framing of the October Crisis offers the prospect of deeper understanding of the dominant and 
prominent interpretations provided to Canadians, through their most trusted and read media sources, at an 
integral moment in the nation’s history. 
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     Due to restrictions of time and scope, I have accorded primary consideration to the most immediate 
national response to and interpretation of the crisis, with the publications under examination ranging 
temporally from October 5, 1970 (the date of James Cross’ abduction) until October 31, 1970. Although 
both reporters’ articles documenting developments, and editorial interpretations, were examined for this 
time period, I focus my analysis on editorials as an expression of the newspaper’s institutional stance on 
the issues at play.147 Communications scholars have widely noted the intended function of newspaper 
editorials: as a public elucidation of the newspaper’s stance, opinion, perceptions, construction of, and 
ideological positioning upon a particular issue or social environment,148 and mechanism which facilities 
readers in structuring their own posture towards the issue.149 As discourse scholar Teun A. van Dijk 
observed, editorials are structured and composed with a particular goal orientation, namely to persuade, 
through its arguments, the reader as to the validity of its opinion and to encourage the further 
dissemination and assumption of that opinion.150  Editorials explicitly seek to sway readers’ social 
cognitions, usually in such a way as to “try to reproduce their own (group) attitudes and ideologies among 
the public at large.”151 In addition to explicitly conveying the editors’ opinion, the very selection of an 
issue as the basis of an editorial − and, by the same measure, the lack of selection of other issues − serves 
as an implicit signal to readers “that the newspaper attributes particular social or political significance” − 
or “relevance” − “to such an event.”152 In other words, through the selection of a particular issue, or facet 
of an issue, as worthy of editorial commentary, publications accord it salience or relevance, thereby 
influencing audiences’ perceptions of which issues are most salient in a process reminiscent of agenda-
setting.153 Academic studies observe how editorials can function to develop or proliferate discriminatory 
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prejudices regarding minority groups,154 “Orientalize” conceptualizations of societal “outsiders,”155 affect 
public assessments or evaluations of political aspirants in electoral campaigns,156 and more broadly 
influence the citizenry’s policy preferences, attitudes, and opinions.157 
     According to political scientist David Myers, editorials therefore serve to “both reflect and attempt to 
lead public opinion,”158 or, as communications scholar Christianne Eilders observed, “influence the 
agendas and attitu[d]es of citizens and political actors.”159 In their expression and direction of opinion, 
they seek to “attack, defend or give advice to the authorities”160 through their evaluation of political 
actors’ conduct and recommendations of avenues of future action. 161  Consequently, editorials can 
influence both the formation of public opinion and of policy.162 From this observation, van Dijk identified 
three categories or classifications of editorials. “Definition” editorials “define the situation” and offer a 
summary description of “What happened,” while “Explanation” editorials seek to “explain the situation” 
and outline “Why did it happen” with respect to the issue, event, or any action taken. Finally, “Evaluation 
and Moral” editorials offer predictions of “What will happen” or recommendations as to “What should be 
done?”163 I use this subdivision in my analysis to determine the extent to which editorials focused on the 
current crisis, its roots, and/or the steps the government should take once the immediate terrorist threat 
had subsided. 
     Editorials thus offer the most explicit and overt indications of a newspaper’s stance during a crisis, and 
the understandings and perceptions it seeks to cultivate among readers. Consequently, an analysis of the 
editorial reactions to and depictions of the October Crisis of 1970 enables an exploration of what facets of 
the crisis the editors deemed most significant and worthy of highlighting for Canadians. Their 
examination facilitates a survey into the interpretations of the crisis with which citizens were presented, 
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which, in accordance with the concepts of framing, agenda-setting, and priming, shaped how citizens 






























164 Eilders, 6. It far exceeds the scope of this study to seek to determine or even hypothesize as to the practical and 
tangible effect of these specific editorial reactions, or even of the newspapers more broadly, upon Canadian public 
opinion with respect to the October Crisis. Nevertheless, scholarly theorizations that editorials are able to impact the 
populace’s appraisal, grasp, and opinion of an issue or event through the frames applied render analyses of the 




CHAPTER II: ATLANTIC CANADA OBSERVES THE OCTOBER CRISIS 
 
     Among the most widely circulated English-language newspapers from the three regions that I analyze 
across Canada, the October Crisis received the least editorial coverage and attention from the four leading 
newspapers in the Atlantic provinces: the Saint John’s Telegraph-Journal, St. John’s Evening Telegram, 
Halifax Chronicle-Herald, and Charlottetown Guardian.165 These four publications contained thirty-seven 
editorial responses addressing the FLQ crisis in some capacity, the majority of which postdated Laporte’s 
abduction and the WMA’s implementation.166 Several broad themes emerged from this corpus of editorial 
opinion. The FLQ was generally depicted as a legitimate threat to national security, through descriptions 
of the group as savage and violent terrorists who were launching an offensive against Canadian society 
and democracy, responsible for the vile attacks against the innocent and noble abductees, and threatening 
to escalate the crisis further. Initially, the papers framed the government as faced with the dilemma of 
whether to capitulate to terrorist demands. After the WMA’s invocation, however, the Atlantic Canadian 
newspapers’ dominant framing of the crisis defended the government’s response to terror, according only 
minimal attention to civil liberties concerns, doubts about the WMA’s effectiveness, and criticisms of 
government conduct. The Atlantic Canadian papers’ overarching approach to the October Crisis also 
constructed the crisis as indicative of a terrorism foreign to the Canadian experience. Reminiscent of 
criminology’s “alien conspiracy” theory, these papers offered little analysis of the systemic origins of the 
FLQ’s grievances, depicting the group as a minority unrepresentative of the Quebec mainstream whose 
																																																								
165 This may be attributable to the papers’ smaller page counts (and less detailed coverage of the crisis), or the fact 
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the Chronicle-Herald, which published fourteen editorials in October, all but three reflecting upon events following 
the WMA’s proclamation. Though Cross’ abduction elicited some attention, and Laporte’s abduction provoked 





activities were connected to foreign tactics, movements, and ideologies, and thus had been a “shock” to 
and unexpected in Canada. 
 
Framing the FLQ - The descriptors used 
     The Telegraph-Journal, Charlottetown Guardian, Evening Telegram, and Chronicle-Herald were 
unanimously and consistently condemnatory of the FLQ in their framing of the organization. In the 
immediate aftermath of Cross’ abduction, the papers denounced the kidnappers as “extremists,”167 
“fanatics,” 168  and “terrorists.”169  The Evening Telegram spoke of Cross’ “irresponsible captors” as 
representative of “a terrorist arm of the separatist movement” and “terrifying visions of barbarism,”170 
while the Chronicle-Herald painted a portrait of “desperate political fanatics, dedicated to the excision of 
Quebec from Canada.”171 Editorials thus described the group’s activities as an “outrage,”172 consisting 
only of “savagery,”173 “insane violence,”174 and “politically-motivated lawlessness.”175 This immediate 
portrayal of the group as comprised of terrorists may have stemmed, at least in part, from the group’s 
known history of terrorist acts in Quebec. Indeed, the Telegraph-Journal immediately framed the FLQ 
within their storied legacy of violence and terror in Quebec. As the paper recounted for its readers, the 
extremists “had frequently resorted to bombings in the past; there had been killings and woundings,” and 
two plots which police had discovered earlier in the year to abduct for ransom the American consul-
general and a trade commissioner from Israel.176 Such descriptors persisted in the papers’ discussions of 
the FLQ following Laporte’s abduction. In addition to continuing to classify the group as “terrorists,”177 
“extremists,”178 and “fanatics,”179 the papers also applied the moniker of “revolutionaries.”180 Editors 
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described the group as demonstrating a “ruthless inhumanity,” 181  and constituting a “violent,” 182 
“desperate,”183 and “terrifying” foe184 composed of “a desperate and murderous minority.”185 
     The range of epithets applied to the FLQ again increased following the WMA’s proclamation and 
Laporte’s murder, and became demonstrably more severe in their reproach. In addition to the popular 
characterizations of the group as “terrorists,”186 “revolutionaries,”187 and “extremists,”188 the editorials 
framed the group as consisting of “anarchists,” 189  lowly “criminals,” 190  “insurrectionists,” 191 
“assassins,”192  “political murderers,”193  and “bandits.”194  These individuals were, according to these 
papers, “violent,”195 “desperate and fanatical,”196 and practitioners of revolution, political murder, and 
“mindless politically-oriented vandalism.”197 Editorials decried the FLQ’s “cold-blooded savagery” and 
“brutal madness,”198 and particularly the group’s commission of the “foul deed” of Laporte’s murder199 
“for which no punishment on earth is really adequate.”200 For the Evening Telegram, Laporte’s murder 
served as a “grim attestation to the ferocious singlemindedness and determination” of the FLQ. Such 
“[m]isguided zealots, ... professional killers, misfits, fanatical idealists or thugs” comprised a “cancer” 
which necessitated speedy excision from the social and political body.201 This framing of the FLQ as a 
“cancer” or illness frequently appeared in editorials following Laporte’s murder, with papers variously 
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referring to the crisis as reflective of Quebec’s “current sickness”202 or to the group as an “anti-
confederation cancer.”203  Throughout the East Coast editorial reactions to the October Crisis, the 
publications were unanimous in their framing of the FLQ as terrorists, fanatics, and extremists, as a 
violent, savage, brutal, and cancerous force which deserved little sympathy but aroused concern. 
 
Framing the FLQ as an affront and challenge to Canadian society and democracy 
     The editorials under examination also framed the group as posing a significant and determined threat 
to the democratic institutions of Quebec and Canada. In the Telegraph-Journal’s assessment, the FLQ 
was deploying terror “as a weapon against our whole society”204 and sought, through its escalating 
terrorist program, to propel the tensions in Quebec “into open insurrection and threats of even greater 
violence” with the aim of the “utter destruction of the nation.”205 The Evening Telegram described the 
FLQ as “threatening the unity and security of the nation” and imperilling the “democratic system and way 
of life.”206 For the Charlottetown Guardian, the FLQ was seeking “the destruction of a united Canada.”207 
     The Chronicle-Herald was most vehement in framing the FLQ as a serious threat to national security 
and order. The publication painted the FLQ as “dedicated to the excision of Quebec from Canadian 
confederation,”208 and “the violent, even murderous overthrow of constitutional government in Quebec” 
and Canada.209 The FLQ sought to implement “an alien dictatorship” in place of the legitimate democratic 
government,210 and demanded “total revolution” and the toppling of Quebec’s democratic institutions as 
well as the capitalist system at large.211 It was thus not merely two lives at stake in the FLQ’s game of 
terror, but “the security of constitutional democracy” in the province and nation. The FLQ was launching 
an assault upon “[p]arliamentary democracy, the rule of law, the whole fabric of justice based on a 
judiciary that is free from political pressures, the right of individuals to protection under the law - all these 
and other hard-won rights.”212 Consequently, the Chronicle-Herald observed that democracy in Quebec 
was in great “peril”213 on account of this “murderous challenge to constitutional government” and the 
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“democratic processes in that province and outside it.”214 The Atlantic Canadian editorials unambiguously 
framed the FLQ as a menace to government institutions and national security, painting a portrait of an 
organization seeking the destruction and dismantling of the social, democratic, and constitutional order. 
 
Framing the victims as innocent martyrs 
     In contrast to this image of the terrorist, savage, and dangerous FLQ, the editorials in Atlantic 
Canadian newspapers tended to depict Cross and Laporte in terms that emphasized their innocence and, in 
the case of the latter, constructed him as a martyr. The Chronicle-Herald, in its first editorial reaction to 
the abductions, rendered Cross as an innocent man completely undeserving of his abduction: “a man 
whose reason for being in this country was to promote trade between Canada - and in particular Quebec - 
and Britain.”215 Following Laporte’s kidnapping the Nova Scotian newspaper described the abductees as 
“two innocent and worthy men,”216 and the Quebec minister’s death produced his portrayal as a “helpless 
victim.”217 In a vein similar, the Guardian emphasized the undue familial suffering that the abductions 
had caused. Indeed, the paper highlighted the stresses on the Cross and Laporte families as they anxiously 
awaited news of any developments, describing the family members as “suffer[ing] in agonizing silence,” 
and thereby heightening the FLQ’s depiction as imbued with evil.218   
     Following Laporte’s death, the Atlantic Canadian newspapers, particularly the Evening Telegram, 
martyrized the slain minister. While the Guardian lauded Laporte’s service as “a great Canadian 
statesman and political reformist,”219 and emphasized his contributions to Quebec and Canada, the 
Evening Telegram was even more explicit. “Quebec,” it lamented, “has a martyr now, a French-Canadian 
slain in cold blood by his own compatriots, in the name of a cause they are pledged to advance by bullet 
instead of ballot.”220 Laporte had died for a “way of life,” the paper later extolled.221 In framing Laporte, 
and the victims more generally, in such a manner − with emphasis on their innocence, calibre, and 
martyrdom − the papers further consolidated their conceptualization of the FLQ as brutal villains. 
 
Framing the government as facing a dilemma 
     Partially by virtue of such descriptions of the victims, early Atlantic editorial responses to the October 
Crisis, reacting to the abductions of Cross and Laporte, tended to acknowledge the federal and provincial 
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governments as confronting an unenviable dilemma. Following Cross’ abduction, the Telegraph-Journal 
framed the government as facing “an agonizing dilemma” and quandary in its decision “whether to 
consider giving in to seemingly impossible demands, including disclosure to the FLQ of the person’s 
identity who betrayed a previous group of terrorists, or to let an innocent man face probable death.”222 
The same day’s issue of the Evening Telegram depicted the Quebec and Ottawa governments as perched 
upon “the horns of a dilemma,” stemming from the government’s responsibility for the security and 
safety of international diplomatic officials. “If they yield to the terms of the terrorists,” the paper warned, 
the government would “open the door to unlimited blackmail and coercion from that source,” yet 
refraining from acceding “could cost an innocent victim his life,” and potentially spark ceaseless 
reprisals.223 On the same day, the Chronicle-Herald noted that the Canadian government now encountered 
“the same terrible dilemma” that had confronted the governments of the citizens abducted during the 
Palestinian guerrillas’ hijacking of four airliners in September. Certainly, the FLQ’s demands were 
“preposterous” and “[i]t seldom pays to give in to blackmail,” but if the government refused to submit, 
the life of James Cross − for whose safety the Canadian government bore a responsibility − would be “in 
grave danger.”224 Once the Chronicle-Herald had concluded that national and provincial security could 
not be surrendered in bargains with terrorists, the October 14 paper continued to recognize that the 
authorities were confronting “a brutal, heart-rending choice,” and a “dilemma” which aroused Canadians’ 
sympathy.225 
     When the Charlottetown Guardian first assessed the crisis on October 13, it did so through a similar 
“dilemma” framework. The question confronting authorities as to whether “any of the demands of the 
criminals [should] be met” constituted, for the paper, “a dilemma.” Comparable to the dilemma noted by 
the St. John’s publication, the PEI paper indicated that if the government were to continue its refusal to 
accede to the demands, “two innocent men may suffer further.” If officials acquiesced, however, further 
kidnappings could result, for “surrender to terror only fosters the spread of terror.” The reality that “there 
is no guarantee that the two men will be released” made the double-edged sword even more biting.226  
     This framing of the government’s initial alternatives as a dilemma, typically revolving around the 
concern for the hostages’ lives as opposed to the urgency to discourage further terrorism, is notable for 
how it illuminates the relative objectivity with which the papers approached the crisis. The papers 
appeared cognizant of the benefits and downfalls of either capitulating or refusing to accede to the 
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terrorists’ demands, and hence refused to advocate either alternative. This is intriguing given that such a 
framing of the crisis as a “dilemma” was relatively unique to Eastern Canada. 
 
Framing a nation in fear of further escalation 
     Contributing to this dilemma was considerable anxiety about the extremity of the methods that the 
FLQ would employ in their quest against federalism, and simultaneous construction of the FLQ as a 
viable threat to the democratic fabric of the Canadian nation. Anticipating that Cross’ abduction would 
inspire a creeping progression of violence, the Chronicle-Herald and Telegraph-Journal asserted on 
October 7 that regardless of how the crisis developed, all diplomats and other public figures in Canada 
would require enhanced personal protection. Such security measures were, by the latter paper’s 
characterization, “essential and overdue,”227 and of particular necessity given the simultaneous fears 
emerging of the FLQ conducting a program of assassination. The Evening Telegram recounted the story 
of French-Canadians training amongst the Palestinian guerrillas and their intent to “return to Canada for 
the sole purpose of spearheading violence, even to the point of assassinating Canadian leaders.” Cross’ 
abduction, the paper cautioned, “marks a new trend in the policies of the FLQ,” indicative of the group’s 
broader turn to “savagery” as they bolstered their prior tactics of the bombing of armouries, mailboxes, 
and commercial and public buildings, with abductions. The “next move,” the paper warned, “might very 
well be skyjacking, within Canada on national airlines.”228 Clearly, the FLQ was not a threat to be taken 
lightly. 
     Tensions rose further following Laporte’s abduction. The Charlottetown Guardian observed that the 
terrorism in Quebec could only escalate further and produce the murder of the hostages,229 and the 
Evening Telegram feared that such “executions” would embolden other extremists. “In Quebec,” the 
paper warned, “such an action might well hearten the fanatical extremists, and create among other groups 
a climate of fear” that could advance “the cause of an independent Quebec.”230 Indeed, according to these 
editorials, the threat posed by the FLQ extended far beyond that facing the two hostages. The economy 
could suffer, the Chronicle-Herald decried, with the further inhibitions to international and Canadian 
investment in Quebec that the crisis would provoke.231 The “backbone of the Canadian federation,” 
namely its railway and air transport systems, had been threatened with an imminent offensive in a 
document reportedly circulated among the French press “by the [FLQ’s] European delegation,” the 
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Charlottetown Guardian intoned.232 As the Telegraph-Journal observed, the FLQ’s escalating activities 
had illuminated its intent to progress towards “open insurrection” and “even greater violence.”233 
     Observations about popular support for the FLQ may have exacerbated such fears. On October 17, the 
Guardian observed the “frightening” endorsement which hundreds of students from Montreal universities 
offered to the FLQ. “God help us,” it lamented, “if thinking students support an organization which has 
been responsible not only for bombings and kidnappings but even murder” and advocated the “violent 
overthrow of democratic government.”234 Overall, these conditions prompted the Evening Telegram to 
note with concern the prophesizing of some Quebeckers that the crisis would devolve into civil war. 
Citizens’ pronouncements that the current crisis did “not quite” constitute “a civil war as yet” served, for 
the St. John’s paper, as “a gloomy enough omen of what may be in store for that province and the nation 
as a whole.” By the paper’s declaration, Quebec was teetering “on the razor’s edge.”235 
     This anxiety regarding the crisis’ potential for further escalation persisted following the revelation of 
Laporte’s murder. Concern was immediately directed onto Cross’ increasingly uncertain fate. While 
Cross was presumed alive, the Evening Telegram worried that “his future fate must be looked at with a 
new concern in the wake of the Laporte tragedy,”236 and the Chronicle-Herald reflected upon the “deep 
anxiety” pervasive amongst Canadians as to Cross’ fate.237 In addition to this concern for the existing 
hostage, anxiety endured as to the FLQ’s capacity to conduct further abductions, with the Telegraph-
Journal intoning that “[d]iplomats and government officials everywhere [are] uneasily wondering where 
the brutal madness will appear next.”238 An enduring tendency among these editorials was to express 
concern about the extent to which the crisis could escalate further, through economic repercussions, more 
abductions, murder, air piracy, assaults on national transport systems, and broader insurrection and civil 
war. In so doing, the papers framed the FLQ as a legitimate threat, capable of inflicting severe damage. 
 
Framing the government’s hard-line response as the most appropriate course of action 
     An examination of the editorials in the Eastern Canadian publications reveals a broad-sweeping and 
dominant framing of the government’s hard-line response to the FLQ terrorists as both appropriate and 
defensible. Indeed, of the twenty-six editorials assuming a stance either in support or in criticism of the 
government’s response, twenty-three defended some element of the government’s hard-line stance: all six 
editorials from the Guardian, two of the three from the Evening Telegram, all seven from the Telegraph-
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Journal, and eight of the ten in the Chronicle-Herald. The predominant framing of the government’s firm 
response and the WMA was positive and sympathetic to the government. 
     Few editorials commented upon the government’s decision to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces into 
Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City in an aid to the civil power capacity. Those that reflected upon the 
development did so favourably and with unqualified support. The Chronicle-Herald characterized the 
deployment of the Armed Forces into Ottawa to assume security and protective duties at government 
structures, as well as the residences of prominent public figures and foreign diplomats, as emblematic of 
Trudeau “doing his duty in ensuring that the heart of Canada’s government will be properly protected.” 
As such, it was “clearly” defensible and necessary in a region in which the regular police forces were 
already “stretched to the limit.”239 Observing the climate of anxiety regarding the crisis’ potential to 
escalate further, the Evening Telegram framed the mass deployment of army and police forces as positive 
and justifiable responses of a government utilizing its available mechanisms “to help preserve a 
democratic system and way of life obviously imperiled by ruthlessness and force.”240 The Chronicle-
Herald concurred, describing Defence Minister Donald Macdonald’s intent to review the federal 
government’s planned reduction of its armed forces to 83,000 as “welcomed.” Its classification of such a 
reduction as “unrealistic” given the necessity to commit some 7,000 soldiers to what could become “an 
“open-ended” anti-terrorist role” in Ottawa and Montreal, and the army’s simultaneous obligations to 
NATO and UN peacekeeping missions, suggested that the paper supported the military’s role in the fight 
against terror.241  
     From some of its earliest commentary on the crisis, the St. John’s Evening Telegram situated itself as a 
staunch supporter of a hard line against terror. As early as October 13, the Evening Telegram suggested 
editorially that it would support the government’s assumption of hard-line, emergency powers to quell the 
terrorist threat bubbling in Quebec. “The government has tried to reason with the terrorists and it has not 
worked,” the paper indicated, with appeals “to their humanity and sense of justice” having proved futile. 
The authorities had been unsuccessful in contending with the terrorist threat, the paper hypothesized, due 
to the “enormous difficulty” which their necessity “to function inside the framework of the accepted rules 
of law and order governing a normal democratic society in peacetime” posed. The FLQ operated exterior 
to such bounds, unconstrained by the law and its “restraints or inhibitions,” and thus the paper suggested 
“the creation of emergency powers as in wartime” to place the opponents on a more even keel.242 
     Once the government proclaimed the emergency measures, and the curtain of the WMA fell upon 
Quebec, the Newfoundland publication remained firm in advocating the measures’ necessity. Though 
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“drastic” and “even frightening,” the undisputed escalation of the FLQ’s terrorist propensities, combined 
with uncertainties and anxieties regarding how the crisis could escalate further, compelled the Evening 
Telegram to conclude that proclaiming the WMA “seems to have been the only way.” If legitimately 
elected governments permitted themselves “to be manipulated by terror and blackmail,” the world would 
inevitably descend into anarchy, and thus capitulation was no viable option for a government contending 
with terrorism. For the Evening Telegram, the murder thus rendered “academic” the opinions of any “who 
had misgivings that the federal government over-reacted to a provincial problem” or “who had any 
lingering doubts about the gravity of the situation.”243 Although these comments represent the sum of the 
paper’s stance upon the WMA, the editorials supported the government’s response. This support derived 
from the necessity to accord authorities a more even footing with a group operating outside the bounds of 
the law, and avert the anarchy that would follow from any capitulation to terrorist manipulation. 
     Despite its initial conceptualization of the crisis as presenting the government with a dilemma, the 
proclamation of the WMA elicited the Telegraph-Journal’s immediate support. In its earliest editorial 
reflecting upon the invocation of the WMA, the paper defended the measures as constituting an overdue 
response to what had been long accumulating violence and provocation. Canada had, according to its 
October 17 editorial, “made the obvious choice” between either surrendering “some of her freedom ... to 
anarchists with bombs or to a government that will restore it when the crisis passes.” The proclamation of 
such emergency measures were defensible, the paper intoned, given that it constituted not the response 
merely to two abductions but rather to “years of mounting provocation until all the forces of law and 
order were challenged by criminals whose aim is utter destruction of the nation.” This patience “had to 
end somewhere,” and the FLQ’s preaching of hate, murder, and terror drew the proverbial line in the 
sand.244 
     The Telegraph-Journal later justified the government’s hard-line stance in that acceding to the FLQ’s 
demands would only provoke further violence and terrorism. Surrendering to terrorist demands would 
have created an environment in which it “never would ... have been possible to walk in safety in our 
country or any other,” as it would inspire any individual bearing a grievance to “simply engineer another 
kidnapping, confident that viciousness would win.”245 The paper reiterated such a defence in its October 
24 editorial, indicating that the Canadian government’s refusal to capitulate represented a “clear” 
decision. “[W]hen two lives must be balanced against the appalling consequences of giving in to 
kidnappers time and time again,” the paper editorialized, the government possessed a duty to refuse.246 
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     The Telegraph-Journal offered various other justifications in brief succession. An October 19 editorial 
defended the emergency measures as the necessary attempts of “a free society” to protect “itself from 
those who would destroy it.”247 The same editorial justified the measures as the response to the existing 
laws’ insufficiency, noting that the laws which protected Canadians in times of peace “were being used as 
a shield to keep FLQ terrorists out of jail” and aid in their campaign to “destroy the state.”248 Supportive 
of the police’s heightened powers under the emergency measures, an October 21 editorial chastised the 
public for not aiding the police more adequately in their manhunt by reporting the suspicious activity they 
had witnessed at the St. Hubert residence in which Laporte had been held and potentially killed. Far from 
criticizing police’s emergency powers under the WMA, the editorial argued that citizens possessed a 
greater responsibility in enabling and facilitating the police’s exhibition of such extraordinary powers.249  
     The newspaper also visibly sought to assuage any concerns regarding the status of civil liberties in 
Canada. Civil liberties had merely been “suspended, not cancelled,” the Telegraph-Journal assured its 
readers, and Canada would restore the full breadth of Canadian liberties “when the sedition is rooted 
out.”250 By its assessment, the WMA had possessed greater assurances and protections of civil liberties 
than any alternate courses of government action. The very fact that the WMA included “extraordinary 
powers, that everyone recognizes them as such, and that the whole nation awaits a return to normalcy” 
constituted solid evidence that the WMA had been a most effective and appropriate mechanism to use in 
this crisis. Certainly, it was superior to any amendment to the Criminal Code, since the WMA’s sweeping 
nature provided its infrequent invocation with a gravitas that a section of the Criminal Code would not 
possess. Indeed, the WMA was an instrument which no one thought should be “used lightly” or “kept in 
force one minute longer than need be.” Its extreme nature and shock-value thus ensured its limited usage 
and, ultimately, the protection of liberty, as opposed to a Criminal Code amendment that risked tempting 
authorities with its “permanently available shortcut to special powers.”251 In its assurances that authorities 
would restore civil liberties, depiction of the WMA as a warranted response to years of escalation, 
indications that accessions would only produce further terrorism, and characterization of existing laws as 
insufficient, the Telegraph-Journal framed itself as a firm advocate of the government’s stance. 
     The Guardian also demonstrated enduring support for the government’s “tough-on-terror” stance. The 
paper first addressed the governmental response in an October 13 editorial. Though not explicitly voicing 
its own position on the government’s courses of action, its reference to three other Canadian editorials 
suggested its support for the government’s refutation of the terrorists’ demands. Cited were a Montreal 
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paper’s argument that the potential for further abductions was a sufficient demonstration of why no level 
of government should accede to blackmail, and another editorial characterizing the FLQ as posing “a 
threat to the existence of every Canadian and to his constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness.” The 
paper concluded with reference to an Ontario newspaper’s position that further acts of terror would 
inevitably necessitate the introduction of “a police state” in which “peace will be enforced at the cost of 
considerable loss of public freedom and civil liberties.”252 The Guardian’s presentation of these editorials 
in support of the hard-line response to terror, without reference to any publications advocating for 
negotiations with the FLQ, suggests support for the government’s firm stance in the current crisis.   
     By its October 15 editorial, this slight ambiguity in the paper’s approach to the dilemma had faded in 
favour of a more explicit argument against approaching the terrorists with anything other than unyielding 
toughness. Recounting the recent political discourse, the editorial indicated that while Ontario premier 
John Robarts may have been “a little harsh” in advocating “total war” against the FLQ, he was “correct” 
in indicating it was now the time “to stand and fight.” At the very least, the government should “[s]tand 
and resist,” meet “force with force,” and not permit the “security of Canada” to “be bargained away on 
criminals’ terms” or allow the crisis to escalate with the group’s plotted destruction of the transportation 
infrastructure. “The time for firmness is now,” the Guardian concluded, if Canadians sought to forestall 
the dissemination of terror across the nation. Thus, “no Canadian” − and not, evidently, the Guardian − 
“will argue with the Prime Minister’s statement that it’s more important to keep law and order in society 
than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don’t like the looks of an army.”253 
     The paper continued to voice its support for and defence of the government’s actions. Its October 17 
editorial sought to reassure readers that Trudeau had indicated that he was implementing only those 
measures that the current crisis demanded, rather than “all of the powers in the act which gives the 
government the right to suspend basic civil liberties.” It seemed to justify the measures to maintain public 
faith in the government, noting that “in times of national crisis ordinary Canadians must have faith” that 
their democratically-elected leaders “have the ability to make prudent decisions.” The paper argued that 
the decision should elicit praise, for “it takes courage to make a decision which could seriously affect the 
political futures of both Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Bourassa.”254 Continuing to emphasize the courage of the 
government’s response, the Guardian deemed the results of the House of Commons’ overwhelming vote 
on October 19 in favour of the WMA as “reassuring” because it signalled that Canada would never permit 
violence and terror to replace the ballot box as the means by which to effect change.255 Although, like the 
Evening Telegram, the Guardian was limited in the degree to which it vocalized its stance upon the 
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government’s response to the FLQ crisis, the editorial team defended its reaction. It did so on the basis of 
the need to prevent the crisis’ further escalation, have faith in the government, and recognize the 
government’s courage in its handling of the crisis. 
     The Chronicle-Herald also initially announced its support of the government’s stern reproach of terror. 
Like the other Atlantic Canadian papers, which had witnessed the transition from a framing of a 
governmental “dilemma” to a proclaimed support of the government’s law-and-order opposition to the 
terrorists following Laporte’s kidnapping, that abduction similarly appeared to mark a turning point in the 
Chronicle-Herald’s approach to the crisis. While its October 7 editorial spoke only of the dilemma which 
the Canadian and Quebec governments now faced in their decision whether to negotiate for the release of 
Cross, its editorial resumption of the discussion one week later reflected its support for a tough stance 
against the FLQ. Given that it was not merely the “lives of two innocent and worthy men” that were at 
stake, but rather the broader “security of constitutional democracy” in Quebec and Canada, “the security 
of the province of Quebec and the realm of Canada cannot be bargained away on the kidnappers’ terms.” 
Thus, although the paper advocated that every available effort should be made to persuade the FLQ to 
spare the lives of their hostages, the Nova Scotian publication affirmed that it was imperative that the 
government remain determined “that a clique of revolutionaries shall not blackmail their way into power 
in this country.”256 When the government invoked the WMA, the editors noted that “[o]nly a very grave 
situation within Quebec and Canada could justify” such extreme measures with their limitations on 
Canadian freedoms. In that respect, the proclamation had been clearly justifiable. The “abominable 
kidnappings,” repeated threats to the hostages’ lives, “open defiance of constitutional authority,” and 
“uncertainties and dangers of trying to deal with different cells of a violent revolutionary movement” had 
all served to generate “a situation which is clearly grave and probably was deteriorating.”257 
     Laporte’s murder cemented and firmed the Chronicle-Herald’s defence of the government’s response 
to the crisis and the necessity of taking a hard line. The politicians, coupled with the police and armed 
forces personnel to represent constitutional authority, were enacting and utilizing laws with the objective 
to protect the Canadian population from the “persons bent, at any cost, on the destruction of our chosen 
type of [democratic] society, and its substitution by an alien dictatorship.”258 Another editorial, sharing 
the Guardian’s stance, praised Trudeau’s capacity to make the “difficult decisions” to approach the FLQ 
with a tough line. In his defiance of the FLQ’s efforts to compel Canada to abide by its terms, Trudeau 
“may have struck a blow not only against “apprehended insurrection” in Canada, but against international 
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acts of piracy and assassination.”259 Reiterating the Guardian’s call for faith in the government, an 
October 20 editorial refuted the “extreme critics” who were portending that the WMA had transformed 
Canada into a “military dictatorship,” recommending that citizens “should have faith that those who carry 
out this legislation will do so with good sense.”260 On October 22, another editorial characterized the 
WMA as the government’s well-supported effort “to protect the fundamental freedoms on which 
democracy and good government are based,” and found it “encouraging” how the nation’s “silent 
majority” had expressed its unity with the government’s approach to the crisis.261 Even as the paper’s 
stance upon the government’s conduct appeared to later sour (as discussed below), it continued to laud 
elements of the government’s response. It classified the WMA’s prohibition of the publication of FLQ 
objectives and communiqués as “sensible” and the product of “the sufficient reason that this organization 
is bent on the violent, even murderous overthrow of constitutional government.”262 In its depiction of the 
government’s hard-line response as necessary to protect national security, portrayal of the crisis as 
sufficiently grave to warrant the WMA, pleas for the citizenry to have faith in the government, and 
lauding of Trudeau’s response to the crisis, the Chronicle-Herald had initially framed the governmental 
response as appropriate.  
     A handful of more broadly-shared framings emerged in the newspapers’ varied defences of the federal 
government. Indeed, some editorials criticized the government for not having implemented a hard-line 
response quickly enough. An October 17 editorial in the Telegraph-Journal chastised that many 
Canadians had perceived that their nation had been patient for “too long:” 
She [Canada] sat still while terrorists planted bombs in mail boxes and office buildings, 
raided armories and banks, looted dynamite stores ... She was grimly restrained when 
anarchists inflamed the radical fringe of students into campus riots and destructive orgies 
... She put up with demonstrations, insults and pelting of public personalities right up to 
the prime minister with bottles and rotted vegetables ... She braced and waited when 
Montreal police went on strike ... She watched calmly while a party dedicated to breaking 
up the country tried to use the country’s democratic elections to take Quebec out of 
Confederation - tried and failed ... And then, as predicted, the revolutionaries who hoped 
to seize control of the separatist Parti Québécois if it was elected took the next step into 
open insurrection and threats of even greater violence.263 
 
The WMA’s invocation was not only a response to the abductions of Cross and Laporte, but an overdue 
reaction “to years of mounting provocation until all the forces of law and order were challenged by 
criminals whose aim is utter destruction of the nation.”264 The Guardian made a similar argument when it 
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editorialized that the FLQ was “a despicable minority who have unfortunately been appeased for too 
long.”265 Although more nuanced in their support, both editorials appeared to justify the government’s 
long-overdue sternness to terror. 
     Support for further firming of the government’s approach illustrated the newspapers’ support for a 
hard-line approach. Though not directly referencing the current crisis, the Guardian noted on October 15 
that Canadians were inundated daily with news reports of murders, sexual assaults, violent robberies, and 
kidnappings. The paper recommended a resumption of the justice system’s “old-fashioned” emphasis on 
punishment, and encouraged Justice Minister John Turner to consider elevating the minimum sentences 
for such offences, in order to deliver a stronger deterrent against violent crime.266 
     The PEI newspaper later became more explicit in its encouragement of a sterner reproach of terror. In 
an October 19 editorial, it lamented the days of capital punishment, implying that its abolition had 
contributed to Laporte’s assassination. Attesting that “this whole business” would serve to “make certain 
other people take a longer look at what has happened as a result of their actions of the past,” namely the 
eradication of capital punishment, the paper indicated that the possibility of “going to the scaffold” posed 
a far more significant deterrent to murder than “the few years he would have to spend in penitentiary.” 
For some, “the delight and satisfaction of murder would far outweigh” a prison sentence, and thus, when 
“fear of punishment” had likely possessed greater deterring power than mere police activities, the 
Guardian recommended the resumption of capital punishment.267 The Evening Telegram adopted a 
similar stance in its October 19 editorial. As it suggested to those politicians considering the legislation 
which would supplant the WMA, such measures “might well reconsider amending the law passed in 
November, 1967” which had restricted capital punishment to those convicted of murdering prison guards 
or policemen. As the paper described, it was an “irony,” and seemingly unjust, “that the slayers of Mr. 
Laporte and the potential killers of any top figure in the state ... can only go to jail for such a crime.” The 
paper intoned that such a consideration was warranted “[i]f one can judge from opinion across the 
country,” suggesting that this support for the reinstitution of capital punishment, and the hardening further 
of the government’s hostility to terror, spread beyond these editorial staffs.268 
     In line with these overt expressions of approval for the government’s hard-line stance, other editorials 
indicated their support by criticizing the opposition’s stand or actions. The Guardian suggested that many 
individuals perceived the NDP and Conservative opposition to the WMA not as an expression of 
legitimate concerns but merely opportunism “to make “political hay” in their opposition” to Trudeau’s 
government, in the hopes of garnering more support from Quebec electors. The paper intoned that seemed 
																																																								
265 “Unity Prevails,” Guardian (Charlottetown, PEI), October 20, 1970. 
266 “Examine The Minimum,” Guardian (Charlottetown, PEI), October 15, 1970. 
267 “And Sudden Death,” Guardian (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970. 




particularly evident given that the opposition parties’ provincial counterparts had supported Trudeau’s 
response.269 The murder of Laporte, in particular, discredited the oppositions’ denouncement of the WMA 
for editors in Atlantic Canada. Recounting T. C. Douglas’ likening of the implementation of the 
emergency measures as using “a sledgehammer to crack a peanut,” the Guardian concluded its October 
19 editorial with the harrumph: “Some peanut.”270 The Telegraph-Journal similarly likened those who 
refused to believe Bourassa’s defence of the WMA to those “convinced to this day that Hitler is alive in 
South America, or that the massive Warren Report on President Kennedy’s assassination is a vast 
conspiracy of concealment of the “real facts.” Such opponents, the paper suggested, sought to wield the 
measures as a “handy club” against the federal and Quebec governments.271  
     A handful of editorials similarly conveyed their defence of the government through their refutations of 
condemnations of the apparent abrogation of civil liberties that its response entailed. On October 19, the 
Telegraph-Journal refuted suggestions that “we are now living in a police state” as the product of either a 
complete lack of awareness of “what is going on in Canada” or utter miscomprehension of “what a police 
state is.” A police state, the editorial argued, entailed the police’s possession of complete power and their 
deployment of that power “at their own discretion or at the direction of a dictator.” This clearly did not 
apply to Canada when Parliament and the Legislatures remained and the military and police continued to 
operate at the discretion and under the direction of the civil authority.272 The October 20 issue of the 
Chronicle-Herald contained a dismissal of the “extreme critics” who sought to depict the emergency 
measures as having effected Canada’s dissolution into a “military dictatorship.”273 
     Even when the papers acknowledged concerns about civil liberties, they framed their suspension as 
being of no fault of the government. The Telegraph-Journal emphasized that the blame lie instead with 
the terrorists and anarchists,274 describing how the true endangerment to civil liberties derived not from 
the government, which sought to defend such liberties, but from “the revolutionaries who would destroy 
them permanently.” When emotions had settled, and calm and rational thought restored, “most people 
will surely see that terrorists and anarchists who would slaughter a man in cold blood would never 
surrender power once they had seized it,” unlike the elected governments.275 Considered in conjunction 
with the editors’ defence of the decision to utilize the armed forces, depiction of the government’s stance 
as overdue and of insufficient firmness, and the papers’ justifications of the WMA, the Eastern Canadian 
editorials offered a sweeping and dominant defence of the government’s response to the October Crisis. 
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Framing the governmental response as ineffectual and inappropriate 
    Two editorials in these newspapers indicated a concern and wariness respecting the WMA’s enabling 
of civil liberties violations, anticipating the debate that now dominates the historiography. In an October 
17 editorial, the Chronicle-Herald cautioned that the government bore an obligation to forestall the anti-
FLQ efforts from ballooning “into a witchhunt against political non-conformists” or attempts “to restrict, 
unnecessarily, freedom of the press.”276 The Evening Telegram warned on October 29 that the WMA had 
been producing an inflammatory effect in other regions, as its “sweeping powers” had encouraged “some 
forms of misuse [and] even repression,” particularly in British Columbia.277 
     These two editorials were the only examples among the Atlantic Canadian publications of civil rights 
concerns. Nevertheless, the editors of these two publications expressed doubts about the effectiveness of 
the WMA as a means to attack a terrorist organization. The Evening Telegram, in its same October 29 
editorial, observed that the additional powers granted to the police under the WMA had neither 
demonstrably aided the police in locating Cross nor salvaged Laporte’s life. If anything, the measures 
“may have hastened his murder.”278 While not overtly condemning the implementation of the WMA, the 
Chronicle-Herald expressed a similar concern, regarding the lack of substantive or clear progress in the 
police’s efforts to quell the terrorism. Despite their “special powers” and the fact that the army had 
“relieved [them] of major security duties,” the police had not succeeded in apprehending the kidnappers. 
Although recognizing that the “unwillingness of informants to come forward” may have been partly 
responsible for this failure, the editorial team expressed doubt in the efficiency of the WMA, noting that 
perhaps the failure could be accredited to “the fact that the WMA is ineffective in these circumstances.”279  
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     A further element of this dissatisfaction with the governmental response and reaction was the 
mounting concern, particularly in the Evening Telegram, about the public’s urgent need for further 
information. Despite Canadians’ initial anticipation that officials would offer evidence of the FLQ’s plot 
to establish a “parallel government” within Quebec, Minister of Defence Donald Macdonald had 
acquiesced that no specific plot had been discovered. Rather, he had indicated that the theft of weapons 
had “justified the belief of an “apprehended insurrection” and the government needed “to nip it in the 
bud.” Combined with the surging rumours of a plan among Quebecois elite to replace the Quebec 
government with an FLQ-sympathetic “provisional government,” and the government’s refusal to 
comment, the paper indicated on October 29 that such developments were “doing some damage to the 
government’s credibility and provoking a more insistent call for the speedy withdrawal of the WMA.”280 
     In all, three editorials in the Chronicle-Herald and Evening Telegram questioned the adequacy or 
suitability of the federal government’s response, whether in its disregard for civil liberties, the 
inefficiency of its emergency measures, or its failure to provide sufficient disclosure to the public of the 
extent of the crisis. That these editorials came at the end of October suggests that editorial opinion began 
to sour as the crisis wore on, given their strong initial support for the measures. That such concerns were 
raised in only three of the thirty-seven total editorials, compared with twenty-three editorials which 
supported the measures, indicates that the dominant media discourse regarding the FLQ crisis in Atlantic 
Canada was supportive of the government and its handling of the events. Furthermore, while the 
Chronicle-Herald and Evening Telegram voiced mild concerns about the WMA and the tight-lipped 
governmental approach, in no editorial − beyond the initial “dilemma” framework − did the Eastern 
Canadian papers demonstrate a support for any approach to the crisis other than a hard-line stance against 
terror. 
 
Framing Canadians as shocked, yet supportive of the government’s stance 
     According to the Eastern Canadian editorials, Canadians had been “shocked,”281 “shaken,”282 and 
“appalled”283 by the developments of October 1970, and left “reeling”284 from the startling and “stunning 
impact”285 of the abductions and murder. Yet the editors affirmed that the populace overwhelmingly 
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supported the government and WMA. Five editorials − one each from the Guardian, Chronicle-Herald, 
and Evening Telegram, and two from the Telegraph-Journal − expressed this view. According to the 
Guardian’s October 13 editorial, the federal and provincial governments’ refusal to accede to the 
terrorists’ demands was “drawing much support,” fuelled by “insistence that the government stand firm in 
the face of terror.”286 Six days later, the Telegraph-Journal concluded that “[m]ost Canadians obviously 
agree with the stand of the government” against a group which had cultivated “universal hatred.”287 The 
same paper expressed that Bourassa’s defence of the measures in response to the FLQ’s assassination 
plots would “convince most Canadians that extraordinary measures were required.”288 For the Evening 
Telegram, the murder of Laporte had bolstered Canadians’ “resolve to see this cancer cut from the body 
politic.”289 Similarly, the Chronicle-Herald spoke of the government’s invocation of the WMA as having 
incurred “the overwhelming support of the population.”290 Thus, all editorials seeking to gauge the 
populace’s response to the implementation of the WMA concluded with a depiction of Canadians as 
wholeheartedly supportive of the government’s response. 
 
Framing the nation’s need for unity 
     Pleas for national unity emerged in Atlantic Canadian editorials respecting the crisis, raising questions 
whether those papers’ support for the WMA reflected a shared commitment to foster such unity. Three 
editorials (in the Evening Telegram, Chronicle-Herald, and Guardian) emphasized the need for national 
unity in the crisis’ wake. The Chronicle-Herald pled for Canadians to accord “some positive meaning” to 
Laporte’s murder by uniting “into a new sense of nationhood and interdependence,” and in recognition 
that the nation’s democratic system, as the chosen system in Canada, must “be nurtured and protected.”291 
As the “Canadian family” endured the FLQ’s test of Laporte’s murder, the Evening Telegram expressed 
hope that it would foster “a more united and determined people, committed to preserving Confederation 
and the way of life for which he died.”292 On the basis of the House of Commons’ sweeping vote in 
favour of the WMA, the Guardian praised that “Pierre Laporte has not died in vain,” with his death 
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Framing terrorism as a construct and phenomenon foreign and alien to Canada 
     It may strike the contemporary reader as curious that the newspapers voiced such shock at the 
abductions in October 1970 when the FLQ had been conducting its well-publicized program of terror 
since 1963.294 Despite Quebec and Canada’s pre-existing acquaintanceship with the FLQ, it appears from 
the editorials that the Atlantic Coast publications had continued to perceive terrorism as a construct 
foreign and alien to Canada. Saint John’s Telegraph-Journal, for instance, emphasized that Cross’ 
abduction represented an act of terror “unprecedented in the Commonwealth, ... a sort of thing most 
people always thought of as belonging to distant countries where revolutions were the rule rather than the 
exception.” 295  Similarly, the Chronicle-Herald conceded on October 7 that while such political 
abductions for ransom could happen “in Bolivia, Brazil or Argentina, perhaps, and certainly in the Middle 
East,” the prospect of such a travesty occurring in Canada could only be met with the outraged 
presumption, “Surely not!”296 An October 13 editorial in the Evening Telegram also emphasized this 
international element, noting that the abductions of recent days had dispelled any illusions that Canada 
was exempt from “‘the dreadful things’ associated with other lands.”297 Editorials described a Montreal in 
which an unprecedented number of soldiers and policemen patrolled its streets, in quantities “[n]ever 
[seen] in history.”298 Referring to Laporte’s murder as “only the second political assassination in Canada” 
since Confederation, the Evening Telegram conformed with the newspapers’ broader tendency to 
construct terrorism as a plague foreign to the Canadian experience to which the nation had unfortunately 
not been “immune.”299 Thus, the editorials reflected upon the FLQ terrorism as a phenomenon wholly 
unexpected in the Canadian context. 
     In addition to framing terrorism as an international phenomenon foreign to the Canadian experience, 
the newspapers exhibited a clear propensity to privilege examinations into the FLQ’s connections with 
and inspiration from international revolutionary movements and ideologies. Several editorials, for 
instance, emphasized the presumed integral role of international terrorist conspiracies in inspiring the 
shroud of violence which had descended upon Quebec. For the Telegraph-Journal, the FLQ had certainly 
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been “agitated anew by the wave of political kidnappings in Central and South America, and by the 
success of some groups in compelling governments to meet their demands.” Consequently, the FLQ had 
derived great encouragement “from the specular airliner hijackings and the drama of the Jordan desert, 
and by the fact that great nations finally capitulated and freed Palestinian commandos.”300 The Evening 
Telegram specifically identified Cross’ abduction as indicative of a bubbling “home-grown terror,” yet 
still referenced the recent discovery of young French-Canadians receiving training in terror from the 
Palestinian guerrillas in the Middle East.301 The Chronicle-Herald similarly framed the FLQ as a group 
with “undoubted Communist leanings, and probably international Communist financial backing.”302 
     Other editorials sought to contextualize and frame the FLQ more broadly within an international 
malaise of revolution and unrest. The Chronicle-Herald identified the group as constituting “a part” of the 
international wave of assassinations and air piracy,303 while the Telegraph-Journal framed such terrorism 
and savagery as “a disease that can spread” as extremists recognized the success of their counterparts’ 
tactics and adopted them for their own usage.304 On October 19, while reaffirming the shock with which 
Canadians had been observing the developments in Quebec, the Evening Telegram emphasized that the 
crisis was symptomatic of an international affliction. Although noting that “[i]t has long been recognized 
that there is a plague of lawlessness, violence and insurrection all around the world,” the editorial 
indicated that the surging extremism was a shock in the “pleasant, moderate, peaceable” Canada.305 Thus, 
in addition to having received inspiration from international terrorist causes, groups, and activities, 
several Atlantic Coast editorials also framed the eruption of unrest and violence in Quebec as a 
component or offshoot of such broader international waves of revolution and insurrection. 
     Appearing in a remarkable ten editorials − three in the Telegraph-Journal, three in the Chronicle-
Herald, and four in the Evening Telegram − this description of the FLQ’s terrorism as international and 
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foreign to the Canadian experience resembled the alien conspiracy theory that prevailed among the same 
period’s perceptions of the American mafia. Criminologist Dwight C. Smith Jr. reviewed that American 
comprehensions of, and thus public policy regarding, the mafia since the late 19th century had revolved 
around “a recurring apprehension that somewhere ‘out there’ is an organized, secret, alien group that is 
poised to infiltrate our society and to undermine our fundamental democratic beliefs.”306 In discussions of 
the mafia, this generally involved framing such organized criminals as bearing their roots in Sicily and 
elsewhere in Italy and, from there, seeking to extend their activities into the United States.307 The framing 
of the FLQ is reminiscent of this alien conspiracy theory, in its emphasis on terrorism as foreign and a 
shock to Canada, and its depiction of the FLQ as inspired by and possessing vast connections to 
international revolutionary ideologies and groups. The aforementioned framing of the FLQ as a “cancer” 
or “illness” to which Canada was not “immune” also reflects such a standpoint by depicting terrorism as a 
foreign substance or entity which had invaded and was corrupting the hitherto innocent Canadian nation. 
 
Framing the October Crisis as the result of internal systemic factors 
     Few Eastern Canadian editorials devoted any considerable effort to examining or delving into the root 
causes which had contributed to the development of the current crisis and the FLQ’s proclaimed 
grievances. Compared to the ten editorials which discussed the international inspiration, connections, and 
origins of the FLQ terrorism, a mere three − one in the Evening Telegram and two in the Chronicle-
Herald − sought to identify and interrogate the internal factors which had contributed to the rise of the 
violent separatist faction. For the Evening Telegram, the initial victimization of a British official revealed 
“the incident for what it is, a horrifying emphasis on the Anglo-French divisions in the nation and on the 
strong aspirations for a Quebec libre,” and thus a clear targeted boiling of “home-grown terror.”308 The 
Chronicle-Herald commented that “[i]t may well be that the separatist extremists see an economically 
depressed Quebec, with high unemployment and vacated factories, as fruitful ground for their own 
assumption of power,” but did not expand upon the root causes beyond this slight recognition.309 A later 
editorial in the Nova Scotian publication accorded responsibility for the crisis not to any particular 
socioeconomic condition in Quebec, but rather the broader Canadian permissiveness. On October 22, its 
editorial on the matter argued that all Canadians were partially and “unwittingly” responsible for the 
crisis. According to the newspaper, the populace had been imperilling democratic governments and 
freedoms “[t]hrough apathy, laziness, indifference, complacency, a tendency to downgrade democracy 
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and ridicule politicians, ... and an excessive tolerance of destructive and violent dissent.”310 These brief 
references to the crisis’ roots in internal tensions, the Quebec economy, and the Canadian attitude 
constituted the only editorial efforts, in any of Eastern Canada’s most widely circulated English-language 
publications, to explore the crisis as resulting from internal deficiencies or dissent. This lack of prolonged 
or widespread attention to assessing the internal sources of the FLQ’s discontent promoted the further 
framing of the October Crisis as an alien conspiracy. 
 
Framing the FLQ as not reflective of Quebeckers more broadly 
     In a similar vein, several editorials in the Eastern Canadian newspapers took great pains to 
differentiate the FLQ from Quebeckers, thus marginalizing and “othering” the terrorists.311 The Evening 
Telegram cautioned against imagining the FLQ as being representative or reflective of the Quebec 
separatist movement, expressing that the terrorist group’s new tactics “will be flatly condemned by even 
the most ardent Quebec separatists” who relied upon democratic means and the ballot-box as means to 
effect change.312 The Chronicle-Herald also suggested that the terrorism would “repel” innumerable 
separatists of a more moderate stripe,313 and the Guardian sought to distance the FLQ from the remainder 
of Quebec and Canada through its depictions of the group as a “few mad dogs” and “a despicable 
minority.”314 Another editorial cautioned against permitting the crisis to evolve into greater intergroup 
tensions, with the paper expressing anxiety that the backlash against the FLQ would mushroom “into an 
English-Canadian condemnation of all French-Canadians or all Quebec” and noting that the government 
bore the responsibility to forestall the battle against the FLQ from devolving into such more generalized 
racial tensions.315 Again, this framing of the crisis as the actions and convictions of a small minority of 
Quebeckers promoted the image of the crisis as remote and restricted. This is an intriguing observation 
given that it suggests that the editorial discourse upon the October Crisis was predominantly episodic as 
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opposed to thematic, focusing specifically upon the current crisis with little protracted attention to 
situating the crisis’ emergence within the broader socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions.316 
 
Framing the nation’s next steps beyond the shock and grief of October 1970 
     Atlantic newspapers offered few suggestions about how Canada should move forward, beyond the 
crushing of the FLQ and prospective resumption of capital punishment. Only three editorials offered any 
indication of how the nation should proceed after the abductors and murderers were apprehended and 
prosecuted. Although the Evening Telegram recognized the necessity of “wiping out the causes, real or 
fancied, that pollute and distort the minds of men” and which had allowed “such a callous disregard for 
human life” to take root, it did not examine those causes or recommend how they should be addressed.317 
The Telegraph-Journal argued only for the consideration among the United Nations General Assembly of 
the proposal of a pledge among all members “not to receive and harbor kidnappers who arrive within their 
borders; and further, to arrest and bring them to trial.”318 The Chronicle-Herald simply chastised the 
government’s opposition for devoting themselves to interrogating the government for its response to the 
crisis as opposed to aiding in the search for remedies to the unnamed issues facing Quebec and Canada.319 
 
In summary 
     The four Atlantic Canadian papers were unanimous in framing the FLQ in condemnatory and 
unsympathetic terms, applying the descriptors of terrorists, extremists, fanatics, and violent and savage 
murderers and bandits, while constructing the image of a dangerous foe which, like a cancer, required 
prompt excision from the national body. The group posed a direct and significant challenge to Canadian 
democratic institutions and society, intending to push the nation to insurrection and its ultimate 
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dismantling, and thus constituted a legitimate threat to the national order. In contrast to this image of the 
terrorist and brutal FLQ, the papers martyrized Laporte and emphasized the innocence and worthiness of 
the victims and suffering of the families, in a frame which heightened the wickedness and depravity of the 
FLQ. Perhaps encouraged by this villainization of the FLQ, the editorials framed the nation as steeped in 
anxiety regarding the crisis’ potential to escalate further. By documenting the increasing fears that the 
FLQ would provoke an economic downturn and broad-scale civil war and insurrection, and commit 
further abductions, selective assassinations, air hijackings, the hostages’ murder, and attacks against 
national transport systems, the papers presented the FLQ as a viable threat to the nation’s survival. 
     In framing the governmental response to the developments of October 1970, the Atlantic Canadian 
newspapers evinced a tendency early in the month to acknowledge the positive and negative aspects of 
both of the Trudeau government’s courses of action − negotiating with the terrorists or refusing to accede 
to their demands. In weighing the impossibility of the FLQ’s demands and the potential for concessions to 
encourage further violence, against the government’s obligation to its diplomatic personnel and the threat 
to the victim’s lives, the papers thus depicted the government as facing a dilemma. However, once the 
federal government called the army into Ottawa and Quebec in an aid to the civil power capacity and 
proclaimed the WMA, twenty-three of the twenty-six editorials that assumed a stance on the crisis aligned 
themselves in support of the government’s response. The papers defended the decision to deploy the 
armed forces, depicted the government’s hard-line reaction as overdue and insufficiently firm, and 
dismissed the political opposition and claims that the measures had transformed Canada into a police state 
or military dictatorship. In so doing, and through various justifications of the WMA, these editorials 
framed the government’s assumption of a firm opposition to terror and the invocation of the WMA as 
defensible and appropriate. Two editorials expressed a concern respecting the WMA’s potential to enable 
the abrogation of civil liberties, two raised doubts about the WMA’s effectiveness in saving the hostages, 
and one contested the government’s failure to provide the public with sufficient details of the extent of the 
crisis. That such concerns respecting the WMA appeared in merely three editorials in Atlantic Canada, 
divided between two papers, suggested a souring of opinion towards the WMA in the final week of 
October − but gave no indication of deviation from or disapproval of the newspapers’ broader tough-on-
terror stance. This finding of broad Eastern Canadian editorial approval of the government’s hard-line 
stance and invocation of the WMA supports the conclusions of Cohen-Almagor, Siegel, and Hewitt. 
     Other framings appeared in the Atlantic Canadian editorials that sought to contextualize the crisis both 
internally and internationally. Five editorials, representative of all four newspapers, framed the Canadian 
populace as supportive of the government’s invocation of the WMA and its refusal to accede to the FLQ, 
even as several framed the nation as shocked by the abductions. Three expressed the urgent necessity of 




English-Canadian newspapers tended to emphasize this theme. Many editorials treated terrorism as a 
construct foreign or alien to Canada (confirming Siegel’s similar conclusion). Indeed, ten editorials in the 
Telegraph-Journal, Chronicle-Herald, and Evening Telegram emphasized the FLQ’s apparent 
international inspirations and connections, framing the crisis as an extension or outgrowth of the 
international waves of insurgency and revolutionary fervour. By comparison, few editorials discussed the 
internal roots of the FLQ’s dissent and grievances, instead treating the FLQ as a minority group far 
divorced from the Quebec mainstream. Consequently, the Eastern Canadian editorials appear to have 
framed the FLQ crisis as a product of an alien conspiracy and ideology that had invaded an innocent 
Canadian nation with the intent to dismantle it. Thus, among the three classifications of editorials which 
van Dijk delineated, the Atlantic Canadian newspapers included few “Explanation” editorials seeking to 
“explain the situation” and conclude why it occurred. “Evaluation and Moral” editorials were also rare, 
with few recommendations regarding the government’s future steps beyond the prosecution of the 
abductors.320 Such a framing could, of course, not merely influence how Canadians themselves perceived 
of the crisis, its roots, and its most appropriate resolutions, but also how the Canadian and Quebec 
























CHAPTER III: WESTERN CANADIAN FRAMINGS OF THE OCTOBER CRISIS 
 
     Compared to the thirty-seven editorials that appeared in the Atlantic Canadian publications, Western 
Canada’s four leading English newspapers − the Regina Leader-Post, Vancouver Sun, Edmonton Journal, 
and Winnipeg Free Press − contained fifty-seven editorials. The timing of these editorials was similar to 
those of Eastern Canada, in that while some editorials responded immediately to Cross’ abduction, and 
Laporte’s abduction provoked further comment, the newspapers commented upon and interpreted the 
developments persistently only after Ottawa invoked the WMA and Laporte was killed. In this regard, the 
Winnipeg Free Press constituted the outlier, with Laporte’s abduction seeming to spark the shift for its 
editors towards editorializing on the matter with regularity and consistency.321 
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“Disagrees with Trudeau: Choquette won’t identify 314 suspects in prisons,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), 
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     Cumulatively, the Western Canadian renditions of the October Crisis were highly comparable to the 
framings adopted in Eastern Canada. Portraying the FLQ in similarly condemning terms, emphasizing the 
terrorists’ threat to the Canadian nation, heightening their villainy contrasted to their victims’ innocence 
and honour, and affirming the group’s capacity to inflict further terror, the Western Canadian newspapers 
rendered the FLQ as a tenable and authentic threat. Although not devoting themselves as thoroughly to 
the “dilemma” framework so prominent in Eastern Canada, the Western Canadian editorials concurred 
with their Atlantic counterparts in broadly endorsing the government’s response and invocation of the 
WMA. More editorials voiced concerns regarding the WMA than in Eastern Canada, centring on civil 
liberties infringements, questions as to the WMA’s effectiveness, and the government’s problematic 
secrecy regarding the crisis, although this framing remained minimal compared to that defending the 
government’s measures. The Canadian populace emerged, again, as a body immensely supportive of the 
government’s handling of the crisis, even as it reeled in shock at the events, and that shock at terrorism’s 
inroads in Quebec was one factor demonstrating the papers’ “alien conspiracy” comprehension of the 
FLQ. Indeed, Western Canadian editorial staffs approached the terrorists with an “othering” focus similar 
to that appearing in Eastern Canada, distancing the FLQ from the Quebec mainstream and emphasizing 
the foreignness of the group’s tactics and ideology. With the notable exception of the Edmonton Journal, 
the Western Canadian papers devoted greater efforts to stressing this alien nature of the FLQ rather than 
seeking to explore its systemic grievances and origins of unrest. Overall, the Western Canadian editorials 
depicted the FLQ, WMA, and October Crisis in terms broadly analogous to those utilized in Eastern 
Canada, dominantly endorsing the government’s handling of the crisis while (with the exception of the 
Edmonton Journal) framing the crisis as more of an “alien conspiracy” than the product of internal 
systemic factors. 
 
Framing the FLQ - The descriptors used 
     In the crisis’ initial days, as the nation shuddered in horror at its affliction with political abductions, 
the Western Canadian editorials characterized the FLQ as “terrorists,”322 “criminals,”323 “extremists,”324 
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and the “lunatic”325 or “manic fringe of the separatist movement.”326 Cross’ abduction appeared as a 
“cruel”327 or “heinous crime,”328 an outrage,329 and a “brutal”330 and “repugnant” action fuelled only by 
“crazed aims.”331 For the Sun, the FLQ’s adoption of political abductions appeared demonstrative of the 
group’s capability and acumen. Such abductions were described as “diabolically ingenious,” particularly 
in their “selection of a representative of a foreign country as the pawn.” Such targets played upon the host 
government’s responsibility for the safety of foreign diplomats and representatives within its boundaries, 
thus producing internal and external pressure upon the government to comply with the ransom 
demands.332 Hence, the FLQ were not merely terrorists, extremists, and criminals, but cleverly devious 
and capable ones at that. 
     After Laporte’s abduction, depictions of the FLQ diversified but remained entrenched in their broader 
derogatory framing. The FLQ continued to appear as “terrorists”333 and “extremists,”334 as well as 
“brutish and unscrupulous men,” a “murderous fanatical minority,”335 “criminal racist fanatics,”336 and “a 
group of megalomaniacs engaged in acts of treason.” 337  The Edmonton Journal applauded Parti 
Québécois leader René Lévesque’s profile of the FLQ as “a type of sewer rat with which every society is 
afflicted” as an “apt description” of the organization.338 Condemning any effort to elevate the FLQ 
beyond its base identity of terrorists, the Leader-Post and Winnipeg Free Press described its imprisoned 
members not as “political prisoners” but “convicted dynamiters, bombers, bank robbers, and terrorists,”339 
and sheer criminals detained “because they broke the law.”340  The Sun, meanwhile, continued to 
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emphasize the FLQ’s capabilities in describing the group as “skilled, and obviously well dug-in,”341 even 
as the papers identified the abductions as “horrifying”342 “outrages”343 and “one of the most despicable of 
crimes.”344  
     Laporte’s murder cemented these constructions of the FLQ’s immorality and viciousness. While still 
termed “terrorists,”345 extremists,346 and “fanatics,”347 the papers now framed the group as “assassins,”348 
“traitors,”349 “anarchists,”350 “grisly extortionists,”351 and representative of the “sinister underground.”352 
The descriptors of “madmen”353 and “maniacs”354 implied a group beyond control, and whose escalation 
was tied to a psychological root. Their “fiendishly cruel,”355 “demented,” “inhuman,”356 and “cold-
blooded”357 actions had inspired fear. The same editorials condemned Laporte’s death as a “senseless,”358 
“ghastly and barbaric act,”359 and indicative of “revolutionary violence”360 and “tragic lawlessness in 
Quebec.”361 
     Beyond this, the Edmonton Journal adopted a combative understanding of the crisis, describing the 
country as “at war” with the terrorist faction.362 Similar to editorials in Atlantic Canada, Western 
Canadian treatments used medical terms to construct the FLQ as a disease or illness. The Leader-Post 
termed the group “a cancer in our society” demanding elimination,363 while the Free Press classified the 
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FLQ as an outgrowth of “[t]he disease of separatism”364 and spoke of a nation succumbing to the 
“contagions of the world.”365 This conceptualization of the FLQ as a cancerous affliction, as terrorists, 
extremists, fanatics, and a savage and inhuman foe, aligns with the group’s depictions in Atlantic Canada. 
The emphasis upon the group’s violence, destruction, and cruelty, combined with the Sun’s depiction of 
the group’s intelligence and skill, constructed a framing of the FLQ as a formidable adversary. 
 
Framing the FLQ as an affront and challenge to Canadian society and democracy 
    Exacerbating the FLQ’s potential to inflict substantial damage and violence was its intent, according to 
the Western Canadian papers, to dismantle the nation’s democratic system and, indeed, its entire societal 
and political structure. The FLQ sought to challenge and demolish the Canadian democratic governmental 
system. Adopting the language of United Church of Canada moderator Dr. Robert McClure, the Sun 
described the FLQ as seeking to “dislocate the whole machine of government.”366 The Free Press 
emphasized that the FLQ considered itself “at war with Canada and with the Quebec government,” 
resolving “to weaken government by intimidating and mocking it; to destroy Canada.”367 Through their 
demands for the release of convicted criminals, the Leader-Post proclaimed that the FLQ sought the 
subversion of “the political and judicial processes of a democratic nation.”368 For the Sun, Laporte’s 
assassination was indicative of the FLQ’s “repudiation” of and intent to eradicate the democratic ideals 
that Laporte symbolized.369 In its place, the Edmonton Journal observed that the group intended to 
establish their own regime, warning that “[m]en who gain power by terror will rule by terror.”370 As such, 
the Edmonton Journal conceived of a group which “threatens the total nation” by seeking to establish a 
rule devoid of all humanity or mercy.371 
     The FLQ not only imperilled Canada’s governmental institutions, but the very existence of an 
integrated Canadian nation. The Sun described the FLQ as seeking to unravel “our ... national fabric,”372 
and launching an attack upon “our beliefs and institutions.”373 The group had thus incited “a time of 
national peril”374 in which “the safety of the nation is at stake” due to the emergence of an organization 
seeking to establish itself as a “parallel power”375 and assault “the Canadian entity.”376 Readers of the 
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Edmonton Journal learned of the FLQ’s intent “to destroy our society and our nation,”377 and the paper’s 
comparison of the crisis to the Second World War in terms of its significance to the nation’s future.378 The 
Winnipeg Free Press similarly warned that the FLQ posed a threat to the entirety of “Canadian 
society,”379 which it sought to destroy380 by fraying national allegiances and pitting citizens against each 
other.381 In framing the FLQ as a menace to the nation’s political institutions, and the Canadian entity and 
society more broadly, Western Canadian editors framed the FLQ in terms comparable to the Eastern 
Canadian editorials. 
 
Framing the victims as innocent martyrs 
     Also reflective of the Eastern Canadian editorials, the four Western Canadian publications editorially 
framed Cross and Laporte in terms emphasizing their innocence and commendable natures. The Sun 
described Cross as an “innocent bystander” 382  and Cross and Laporte as “innocent men.” 383  The 
Edmonton Journal similarly reflected solemnly upon the targeting of such “innocent victims.”384 The 
editorials also emphasized the hostages’ value as individuals and officials, particularly with respect to 
Laporte. The Winnipeg Free Press mourned the loss of “a distinguished French-Canadian federalist,”385 
while the Edmonton Journal lamented Laporte’s death as the first casualty in the war with the FLQ, 
classifying him as “[a] fine journalist and parliamentarian” who had been “killed senselessly and brutally 
to a useless purpose.”386 Meanwhile, the Sun described him as having been “chosen by terrorists as the 
surrogate victim for us all,” whose life was thus “symbolic of the democratic decencies and his murder by 
madmen as a token of repudiation of those ideals.”387 In doing so, the Sun showed the same tendency to 
martyrize Laporte as Eastern Canadian editorials. Thus, although devising a narrative frame for the 
hostages was clearly not a priority among the Western Canadian papers, those editorials which did 
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Framing the government as facing a dilemma 
     Similar to five editorials in Eastern Canada, the concern for Cross and Laporte contributed to an initial 
conceptualization within four Western Canadian editorials of the government as facing a dilemma in its 
decision whether to capitulate to the terrorist demands. The Edmonton Journal, in its first editorial on the 
abductions, evinced such a frame. Capitulating to terrorist blackmail would be “loathsome,” for once the 
government established the precedent and “the FLQ terrorists have tasted success, there’s no telling 
where it will end.” More abductions, threats, and demands would occur, motivating other groups to adopt 
the techniques. “It would be anarchy,” the Journal concluded, and “intolerable.” There was “a human life 
at stake,” and not acceding to the terrorists’ demands could produce Cross’ death, an “agonizing” 
outcome humanitarianly and for how it would hamper international relations by signalling to foreign 
governments “that we can’t guarantee the safety of their representatives while in Canada.” Accordingly, 
the government’s decision was an “agonizing choice.”388 
     The other three Western Canadian papers also initially characterized the government as embroiled in a 
dilemma,389 with the Leader-Post indicating that only those individuals “closest to the action can say what 
should be done.”390 Such classifications of the “dilemma” were followed with arguments advocating a 
hard-line stance. As such, the British Columbian, Manitoban, and Saskatchewan papers viewed the crisis 
as a dilemma nominally rather than practically. With the exception of the Edmonton Journal, which 
objectively delineated both alternatives available to authorities, the Western Canadian papers did not 
adopt the “dilemma” framing with comparable frequency and depth as Eastern Canadian editors. 
 
Framing a nation in fear of further escalation 
      As the Edmonton Journal described, part of the government’s dilemma arose from concerns that the 
FLQ’s terrorist program would escalate to more frequent and more destructive attacks against democracy, 
the nation, and its citizenry. Western Canadian editors shared this anxiety regarding the crisis’ potential to 
deteriorate further and for further abductions. The Sun, like the Telegraph-Journal, worried that, if the 
FLQ terrorists were allowed to proliferate, further abductions could be “expect[ed]” and even “the 
“selective assassination” of prominent Canadian politicians.”391  Since previous abductions in Latin 
America and Jordan had “led to actual murder, as a means of coercing governments,” the Winnipeg Free 
Press indicated that the prospect of political murder constituted “a new danger to society.”392 Together 
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with the threat of additional abductions, these concerns for the safety of prominent figures provoked the 
Winnipeg Free Press to insist on the need for “more adequate safeguards for diplomatic personnel” in 
Canada,393 and the Leader-Post to urge “the utmost protection” of diplomats and politicians in Canada.394 
The Sun painted Canadians “everywhere” as “in fear for themselves or their families,”395 intimating a 
broader panic about how far the crisis might devolve. 
     Other editorials centred on concern for the hostages’ well-being. On October 14, the Leader-Post 
observed a “tension and great anxiety about the fate of the two men.”396 Following Laporte’s murder, this 
concern refocused on the mounting consternation over whether Cross would meet a similar fate, with the 
Sun similarly noting on October 27 that “hope wanes for the safety of James Cross.”397  
     Beyond these specific threats of abductions, assassinations, and murder, several editorials mirrored a 
general anxiety regarding the extent to which the FLQ’s activities could intensify. The Winnipeg Free 
Press ominously characterized the abductions as instigating a “new wave of terrorism”398 and potentially 
a new “pattern of political violence,”399  much like how the Evening Telegram had described the 
abductions as representing a new trend in the FLQ’s tactics. For some papers, these broader concerns 
centered on how the crisis would affect the nation more generally. For instance, the Edmonton Journal’s 
concerns focused on the “untold damage” and defacement that the FLQ’s conduct would bring upon the 
Quebec and Canadian image as a society and land premised upon law and order. Expressing unease 
regarding how the crisis would surely deter immigration to and investment in Quebec,400 the paper 
foretold that not only were Cross and Laporte’s lives at stake, but the nation’s “dignity and honor.”401 
Thus, like the Atlantic Canadian editorials, the Western Canadian papers expressed apprehension about 
how the crisis could intensify in scope and destructiveness, emphasizing many of the same fears about the 
potential for further abductions, assassinations, new waves of terrorism, and blows to the Canadian 
reputation and economy. 
 
Framing the government’s hard-line response as the most appropriate course of action 
     Having recognized the crisis’ potential to deepen, the Leader-Post, Edmonton Journal, Sun, and Free 
Press presented the government’s stance against the FLQ through predominantly positive frames. Of the 
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forty-two editorials assuming an attitudinal stance on the government’s response, thirty-three positively 
assessed the government’s posture. This pro-government framing of the crisis was, statistically, the 
dominant perspective throughout October. Two of the four Leader-Post editorials favoured the 
government (with both those critical of the measures only voicing discontent regarding the government’s 
secrecy rather than the WMA itself). Seven of the eight Edmonton Journal editorials adopted a similar 
stance on the crisis, as did eight of the fourteen Sun editorials, and sixteen of the eighteen Free Press 
editorials. The dominant framing within Western Canadian papers constructed the government’s tough-
on-terror stance as the appropriate response to a crisis seemingly dwindling from control. 
     Unlike in Eastern Canada, the government’s decision to deploy the Armed Forces to aid the civil 
power did not elicit any substantial or concerted assessment in the Western Canadian editorials. The only 
reference to the military’s deployment in the crisis appeared in two Winnipeg Free Press editorials. 
Describing how the crisis had compelled the Department of National Defence to rethink its plans to 
downsize the military, the Free Press recommended that it consider strengthening the militia to “take over 
at least some of the duties now being shouldered by regular troops” in an emergency. “There will be other 
crises” which necessitated defence forces, the editorial intoned, along with “our commitments to our 
friends and allies.” Accordingly, the editorial recommended increasing the strength of Canada’s reserve 
forces so that the country could address internal homefront crises.402 The Winnipeg Free Press reiterated 
its support for deploying the Canadian forces in an aid to the civil power role in its October 27 editorial, 
praising the Defence minister’s wise decision to reconsider military cuts in light of the crisis. Indicating 
that Canadians must be prepared for a future terrorist emergency, the paper’s lauding of this 
reassessment403 indicated its support for a militaristic stance against terror. 
     The Regina Leader-Post contained the fewest editorials in Western Canada endorsing the 
government’s stance in the crisis. Its first effort to come to grips with assessing the most appropriate 
response to the FLQ was in its October 14 editorial. While not expressly voicing support for the 
government’s tough stance, the paper clearly implied its disapproval of any capitulation to the FLQ by 
characterizing the group’s blackmail as requiring that “political and judicial processes ... be subverted and 
smashed by officials sworn to uphold them.”404 On October 21, the Leader-Post made its defence of the 
hard line more explicit. It did so through a two-pronged approach: framing the government as having had 
no alternative but to respond sternly to the FLQ, and framing the WMA as the only legislation available 
to do so. The paper described the government as having been “forced to invoke” the WMA, due to the 
severity of the FLQ’s activities and threat. By the Leader-Post’s assessment, the WMA had been justified 
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to address the crisis with requisite haste, given the “over-riding concern” that the perpetrators be urgently 
“brought to justice” and the FLQ “uprooted.”405 Hence, the Leader-Post situated itself in defence of the 
government and WMA, dismissing negotiations with the FLQ because these would repudiate the 
democratic processes, and framing the hard line and WMA as the only options available to the 
government. 
     The Edmonton Journal likewise positioned itself among the government’s supporters, publishing 
seven editorials justifying its measures. Following its initial expression of the government as facing a 
dilemma on October 7, its October 14 editorial firmed its support for a hard line against the FLQ, 
assuming a definitive stance opposed to any capitulations. While these two lives were “important,” and 
demanded “[a]ll reasonable efforts” to effect their return, the paper cautioned against serious accessions. 
Not only were the editors uncertain that capitulations would save the hostages, but any submission would 
promote the FLQ’s resumption of such tactics with “more outrageous demands,” signalling the nation’s 
descent towards anarchy and the FLQ’s “rule by terror.” The Journal exhorted Canadians to aid in the 
defeat of the terrorists by supporting “their governments in a firm refusal to surrender to blackmail.”406 
This defence of a hard-line stance due to the need to prevent further terror and anarchy persisted 
throughout October. The paper contended on October 16 that the nation could not “afford to surrender to 
the tactics of terror,” and thus “[t]his is no time to give in” to the FLQ or to those who opposed the 
government’s stern response.407 Three days later, the paper again defended the measures as necessary, 
describing the situation as “boil[ing] down to Canada or anarchy,” and requiring that the state “be 
supreme and assert its complete authority against terrorists who would destroy it” to enforce its own 
inhumane rule. “The FLQ cannot prevail and must be eliminated,” the paper intoned, and thus the arming 
of the nation’s soldiers and police with emergency powers was entirely defensible.408  
     The Edmonton Journal also defended the WMA in the absence of any readily available and more 
suitable legislation. On October 21, the paper asserted that temporary civil liberties suspensions were “a 
sad necessity” against internal enemies, and when “the situation demanded action possible at present only 
under the War Measures Act.”409 The Journal endorsed the government’s response to the crisis, defending 
the WMA on account of the need to forestall future terror, and as having been without alternative. 
     After depicting the Canadian government as embroiled in “one of the most perplexing dilemmas of our 
time” in its decision whether to negotiate for Cross’ release, the Vancouver Sun also supported a hard line 
response on the same basis as the Evening Telegram, Telegraph-Journal, Edmonton Journal, and Leader-
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Post. This sternness was necessary to deter further terrorist and anarchical acts. Surrendering to terrorists 
would not ensure the hostages’ well-being, the paper echoed, and would only serve to bolster the 
terrorists’ ranks, fabricate “bigger and bolder demands,” and eventually create “rule by gangster.” The 
$500,000 ransom demanded by the FLQ would “[f]inance ever-greater outrages,” and the released 
“political prisoners” would commit more bombings, enable an escalation in recruitment by illustrating the 
capacity to commit “crime without punishment,” and inspire the FLQ to conduct further abductions and 
selective assassinations. Consequently, the government’s decision centred around the question of 
“whether to jeopardize many lives, indeed our whole national fabric, in what might have been a vain hope 
of saving one life,” with its refusal to capitulate constituting “the right decision.”410 
     Given the paper’s firm stance against capitulation, the Sun decried how the government’s capitulation 
to elements of the FLQ’s demands suggested a wavering in its hard-line stance.411 “[D]angerous days,” 
the paper warned, were imminent if the federal government’s resolve “is deteriorating as abjectly as 
events suggest.” In its concessions, the government had accorded the FLQ a “stature, a credibility and a 
degree of equality with democratically elected government that is obscenely out of keeping with the 
perpetration of one of the most despicable of crimes.” Such abductions, the paper indicated, could not be 
permitted to overrule the maintenance of democracy, and thus the Sun decried the concessions as 
indicative of the government’s gradual fall to rule by “gangsterism.”412 It continued to firmly oppose 
capitulation in the October 16 issue, where the Sun condemned the government’s negotiations as a 
“cowardly and self-destructive course of compromise.” Only through Ottawa’s resumption of a tough-on-
terror stance could Canada “return to stability, law and order,” and thus the paper argued that “[i]f the 
unhappy choice had to be made between government by gangsterism and reduction of the freedom of 
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dissidents to attack our beliefs and institutions,” the latter was most feasible.413 This enduring opposition 
to negotiations is reminiscent of that witnessed in the Leader-Post and Edmonton Journal. 
     The Sun also championed the WMA because of the lack of alternatives. This justification assumed a 
prominent role in the paper’s defence of the WMA, appearing in four editorials. Reacting to the WMA, 
the Sun argued that the time required to pass an act specifically targeting the FLQ and limiting liberties 
“as little as possible” would have produced measures which were “too little and almost certainly too 
late.”414 Laporte’s “premeditated killing” and the threats that Cross would meet a similar fate had 
illustrated “the need for speed” in the government’s response, and since this threat of escalation had “left 
no time for the passage of less sweeping legislation,” the WMA had offered the only option available.415 
The paper continued to defend the WMA as the “only legislative weapon in the government’s arsenal” 
available to protect law-abiding Quebec and national unity “without waiting for the drafting and passage 
of a special act aimed at the Front de Liberation du Quebec,”416 and as the only alternative available to a 
government which “had to act quickly.”417 Accordingly, the Sun regularly insisted that the government’s 
decision to invoke the WMA, as opposed to formulating legislation specific to the FLQ, had been most 
appropriate. This, combined with the paper’s opposition to negotiations, for how engaging in such would 
only elevate the FLQ’s status and encourage further terror, revealed the British Columbian publication to 
be staunchly supportive of a firm stance against terror.  
     The Winnipeg Free Press was particularly fervent in its promotion of a firm stance against terror, with 
sixteen of its twenty-three editorials containing some defence of an unyielding approach to the FLQ. 
From the onset, the paper advocated for the government’s assumption of a consolidated stand against the 
FLQ. Addressing the crisis for the first time on October 8, it argued that the FLQ’s activities satisfied the 
legislative requirements for a prosecution for treason, thus indicating its endorsement of combatting the 
group with a tough, legalistic stance.418 With Laporte’s abduction, this support for firm opposition to the 
FLQ intensified. Reflective of the Evening Telegram, Telegraph-Journal, and other Western Canadian 
publications, the Free Press endorsed the government’s stern opposition to the FLQ on the basis of the 
need to prevent further terrorism. If the government capitulated to the terrorists, the paper acknowledged, 
it would “whet their appetite,” encourage more daring terrorist exploits, and promote further abductions, 
which “cannot be permitted to happen.”419 Negotiating and acceding would moreover constitute the 
government’s abdication of its obligations and “oaths of office,” and “compromis[ing] with treason” 
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would only propel the nation towards anarchy.420 Consequently, even prior to the WMA’s invocation, the 
paper announced its support for any civil liberties infringements the government deemed necessary to 
quash the terrorist threat. If the government felt it necessary to curtail civil liberties through, for instance, 
wiretapping, the Free Press conceded that such sacrifices were necessary to contend with “an emergency 
of this nature” and “the threat it poses to Canadian society.”421 The Free Press thus endorsed Trudeau’s 
stern approach to terror and any civil rights curtailments required to restrain the situation. 
     Once the WMA descended upon the nation, the Free Press continued to affirm that such restrictions 
upon civil liberties were justifiable under the present circumstances. The paper observed on October 16 
that “there are times when some of the rights we hold most dear must be placed in suspension,” and this 
situation was “one of them.”422 The following day, it acknowledged that society had been presented with 
two alternatives − anarchy, or “a period of repressive government measures” − and “there really is no 
choice.”423 On October 19, it insisted that until the FLQ was smothered, Canadians “must accept the 
short-term disciplines required by it so that democracy in the long term may be secure.”424 Hence, 
according to the Winnipeg Free Press, any infringements of civil rights and liberties under the WMA 
were defensible given the alternative. 
     Demonstrating the same framing which had emerged in the Leader-Post, Edmonton Journal, and Sun, 
the Winnipeg Free Press justified the WMA on account of the lack of legislative alternatives available for 
implementation with comparable expediency. This justification was particularly prominent in the Free 
Press, appearing in six editorials. Reflecting upon some politicians’ suggestions that the government 
would have been wiser to pass emergency legislation tailored to the specific situation, the Manitoban 
paper reminded readers that “one of the needs of the situation was speed.” Passing such legislation would 
have consumed considerable time, during which the FLQ “would have gone underground, instigated new 
outrages and accelerated their program of violence,” creating “no choice” but to invoke the WMA.425 On 
October 19, the Free Press reiterated that if the government’s response “was to be immediate,” as the 
severity of the situation had mandated, “this was the only course open” when no peacetime government 
had ever considered it necessary to create a “standby statute to deal with dangers which always seemed 
academic.” Any efforts to devise special legislation would have been untenable since the FLQ would 
certainly “not cease and desist from savagery while we busy ourselves with social blueprints.”426 As the 
month progressed, the paper continued to defend the WMA as “the only tool to hand” to contend with a 
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crisis “of such gravity that there was no time for the government to draft peacetime legislation that would 
deal with the situation,”427 and the only “means at hand” at a time demanding the government’s urgent 
action428 to “prevent further trouble.”429 Clearly, a primary component of the Free Press’ justification of 
the WMA was the dearth of any more tailored legislation available for implementation with a comparable 
rapidity. Considered with its arguments that suspending civil rights was necessary in the circumstances, 
and that harsh measures were required to deter future anarchy, this depiction of the government’s lack of 
alternatives situated the Free Press as supportive of an uncompromising opposition to the FLQ. 
     Like in the Telegraph-Journal and Guardian, one Western Canadian editorial (in the Sun) argued that 
the government’s hard-line response to the FLQ, while appropriate, was overdue. The Sun’s depiction of 
the WMA as representative of government “at last” equipping “itself to fight fire with fire and match 
ruthlessness with ruthlessness,” implied its approval of a stern opposition to terror and assertion that this 
opposition had not been adopted with sufficient haste. Had the nation “had our house in order” and not 
treated the FLQ’s crimes as occupying “the no-man’s-land of the Canadian political and social entity” 
rather than the “common crimes” they were, the WMA would have been unnecessary and thus avoided.430 
In other words, the paper suggested that had the government adopted a firmer stance in opposition to the 
FLQ with more haste, and punished their activities as crimes rather than treating them leniently as social 
or political crimes, the crisis may have been forestalled. 
     Also reflective of a framing which had briefly emerged in the Guardian and Evening Telegram, one 
editorial in the Free Press argued that the government’s hard-line stance was not sufficiently firm or 
stern. The Manitoban paper noted on October 15 that the reinstitution of the death penalty could 
potentially constitute “the only effective answer” to individuals seeking to utilize terror to “threaten the 
nation.”431 While endorsing a tough-on-terror stance, the Free Press had recommended the government 
further cement its opposition to terror with the reinstitution and reintroduction of capital punishment. 
     For some Western Canadian publications, the emergency measures were further justifiable because 
Canadians needed to have faith in their elected government. Comparable to the two editorials in the 
Guardian and Chronicle-Herald that had justified the WMA on this basis, one editorial in the Edmonton 
Journal and three in the Sun adopted a comparable defence. For the Journal, it was urgent that Canadians 
disregard any worries of the government having over-reacted, and instead had to “take on faith” that the 
measures had been necessary to maintain “peace, order and good government,” thus according authorities 
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their “deserved” support.432 The Sun expressed a similar perspective, assuring readers that Trudeau’s 
“record in defence of civil liberties is the guarantee of his sincerity” in his promises to utilize only the 
segments of the emergency regulations required, and to revoke them at the foremost opportunity.433 The 
government, as the Sun later reiterated, “must be trusted to use its unusual powers,” given the horror of 
the opponent it faced, the urgent need to destroy such terrorism, and Trudeau’s “reassuring” promise to 
utilize the powers “as little and as leniently as possible.”434 These editorials, though minute in numerical 
scope, are notable for how they entreated the public to support the WMA due to the pure necessity of 
Canadians to have faith in the government during a tumultuous time. 
     Like the Atlantic Canadian papers, several editorials in Western Canada demonstrated their support for 
the government and the WMA’s invocation by chastising and dismissing the opposition. Ten editorials − 
two in the Sun, four in the Winnipeg Free Press, three in the Edmonton Journal, and one in the Leader-
Post − indicated their support for the government through their adoption of such a frame. Indeed, several 
Western editorials framed the opposition as only opposing the government and WMA for partisan 
political reasons to bolster their own support. Comparable to the Guardian’s dismissal of the NDP and 
Conservatives as seeking only to “make political hay,” the Edmonton Journal condemned Lévesque’s 
pro-negotiations stance (and opposition to any federal interference) as suspicious. Since the PQ would 
benefit from tensions between the Quebec and federal governments, the paper indicated that Lévesque’s 
stance had sought “to make political capital” out of the crisis by blaming the Trudeau government for 
“any settlement delay, and by insinuating that the Quebec government, without pressure from the 
“outside,” would have reached a solution.”435 The NDP also came under fire, as the Edmonton Journal 
argued that its “ridiculous” opposition to the WMA reeked of “a smell of politics,”436 and the Free Press 
submitted that the party’s opposition to the act had been politically irresponsible. Reviewing the party’s 
proposed legislation to supplant the WMA, the Free Press noted that the NDP’s plan lacked any 
substantial divergences from the WMA, with the only “essential difference” being the NDP’s vague 
necessitating of “a full description of the critical circumstances” and group(s) involved, and the 
proclamation’s limitation to the region concerned. Otherwise, the proposed legislation’s requirements 
were ones which the government “could reasonably claim that it had met” in the crisis and were inclusive 
of the powers “now being used,” suggesting to the Free Press that the NDP had “had no strong case for 
opposing” the WMA.437 The paper later berated Deputy NDP Leader David Lewis for his “naïve” and 
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“irresponsible” speculation that the government had panicked or “acted for some reason other than the 
safety and security of Canada” in implementing the WMA, scolding his “imaginative scenarios” as 
intending only “to damage the Quebec government” and attack the federal government.438 
     Aside from constructing the governments’ opponents as only opposing the hard-line stance and WMA 
with purely political motivations, the papers dismissed claims that the WMA unduly infringed upon civil 
liberties. The Edmonton Journal dismissed civil liberties concerns as “academic, for no war ... is fought 
without temporary abridgement of such liberties,” and argued that the time for citizens to question and 
doubt whether the governments had “unduly violated such rights” existed only in elections pursuant to the 
crisis’ conclusion.439 Similarly, the Winnipeg Free Press discounted concerns of over-reactions and civil 
liberties infringements, cautioning the opposition to “be responsible enough to recognize the inherent 
difficulties of the situation.” If the government appeared to be inordinately cautious respecting the release 
of detainees, it would incite criticisms of rights infringements, while the opposite response could lead to 
accusations of irresponsibility. Hence, it was “only realistic to expect that in so hard a situation, mistakes 
will be made.”440 For the Journal and Free Press, the concerns emerging respecting the suspension or 
abrogation of civil liberties were either inevitable given the difficulties of the circumstances, or a concern 
to be postponed until after the war had been waged and the enemies exterminated. 
     Reminiscent of the Eastern Canadian editorials, a common theme in the Western Canadian efforts to 
discredit opposition to the WMA was their attempt to suspend any belief that the measures had imperiled 
Canadian democracy. The Edmonton Journal characterized claims that the WMA had suspended 
Canada’s constitution as “ridiculous” and refuted suggestions that the measures had “suspended 
democracy” when Trudeau remained responsible to the public and Commons. The paper also dismissed 
those individuals in the province who opposed the WMA as consisting mostly of “people with no interest 
in Canada as a nation,” implying that any individual who desired Canada to remain united would support 
the WMA.441 These arguments contributed to the overall narrative seeking to discredit the opposition, 
through their constructions of critics as seeking only to further their own political support, and dismissal 
of characterizations of the WMA as having unfairly diminished civil liberties. Cumulatively, these 
editorials framed the opposition’s arguments as dismissible, untenable, and unsound, thereby reinforcing 
the papers’ broader stances in favour of the governmental response to the FLQ. 
 
Framing the governmental response as inciting concern and potentially inappropriate 
     Compared to these thirty-three editorials which defended the government’s approach to the crisis and 
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invocation of the WMA, fifteen expressed some concern or doubt regarding how authorities were 
confronting the crisis. The Sun was relatively balanced in offering eight pro-WMA editorials compared to 
seven voicing some concern regarding the measures’ invocation, primarily regarding the repressive spirit 
the measures were nurturing in British Columbia and the populace’s need for more information about the 
measures and their implementation. The Leader-Post was similarly balanced, publishing two editorials of 
each framing (although the paper’s concerns revolved around the government’s necessity to take the 
populace further into its confidence). For the Edmonton Journal and Winnipeg Free Press, the pro-WMA 
editorials far outweighed those voicing concern as to authorities’ conduct in the crisis, with the two and 
four editorials they respectively published expressing some concern or challenge being surpassed by the 
seven and sixteen editorials endorsing the measures. The papers voiced this concern in terms of the 
unease regarding civil liberties infringements, the misuse of the WMA by authorities removed from the 
crisis, demands for further governmental disclosure regarding the extent of the crisis, and doubts 
surrounding the efficacy of police activity. Overall, however, no Western Canadian paper argued that the 
government should not have adopted a firm response to terror, or that the WMA was an unjustified 
mechanism to address the crisis. Though voicing concerns regarding authorities’ response, the Western 
Canadian papers remained supportive of the WMA and hard-line reaction, finding fault instead with the 
flaws within those measures and their deployment by authorities removed from the crisis. 
     Eleven editorials voiced concerns regarding the civil liberties infractions coming to light due to police 
activities under the WMA. Compared to the mere two editorials in Eastern Canada reflecting similar civil-
liberties-centred concerns, the WMA’s purported diminishment of civil rights garnered greater concern in 
the Western provinces. The Sun, on October 22, observed the release of fifty of the over three hundred 
individuals who had been detained under the WMA, indicating that one could assume such numbers, and 
the probable release of more innocents, “to be a measure of the degree to which the arbitrary interference 
with personal liberties has fallen on the demonstrably innocent.” It was “disquieting to know that so many 
Canadians have been jailed without probable cause,” but the Sun still deemed such errors “inevitable” and 
defended the WMA as necessary “under the threat of mass terror” and a “parallel power.”442 Concern that 
innocent individuals may have been swept up within the police’s dragnet prompted the Winnipeg Free 
Press to urge the establishment of a committee to review the evidence against each detainee.443 In 
addition to this detainment of innocents, the Edmonton Journal conveyed further concerns in advising the 
government to “make clear to overzealous enforcers of the War Measures Act ... that it did not proclaim 
the act to provide a chance for witch-hunting or censorship,” though it did not specify which incident had 
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prompted that concern.444 Other papers expressed more general anxiety or caution about the condition of 
civil liberties. Indeed, the Journal decried the WMA’s excessive geographical scope, since “a crisis in 
Quebec doesn’t warrant suspension of civil rights in Alberta,”445 while the Free Press encouraged the 
government to not keep the WMA “alive a moment longer than necessary” when “[c]ivil liberties have 
been fought for too long and too bitterly to permit them to be abrogated for any longer” than needed.446 
Though illustrating various civil rights concerns ranging from the detention of innocents, possibility of a 
witch-hunt and censorship, and the excessive scope of the measures, it is notable that no paper contested 
the WMA’s defensibility. Indeed, descriptions of civil rights concerns centered on the WMA’s inherent 
faults, rather than blaming the government for having necessarily invoked the measures. 
     Particularly disconcerting in Western Canada, especially for the Sun, was the repressive spirit which 
the WMA wrought across the nation, as provincial governments − particularly British Columbia’s − 
sought to misuse the emergency measures. Despite the Sun’s supportive tone respecting the WMA, in five 
editorials it condemned its application beyond its intended extent, raising concerns regarding the civil 
liberties infringements the measures were enabling in locales removed from the crisis’ epicenter. For 
instance, the Sun denounced Vancouver Mayor Tom Campbell’s intent to utilize the WMA “to further his 
vendetta against local hippies and draft dodgers” as the “irresponsible,” “damnable,” contemptuous, and 
“crude” use of “a national tragedy” to shore local support.447 Later, the Sun decried the B.C. government’s 
order-in-council dismissing pro-FLQ and pro-revolutionary instructors as an overreaction to a situation 
those institutions’ authorities could handle independently, and as questionably democratic, for how it had 
been “submitted to nobody ... for consultation or ratification” and violated all notions of reliance upon 
“due process of law.”448 The order-in-council was “clumsy and needless,” the Sun chastised, particularly 
when the federal government had warned against “extraneous witch-hunts” and efforts to utilize the crisis 
to pursue “all manner of repressive and otherwise illegal side issues,” and thus deemed the legislation the 
very sort of “crude demonstration ... of raw power” which could “bring government into disrepute.”449 
Having noted such eagerness among politicians “to twist” the WMA “to unrelated and/or undemocratic 
ends,”450 and “tamper with civil liberties for what they conceived or advertised to be the best of reasons,” 
the Sun urged that the WMA’s replacement be an act itself, rather than a segment of the Criminal Code, to 
forestall similar abuses.451 In addition to these five editorials in the Sun, the Winnipeg Free Press also 
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chastised the British Columbian and Vancouver regimes for their willingness to manipulate the WMA for 
their own political gains, recounting Campbell’s intentions and the order-in-council as illuminative of the 
WMA’s “shortcomings” and “the kind of misuse to which it can be put.”452 Again, these civil liberties 
concerns and criticisms of the WMA derived not from any error or fault in judgment in the government’s 
invocation of the act, but from its misuse and abuse among other authorities. Indeed, the primary concern 
regarding the WMA centred not on its necessity but its inherent flaws enabling such misuse. Although 
reflective of the civil rights element of the historiographical discourse on the crisis, and suggestive of the 
greater concern for civil liberties infringements in Western Canada as opposed to Eastern Canada, such 
concerns did not detract from the papers’ defence of the government’s hard-line response and WMA. 
     Doubts regarding the emergency measures, however, emerged in Western Canada in late October. 
More than in the Eastern Canadian editorials, the government’s urgent necessity to disclose to the 
Canadian populace the true extent of the “apprehended insurrection” plaguing Quebec emerged as a 
dominant theme in the Western Canadian publications. In the final weeks of October, nine editorials 
(concentrated in the Sun and Winnipeg Free Press) focused on this surging discontentment and unease 
respecting the public’s inaccessibility to the full details of the extent of the crisis and WMA’s use. 
     One facet of this displeasure arose respecting the government’s failure to adequately keep Canadians 
apprised of how the WMA was being implemented. As Canada approached one week under the WMA, 
the Sun observed on October 22 that “the public deserves and would welcome” some statement “giving 
all possible details of the use of these emergency powers to date,” to dispel misunderstandings and 
misinformation.453 Other editorials chastised the government for failing to disclose the complete spectrum 
of details leading to the WMA’s invocation. An October 27 editorial in the Sun portrayed a Canada 
“waiting for some definite answers,” and “legitimate[ly]” demanding more details on the “apprehended 
insurrection” that had prompted the WMA. The paper lent its voice to such demands, noting “it should be 
possible ... to lift more than a tiny corner of the veil of secrecy held so firmly in place by Mr. Trudeau and 
the Quebec administration.”454 It was particularly imperative that the government do so given that the lack 
of information was confusing the situation by permitting rumours to ferment among the populace. As 
reports emerged of a plot among a group of prominent Quebeckers to supplant Bourassa’s government 
with a “provisional government” more conciliatory to the FLQ,455 the Sun commented that Trudeau’s 
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“reticence in the Commons” to respond to such rumours was according them “undue weight in the rest of 
the country” and offering “an impression of deliberate concealment.” As such, the Sun questioned again 
“whether the time has not come” for Trudeau “to take the public into his full confidence.”456 
     The Free Press expressed a similar urgency that the government disclose a fuller image of the extent 
of the crisis that had necessitated emergency measures. The paper indicated that the government bore the 
responsibility “to keep the public - which has given it such strong backing - in the picture as much as 
possible,” and thus at his earliest permissible opportunity, “Trudeau should disclose the exact information 
which led his government to take the drastic step of invoking the Act.”457 Indeed, when the public had 
offered authorities their support “on trust,” on the basis that the government would expediently disclose 
the reasons necessitating “such strong measures,” the public thus had “the right to know” the facts that 
prompted the sudden proclamation of the WMA. The majority of Canadians were not convinced that the 
act had been proclaimed merely on the facts already known to the public and House, since the abductions 
“were not enough to bring out thousands of armed troops” and dynamite and arms had been disappearing 
for years without necessitating emergency measures, and hence they were demanding and entitled to 
further explanation.458 The absence of such details was allowing gossip and rumours to diffuse and 
exacerbate tensions,459 for instance regarding the FLQ’s apparent associations with a Montreal political 
party.460 Consequently, the Free Press reiterated its appeal for Trudeau “to take the Canadian people into 
his confidence about what really happened” and justify the WMA’s proclamation.461 
     In spite of its enduring editorial support for the Trudeau government and WMA, the Edmonton 
Journal began to express similar demands for further information and details on October 24. For the 
Alberta paper, this necessity centred around the government’s democratic obligation to furnish citizens 
with the information they required to assess the adequacy of the government’s response. Government 
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officials had issued “some disquieting statements,” the paper intoned, notably Justice Minister John 
Turner’s admission that “it may never be possible to tell Canadians why the War Measures Act was 
proclaimed.” While this was justifiable as the crisis continued, postponing a thorough explanation was 
unacceptable for how it would deny “the public the information it needs to decide ultimately whether the 
government’s conduct was justified,” and thus deny true democracy.462 
     Even if the government could not yet take Canadians into its confidence, the Leader-Post argued that 
the government was obligated to at least provide Parliament’s opposition leaders with fuller disclosure. 
For instance, in the final days of October, the Leader-Post reflected the uncertainties with the 
government’s silence in the editorial “All leaders should know.” Question periods in the House of 
Commons had devolved into repeated opposition attempts to solicit more details from Trudeau’s 
government regarding the reasons for the WMA, with Trudeau consistently refusing to entertain such 
requests and to confirm or deny rumours. Observing this repartee, the Leader-Post chastised the 
government for “playing cat-and-mouse games in the House of Commons,” in a time in which “it should 
immediately take into its confidence the leaders of the three opposition parties” who “should be kept fully 
informed of all the facts in the government’s hands.” Only by doing so could “the endless speculation and 
guessing” cease.463 The paper reiterated this insistence in its final editorial of October. Noting that the 
NDP opposed the WMA due to the adequacy of the treason and sedition laws, while the government 
asserted such laws did not possess sufficient teeth, the Leader-Post indicated that evidently the 
government − but not the opposition − had details demonstrating that the crisis possessed “a seriousness 
that goes beyond the acts dealing with treason and sedition.” This affirmed “the case for the other party 
leaders to be told.”464 
     Hence, the Western Canadian papers evidenced a mounting concern regarding the government’s 
failure to take Canadians into its confidence. While the Sun demanded further details of the WMA’s 
implementation, all four papers demonstrated some anxiety regarding the government’s failure to disclose 
the true extent of the crisis which had conspired to produce the WMA’s invocation. Whether due to the 
government’s obligation to offer to the public the information required to democratically evaluate its 
representatives, or how the lack of details was exacerbating the situation by enabling rumours, the papers 
demanded more information. The prominence of such disquiet may suggest a souring of opinion or 
emergent doubt among the newspapers, particularly the Sun and Winnipeg Free Press in which this 
consternation was most frequent, regarding the appropriateness of the government’s response to the FLQ.       
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     Similarly indicative of the emergence of doubts respecting the WMA were the concerns raised in two 
editorials regarding the police’s apparent failure to utilize the measures with any quantifiable success. In 
so doing, the papers reflected a similar theme to that which emerged in three Eastern Canadian editorials. 
The October 24 issue of the Edmonton Journal conveyed a mild discontent over the lack of any tangible 
results from the investigations, expressing that even with the army’s aid and the “extraordinary powers of 
arrest, detention and search,” the police had not been capable of apprehending the terrorists.465 The Sun’s 
October 27 editorial was more explicit in its bewilderment as to the police’s lack of success in their 
manhunt. Canadians, it suggested, were “genuinely puzzled to account for the failure of the massed police 
forces of Quebec, backed by the armed forces, to catch even one of the suspects” in the abductions and 
murder. It was unclear what this revealed of the crisis and its perpetrators − whether it demonstrated 
insiders alerting the FLQ of police activities, the culprits’ entrenchment “beyond the reach of the law,” 
the group’s cunning, or police ineptitude.466 Though not as explicitly as the Evening Telegram, which had 
suggested that the WMA was not only ineffective in aiding the police but had potentially contributed to 
Laporte’s murder, these two Western Canadian editorials are redolent of an emerging doubt regarding the 
utility of the WMA in the crisis. It bears noting that, despite these doubts, the papers did not argue that the 
WMA had been unwarranted or unjustified, or suggest that an alternative course of action would have 
been more appropriate. While indicative, then, of the presence in October 1970 of a discourse critical of 
the government’s response to the crisis, all four Western Canadian papers clearly positioned themselves 
in support of the hard-line response and WMA. 
     There also existed, in the Western Canadian publications, a handful of editorials critical of the 
government’s long-term handling of the FLQ threat. This criticism appeared in two editorials, in the Sun 
and Leader-Post, which criticized the government for permitting the crisis to intensify to the extent of 
necessitating emergency measures. Recalling Bourassa’s promise to reveal the details of the conditions 
that had resulted in the WMA’s proclamation, the Sun pondered whether he would also account for how 
the FLQ was “permitted to become so firmly dug in that it suddenly became essential to call in the troops 
and invoke the most fearsome federal legislation to try to oust them.”467 This implied that the government 
bore some responsibility for the crisis due to how it had unsuccessfully confronted terrorism throughout 
the 1960s. The government’s failure to sufficiently recognize the FLQ’s threat was, for the Leader-Post, 
even more glaring in its failure to respond adequately to the FLQ’s escalation of activities throughout 
1970. Indeed, the FLQ had devised a well-publicized plot to abduct an American diplomat, and yet “only 
the most elementary precautions were taken to protect persons in the diplomatic service,” making it 
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apparent that “someone in authority is at fault” for approaching the known extremist threat with an undue 
lightness that enabled Cross’ abduction.468 Since these editorials did not situate the papers on either side 
of the discourse surrounding the aptness of the hard-line approach, they were not included in the above 
tally seeking to analyze the prominence of the two sides of the discourse. They remain notable, however, 
in suggesting that the government itself was partially accountable for the current crisis through its failure 
to adequately respond to the FLQ’s emergence and signalled intent to escalate. 
 
Framing Canadians as shocked, yet supportive of the government’s stance 
     In a similar framing to that which appeared with prominence in Atlantic Canada, the editorials in the 
British Columbian, Saskatchewan, Albertan, and Manitoban papers depicted the nation as one united in 
awe. Indeed, the papers characterized the FLQ’s activities as having “shocked” Canada,469 rattled and 
startled citizens,470 and unified the nation in questioning “[i]s this really Canada?”471 Comparable to 
editorial opinion in Atlantic Canada, this shock and consternation did not detract from Canadians’ 
apparently dominant support for the government’s hard-line stance against terror and invocation of the 
WMA. Sixteen editorials in the Western Canadian papers referred to the public as having aligned itself in 
support of the government during this trying time, illustrating that this framing was more prominent than 
in Atlantic Canada, in which that theme was evident in five editorials. 
     Even prior to the government’s proclamation of the WMA, the government’s reluctance to accede to 
the terrorist demands and seeming inclination to adopt a law-and-order stance reportedly culled favour 
with the Canadian public. In his firm insistence that society must protect itself against any parallel power 
seeking to challenge the democratically elected rule, the Winnipeg Free Press anticipated that Trudeau 
could “expect the support of most Canadians in the stand he has taken.”472 In the brief window between 
the proclamation of the WMA and the revelation of Laporte’s murder, the editorials described a populace 
vastly supportive of the emergency measures. After the government invoked the act, the Free Press 
argued that any “adverse reaction” to the WMA or belief in the government’s over-reaction would be 
tempered by the “overwhelming support of the action by Canadians,”473 who were “prepared to accept” 
the measures when the alternative was anarchy.474 The Sun asserted that the public reaction to the WMA 
had demonstrated “that the majority of Canadians ... accept that he [Trudeau] acted in good faith in 
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response to urgent pleas from the authorities in Quebec and Montreal,”475 while the Edmonton Journal 
concluded that “[t]he great majority of Canadians will support” Trudeau’s case in proclaiming the 
WMA.476 
     Laporte’s tragic murder appeared to only affirm this popular support for the government. While some 
Western Canadian editorials implied the populace’s support by illuminating their distaste for the FLQ − in 
the Sun’s portrayal of Canadians as united “in revulsion” at the murder 477 and the Edmonton Journal’s 
declaration that “all the nation cries out” in opposing the deed478 − other editorials explicitly framed the 
public as in the government’s corner. The Winnipeg Free Press observed that the WMA’s proclamation 
had solicited the support “of the great majority of the Canadian people,” who had accepted the WMA’s 
necessity.479 Trudeau enjoyed “the support of the great majority” of the citizenry480 or “strong public 
support,”481 with the “formidable surge of public opinion” being evidenced in the House’s overwhelming 
vote approving the WMA.482 When sixteen members of the federal NDP party voted in opposition to the 
measures on October 19, the Sun suggested that such a position was “clearly not in keeping with the 
mood of the country.”483 Later, following Montreal mayor Jean Drapeau’s stunning victory in the October 
25 municipal election, the Sun interpreted the victory as revealing that Montrealers “not only do not share 
the alarm” respecting the WMA, “but positively endorse the move.”484 The Leader-Post described the 
FLQ’s crimes as having “united people of all ethnic origins in the country in their determination to 
support the government in its actions to eliminate” the FLQ,485 while the Edmonton Journal asserted that 
Western Canada was “overwhelmingly in support of the actions taken,”486 reflective of the “wide public 
support” that the government was receiving nationwide for the WMA.487 All four Western Canadian 
newspapers painted the portrait of a nation pledging unyielding support to its government’s response to 
the crisis. 
 
Framing the nation’s need for unity 
     One can predict that the Western Canadian editorials would have observed this apparent national unity 
																																																								
475 “A choice between evils,” Sun (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970. 
476 “Justified action,” Edmonton Journal (Edmonton, AB), October 17, 1970. 
477 “Unified by grief and horror,” Sun (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970. 
478 “Canada or anarchy,” Edmonton Journal (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970. 
479 “No Longer than Necessary,” Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg, MB), October 22, 1970. 
480 “The Public Should Be Told,” Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970. 
481 “New Act Needed,” Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg, MB), October 28, 1970. 
482 “Challenge and Response,” Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970. 
483 “A regrettable necessity,” Sun (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970. 
484 “Many questions, few answers,” Sun (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970. 
485 “A unified front,” Leader-Post (Regina, SK), October 22, 1970. 
486 “Canada or anarchy,” Edmonton Journal (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970. 




favourably, given their recognition that the crisis necessitated such a unified opposition to the FLQ. In ten 
editorials, the four papers presented readers with a framing identifying national unity as imperative in this 
time of crisis. An October 19 editorial in the Sun offered an early expression of this need, when it 
encouraged the “men of goodwill in Parliament to close ranks at a time of national peril” by offering 
unanimous support to the WMA during that day’s vote on the measures. Such was essential for how it 
would demonstrate that the FLQ’s efforts to destroy Canada had only served to draw its components 
tighter and more cohesively together.488 The Free Press, in an editorial published the same day, expressed 
discontent over the opposition’s initial response to the WMA, denouncing the “shabby display of politics 
put on by some members ... when the crying need was for a show of national unity and solidarity.”489 
     This need for unity incited ire at the opposition, and particularly the NDP, for not providing the 
government with requisite support. When sixteen members of the federal NDP party voted against the 
WMA during the October 19 vote in Parliament, the Sun chastised the party. Robert Stanfield and the 
Conservatives, in their willingness to set aside their misgivings about and criticisms of the measures in 
favour of realizing the necessity for “a day of unity,” had conducted themselves most appropriately, 
adopting a stance which was “wholly praiseworthy” and exhibitive of a “responsible appreciation of the 
Quebec crisis.” Substantially less responsible had been the NDP’s failure to accord the same support to 
the WMA. In the editorial staff’s perspective, it was “unfortunate” that the New Democrats had refused to 
approve the measure, when “[a] unanimous vote would have given the world a stronger impression of 
Canada’s determination to root out political terrorism.” Indeed, their opposition had not reflected the 
national mood or “the known facts about the tragic lawlessness in Quebec.”490 The NDP found itself 
similarly under attack in the Leader-Post. Expressing that given the nation’s situation “the government 
should have had the unanimous support of Parliament,” the Leader-Post applauded Stanfield for being 
cognizant of the need to set aside his reservations in favour of presenting “a solid front of support in 
dealing with the FLQ.” When considering this need for unity, the paper “regretted” that the NDP 
members had failed to support the government,491  particularly given that Parliamentary unity and 
solidarity was “essential” in such a situation as that which the government currently faced.492 
     Beyond this necessity for unity among the nation’s political leaders, a handful of editorials in the 
Leader-Post and Edmonton Journal urged similar solidarity and harmony amongst the general populace. 
Two editorials pleaded that English-Canadians should not allow the crisis to colour their perceptions of or 
incite a backlash against French-Canadians. “There should be no backlash,” the Leader-Post argued, with 
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the paper expressing hope that the crisis could usher into the annals of history a period in which citizens 
united to redress grievances and remedy intolerances.493 Observing that the FLQ sought to inflame 
intergroup tensions, the Edmonton Journal urged English-Canadians to not perceive the group as 
characteristic of French-Canadians who were, primarily, as equally fervent in their belief in the law as 
English-Canadians. The crisis could not be allowed “to deflect us from the essential job of building a 
nation” in which the French and English could harmoniously co-reside, and thus the editorial demanded 
that Canadians prohibit the FLQ’s objectives of inciting “backlash” and “bigotry.”494  Further, the 
Edmonton Journal pronounced its longing on October 19 that this drawing together of the nation in crisis 
would inspire a long-standing surge in national unity. It voiced its hope that “there will emerge ... a new 
unity for troubled Canada” following “this intrusive outrage,”495 indicating that such unity would prove “a 
valuable result of a desperate situation.”496 An October 28 editorial in the Sun affirmed a similar need for 
unity, arguing that the tragedy “will not be without good results if it opens people’s eyes in both parts of 
Canada to the need they have for each other.”497 In addition to the need for political unity, a handful of 
Western Canadian editorials also promoted solidarity among the general populace. In their inclusion of 
ten editorials touching upon this necessity of political and social unity in a time of crisis, the Western 
Canadian papers demonstrated a greater prioritization of this framing than in Eastern Canada, where three 
editorials adopted a similar frame. Such perceptions about the need for unity prompted questions about 
how such pleas may have been correlated with the papers’ own support for the measures. 
 
Framing terrorism as a construct and phenomenon foreign and alien to Canada 
     The shock expressed in the papers appeared to stem, in part, from the conceptualization promoted 
among several Western Canadian editorials − nine overall − of terrorism as a phenomenon alien to the 
Canadian experience. Prominent in this framing was the belief that the tactic of political abductions had 
originated in and spread to Canada from other international revolutionary movements. The Edmonton 
Journal’s assessment following Cross’ abduction that “Canadians can no longer be smug in the mistaken 
belief that political kidnappings happen only in distant, lesser-known countries” 498  reflected this 
conceptualization of terrorism as foreign to Canada. So too did the Winnipeg Free Press’ observation that 
the abductions had dispelled the preconception that “it can’t happen here,” in a nation presumed “immune 
from the perils and contagions of the world.”499 The Leader-Post noted that Cross’ kidnapping “brings 
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close to home the lawlessness which has been rife in recent months” in America, Jordan, and Latin 
America,500 while the Free Press spoke of the FLQ as “eager to import the revolution techniques 
developed in the outside world”501 − notably the “modern terrorist techniques” of abductions that had 
been witnessed in Latin America and Jordan.502 The Sun similarly associated the abductions with foreign 
terror that had been imported into Canada when describing Cross’ abduction as illuminative of “[t]he 
spread to Canada of the diplomatic kidnapping outrage” from North Africa and Latin America,503 which 
the Edmonton Journal echoed in depicting the tactic as having “spread to Canada.”504 According to the 
Sun, the FLQ’s assumption of such tactics had been the resultant of terrorist activities elsewhere. Through 
their success in coercing governments to release detained guerrillas in return for hostages, international 
revolutionary movements had demonstrated that crime could occur “without punishment” and 
emboldened such “violent minorities of the world” as the FLQ.505 Thus, several Western Canadian 
editorials conceptualized the FLQ’s new tactics as being rooted in international revolutionary movements. 
     In addition to internationally inspired tactics, editorials noted the foreign roots of other facets of the 
FLQ. The Winnipeg Free Press described the group’s structure as internationally inspired, noting that it 
had “drawn on an international revolutionary experience” to adopt “a cellular structure” difficult to 
infiltrate.506 The Leader-Post focused upon the group’s foreign ideological inspirations in characterizing 
the FLQ as “Quebec Maoists,”507 while the Sun accepted External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp’s 
contention that the FLQ was driven not by French-Canadian nationalism but “international anarchists and 
nihilists” seeking to deploy perceived French-Canadian grievances to advance international revolution.508 
For the Winnipeg Free Press, the broader revolutionary impulse propelling the FLQ was not native to 
Canada, which had merely succumbed to “the perils and contagions of the world.”509 This proposition 
recalls the alien conspiracy theory, with its suggestion that terrorism and revolutionary violence were 
international “contagions” which had spread into Canada to corrupt it. Combined with the tendency to 
construct the FLQ’s tactics, structure, and ideology as foreign, as well as the aforementioned framing of 
the FLQ as a cancer or disease which had spread to Canada from international origins, the papers clearly 
perpetuated a framing of the FLQ crisis as an alien conspiracy rather than the product of native tensions. 
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Framing the October Crisis as the result of internal systemic factors 
     Compared to these nine editorials framing the crisis as the product of foreign revolutionary movements 
or inspiration, six sought to interrogate the systemic and structural roots of the crisis. Quantitatively, this 
suggests a deeper recognition of the crisis’ internal roots than in Atlantic Canada, in which merely three 
editorials sought to examine such roots compared to the ten demonstrating an alien conspiracy framing. 
However, the majority of Western Canadian editorials providing some analysis of the crisis’ roots did so 
only tenuously and fragmentarily. The Sun referred to the FLQ’s efforts to “exploit the real or imagined 
grievances of some French-Canadians,” without delineating such grievances,510 and tenuously referenced 
the “two-races problem,” Quebeckers’ impression that they were unequal Confederate partners, their 
unique cultural aspirations, and the province’s notable economic challenges.511 While not explicitly 
associating such economic difficulties (and the cultural impulse for la survivance) to the development of 
the crisis, the implied connection is clear. The Winnipeg Free Press recognized the interplay within the 
crisis of systemic factors with a similar vagueness. Recognizing that crime and discontent blossomed 
under “evil social conditions,” the paper condemned critics who chastised the WMA for failing to address 
the crisis’ roots, indicating that the societal ills were “so deep-rooted” that no individual government or 
immediate policy could do more than contribute to their gradual elimination.512 Thus, while not offering 
any significant analysis of these ills and the reforms required, the Free Press appeared to acknowledge 
the role of certain societal, economic, and political factors in sparking the crisis. A subsequent editorial on 
October 21 submitted that “[t]here may have been injustices to Quebec in the past,” without expanding 
upon the nature of such injustices.513 Thus, while several editorials did appear to recognize broader 
economic, political, and social grievances as at the root of the current discontent plaguing Quebec, the 
majority of such attempts were undeveloped and rather tenuous in nature. 
     The Edmonton Journal was more explicit in exploring the crisis through the framework of societal and 
economic grievances, offering the most comprehensive effort in either Eastern or Western Canada to 
interrogate the internal roots of the crisis. Its October 22 editorial offered a remarkably concerted 
analysis, describing Quebec as enduring the psychological and social strain of emerging from a “semi-
feudal past” to the realization “that French-speaking Canadians will probably always be a minority in the 
nation.” It portrayed the province as suffering from “a lagging economy and endemic unemployment.” 
The province had experienced, for the prior fifteen years, an “intolerable” unemployment rate twice that 
of Ontario or any Prairie province. This was “bound to result in social unrest,” particularly given the 
expectation that ten to twelve percent of the province’s labour force would be unemployed in the coming 
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winter, suppressing further a per capita income which was already beneath the Canadian average. Part of 
the responsibility for this, the editorial conceded, lay with the federal government, which had too 
frequently devised solutions for national economic concerns that failed to consider how they would 
disproportionately impact the Maritime provinces and Quebec.514 
     Intriguingly, not all editorials concurred with the Edmonton Journal’s assessment of the roots of the 
crisis, and the federal government’s contribution to those roots. Of the Western Canadian editorials that 
did interrogate the crisis’ internal origins, three constructed Quebec itself as responsible for the 
grievances. For instance, the Winnipeg Free Press submitted that while “[t]here may have been injustices 
to Quebec in the past ... many Canadians outside the province would argue that these at least in part were 
the result of the province’s institutions rather than of deliberate oppression by other Canadians.”515 As the 
Sun continued in its own exploration of the crisis’ roots, “[w]e come back to the past flaws in French-
Canadian attitudes to the demands of modern life, the failure above all to bring their educational system 
into line with modern industrial and technological needs.”516 Both editorials indicated − with some 
regionalism − that the grievances to which the FLQ were responding originated not from any federally-
inflicted injustices, but from flaws in the French-Canadian institutions and attitudes. 
     In a similar vein, the Winnipeg Free Press accorded some responsibility for the current tensions to the 
separatist movement and Parti Québécois. Contesting the alien conspiracy theory in other editorials, the 
Free Press deemed it essential that, once the FLQ was crushed, Canada confront such “unpleasant 
realities” as the fact that the FLQ and its ideology “did not suddenly appear from nowhere or from Cuba.” 
Rather, the FLQ had evolved and developed from “an existing movement, headed by respectable, far-
from lawless people who thought Quebec had no future within Confederation and sought, by peaceful 
means, to transform it into a separate, independent state.” The creation and rise of the PQ had established 
the party at the head of “a movement they c[ould ...] not control,” exciting radical students and groups, 
embracing extremists “ready to use any means,” and encouraging the “naïve” conviction “that common 
sense would govern everything and induce everyone to comport himself in the finest democratic fashion.” 
As such, the Free Press questioned Lévesque’s judgment in creating and leading the PQ, for he had failed 
to balance “the theoretical advantages” of separation with the “risks involved in a partitionist course.”517 
This segment maintained that the true roots of the crisis emanated from the flaws in Quebec’s social and 
political reality, as opposed to any fault of the Canadian government. 
     Such assessments of the internal factors which had contributed to the development of the October 
Crisis were nevertheless rare, present in merely six editorials. Aside from one editorial in the Edmonton 
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Journal, the editorials either presented only a brief and summary note of Quebec’s grievances, or sought 
to divert responsibility to Quebec itself. 
 
Framing the FLQ as not reflective of Quebeckers more broadly 
     In line with the alien conspiracy framing, the Western Canadian papers promoted a conceptualization 
of the FLQ emphasizing their “otherness” and distance from the majority of the Quebec and Canadian 
population. Indeed, frequent emphasis was accorded to the group’s minority status. The Sun referred to 
the FLQ as “a minority of minorities,”518 “murderous fanatical” and “violent minority,”519 “handful of 
criminal racist fanatics,” and “rag-tag covey of mail-box bombers.”520 In the Leader-Post the FLQ 
emerged as a “minority group”521 and “small group of assassins and anarchists,”522 while the Free Press 
described it as representing “a small minority of Quebecers.”523 Clearly, the editorials took great pains to 
frame the FLQ as encompassing only a tiny number of Quebeckers. For the Winnipeg Free Press, 
Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau and his Civic Party’s remarkable victory in the municipal election of 
October 25, 1970524 was partly indicative of Montrealers’ desire to demonstrate that the FLQ’s “activities 
are the work of a mere handful of men; that they in no way represent the feelings and attitude of the 
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citizens of Canada’s largest city.”525 Similarly, the Edmonton Journal characterized Drapeau’s vast 
margin of victory as illuminative of the Montreal populace refuting the FLQ’s claims to represent 
Quebeckers. They had sought to do so through offering their fervent support to “a man identified with 
tough opposition to the FLQ,” thereby clearly demonstrating that “they want no part in terrorism or 
politics conducted by means of murder.”526 
     Editorials also took strides to situate the group as external to the mainstream of Quebec. For the Sun, 
the crisis had illuminated Quebec as a province of “decent people ... beset by murderous fanatics,”527 
while the Leader-Post contended that “[r]easonable Canadians realize that the FLQ’s actions are as 
regrettable to Quebec as to any other part of Canada.”528 The Winnipeg Free Press deemed the staunch 
support offered by Quebec Members of Parliament for the WMA as “indicative” that it was Quebeckers 
who were “the most grieved” by Laporte’s “cold-blooded” murder.529 The Edmonton Journal offered a 
similar observation as to the FLQ’s marginality within Quebec, extending it to urge against any 
exacerbation of intranational tensions. Noting that the FLQ was attempting through its terrorist actions to 
pit English and French-Canadians as adversaries, the Journal urged Canadians not to view the abductions 
as typical of Quebeckers and French-Canadians. Most French-Canadians were “no more responsible for 
the actions of the tiny terrorist minority than are the people of Alberta for the criminals in our midst.” As 
such, the editorial argued that this crisis could not be allowed to inhibit the construction of a nation rooted 
in the harmonious co-existence of its “two founding peoples,” and urged Canadians to refuse to satisfy the 
FLQ’s desire for “backlash” and “bigotry.”530 While the Journal was novel in overtly voicing the concern 
that the crisis would hamper the relationship between Canada’s founding nations, it fit into the broader 
urge to frame the FLQ as not reflective or representative of the vast majority of Quebeckers. 
     The editorials sought to “other” the FLQ further by differentiating the group from the separatist 
movement they purported to represent. In so doing, the Sun described the FLQ as “the manic fringe of the 
separatist movement,”531 while the Winnipeg Free Press depicted the group as existing “on the fringe of a 
legal separatist movement,”532  which itself represented only “a minority of Quebecers,”533  thereby 
reinforcing the group’s marginality. The Edmonton Journal identified the “small group of assassins and 
anarchists” which comprised the FLQ as “distinguishable from the Quebec separatists who have used 
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political means to seek their ends.”534 The Western Canadian editors deliberately emphasized the FLQ as 
a radical minority, divorced from both the Quebec mainstream and the separatist movement from which it 
sought to feed. Thirteen of the fifty-seven editorials in the Western Canadian newspapers contained some 
exemplar of the framing of the FLQ as marginal and unrepresentative of Quebec (compared to the 
Atlantic Canadian publications, in which three of the thirty-seven editorials contained such a theme). 
 
Framing the nation’s next steps beyond the shock and grief of October 1970 
     Reflective of the alien conspiracy discourse, framing of the FLQ as a fringe minority group, and the 
minimal attention to delineating the internal factors that had contributed to the crisis’ development, 
Western Canadian editorials offered few recommendations of how the province and nation should address 
the FLQ crisis beyond prosecuting its perpetrators. Merely two editorials sought to extend the discourse 
on the crisis into suggestions of how to address the grievances underlying the FLQ’s program. The most 
concerted effort to offer recommendations arose from the Edmonton Journal, unsurprising given the 
paper was also the source of the most thorough examination of the social, psychological, and economic 
strains which had contributed to the FLQ’s surge. Noting that while the WMA and deployment of the 
armed forces had constituted a “necessary response to terrorism,” the paper argued on October 22 that the 
emergency measures did not comprise the long-term solutions required to address the province’s 
legitimate grievances. Consequently, the Journal offered recommendations on further action to redress 
such issues, and offer a more long-lasting solution to the crisis than simply crushing the FLQ. “Part of the 
answer,” the editorial indicated, was to continue the pursuit of ensuring French-Canadians received 
equitable and understanding treatment. Resolutions to Quebec’s economic grievances, particularly the 
unemployment rates, were sorely required, demanding the federal government assume “[a] more regional 
approach” to the economy cognizant of the specific needs, for instance, of the provinces to Ontario’s east, 
which “may also need extra cash help this winter.” 535  Otherwise, only the Sun offered any 
recommendations, insisting that a heightened and dispersed reformist impulse in Quebec would ease the 
tensions fuelling the crisis.536 In this minimal discourse on the means by which to target the crisis’ origin, 
the Western Canadian editorials again were comparable to the Eastern Canadian framing of the crisis. 
 
In summary 
     In fifty-seven editorials, the four Western Canadian papers devoted more extensive editorial coverage 
to the FLQ crisis in the month of October 1970 than the four Eastern Canadian publications. In so doing, 
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the Winnipeg Free Press, Leader-Post, Edmonton Journal, and Sun adopted several of the same narrative 
framings of the crisis as Eastern Canadian editors. Indeed, the Western Canadian papers tended to frame 
the FLQ in the same condemnatory terms, depict the group as posing a legitimate challenge to the 
Canadian nation, and emphasize the victims’ innocence and commendability in terms that further vilified 
the FLQ. The group’s noted capacity to escalate further affirmed its stature as an authentic threat, capable 
of orchestrating additional abductions, selective assassinations, the hostages’ murder, the intensification 
of terror, and the ensuing economic challenges. Perhaps linked to this conceptualization of the FLQ as a 
legitimate threat, and the crisis as bearing the potential to spiral from control, the papers offered 
widespread support to the WMA. Thirty-three of the forty-two editorials which assumed some stance on 
the crisis indicated their support for the government’s measures, reflective of the support for the WMA 
noted in Hewitt and Cohen-Almagor’s studies. Dominant themes included expressions of the need to have 
faith in the government, dismissal of the oppositions’ arguments, support for the death penalty in the 
Winnipeg Free Press, and the Sun’s arguments that the hard-line stance should have been invoked sooner. 
Editorial opinion opposed negotiations because capitulating to terrorist demands would encourage further 
terror and anarchy. In turn, editors defended the WMA because of the lack of legislative alternatives. The 
papers depicted a Canadian public that broadly supported the government and WMA, and described 
national unity as instrumental in this time of crisis, echoing the findings of Cohen-Almagor and Siegel. 
     While this pro-government and pro-WMA stance was dominant among the editorials, it was not the 
only discourse present. Fifteen editorials − less than half the number of those supportive of the WMA, yet 
still notable − framed the measures in terms reminiscent of the anti-WMA framing which now dominates 
the historiography. The Western Canadian papers raised concerns about threats to civil liberties more 
frequently than their Eastern Canadian counterparts, with eleven editorials voicing unease regarding the 
provincial abuse of the WMA, detainment of innocents, and necessity to avoid censorship and witch-
hunts. Other doubts appeared in two editorials about the WMA’s effectiveness given the lack of any 
quantifiable success in the police investigations, while nine disputed the government’s secrecy 
surrounding the war measures, the latter of which recalled the similar concern noted in Holdrinet’s study. 
Together these formed a corpus of editorials questioning the WMA’s efficacy, although such doubts were 
often tempered with caveats or explanations that it was not the government to blame for the civil rights 
concerns, but the WMA’s flaws and the provincial authorities’ misuse of the act. Even among the 
editorials critical of the WMA and the government’s stance, no editorial staff argued that the WMA had 
not been an appropriate or necessary response to the FLQ. 
     Similarly reflective of the Atlantic editorials was the alien conspiracy framing which, supporting 
Siegel’s findings, dominated all of the Western Canadian papers with the exception of the Edmonton 




reflective of the broader Quebec populace. While nine editorials stressed the foreignness of the FLQ’s 
tactics, structure, and ideology, only six editorials examined the systemic grievances which had 
contributed to the FLQ’s rise. Half of these were concentrated in the Edmonton Journal, indicating not 
only that it was the only paper to construct the crisis as the product of internal grievances rather than 
foreign influences, but that the “alien conspiracy” framing dominated the other three Western Canadian 
papers. Only two editorials − one of which was in the Journal − offered any suggestions on how to 
address the crisis in the long-term. Indeed, beyond the alien conspiracy framework, only the Edmonton 
Journal offered any concerted effort to examine the crisis through either an Explanation, or an Evaluation 
and Moral, framing lens. As in the Eastern Canadian editorials, this conceptualized the crisis as restricted 
in origins, scope, and resolution, limited to the FLQ, and which would thus conclude with their 
apprehension. In this sense, the Leader-Post, Sun, and Winnipeg Free Press’ framing of the crisis was 
thematic only insofar as they connected the crisis to international movements and ideologies, while the 
Edmonton Journal married its episodic coverage of events with a handful of detailed thematic 
explorations of internal grievances. 
     While the Western Canadian newspapers’ general framing of and stance on the October Crisis was 
thus comparable to that presented to Eastern Canadian readers, there were some novel departures. The 
Eastern Canadian editorials were more likely initially to frame the government as confronting a dilemma, 
and accorded more attention to the decision to call in the army to aid the civil power, although the Free 
Press did indicate its support for the army’s future resumption of such a role. Western Canadian papers 
offered more of a dialogue respecting the WMA in terms of containing more editorials expressing some 
concern regarding the emergency measures − while the Atlantic Canadian publications contained six 
editorials critical of the government’s response and two voicing concerns regarding civil rights, the 
Western publications provided fifteen and eleven editorials respectively. Similarly, the Western Canadian 
papers were more critical of the government’s failure to reveal to citizens the extent of the “apprehended 
insurrection,” suggesting the emergence of some doubts about the government’s conduct during the crisis. 
The same papers were more likely to describe the public as supportive of the government’s stance 
(sixteen editorials as opposed to five), and express the necessity of national unity in such trying times (ten 
editorials compared to three). Although neither region accorded any substantial examination to the crisis’ 
internal roots, twice as many editorials in the Western papers − concentrated in the Journal’s unparalleled 
analysis − contained such a theme. Generally, however, the broad contours of the Western and Eastern 
Canadian editorial constructions and framings of the crisis were comparable in their predominant 
endorsement of the government’s hard-line stance and invocation of the WMA, and with their portrayal of 





CHAPTER IV: OBSERVING THE OCTOBER CRISIS IN CENTRAL CANADA 
 
     The four most circulated English newspapers in Central Canada in 1970 − the Globe and Mail, 
Toronto Daily Star, Montreal Star, and Montreal Gazette − offered ninety-two editorials that interpreted 
and analyzed the crisis for readers.537 Although the papers adopted many of the same framings of the FLQ 
as did coverage in other regions, in several key respects the Central Canadian papers adopted novel and 
unparalleled frames. While the Montreal papers reflected the nationwide tendency to support the 
government’s hard-line response, the Toronto papers were uniquely critical and disapproving of the 
government in urging that the government negotiate for the hostages’ release, and framing the WMA as 
“dangerous,” excessive, ineffective, and enabling undue civil liberties violations. The Ontario and Quebec 
papers also provided a broader analysis of the roots of the crisis, relied less frequently on an “alien 
conspiracy” framing, and recommended long-term measures to redress the FLQ’s grievances. 
 
Framing the FLQ - The descriptors used 
     The Central Canadian newspapers framed the FLQ in deprecating terms, emphasizing the group’s 
inhumanity and brutality. Directly following Cross’ abduction, the papers characterized the FLQ as 
comprised of “terrorists,”538 “fanatics,”539 “criminals,”540 “extremists,”541 and members of a “pestilent 
organization.”542 The abduction appeared as “mad and heartless,” a “violation of human decency”543 and 
an “outrage.”544 In the early stage of the crisis, the Globe and Mail and Montreal Star chided any efforts 
to legitimize the FLQ and its actions as being “political” in nature. The Toronto paper denounced efforts 
to frame the FLQ in terms of “political crimes and guerrillas” when there existed “only crimes and 
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criminals,” and refused to frame Cross’ abduction as “a political act” rather than a simple crime.545 The 
Montreal Star also refuted any attempt to classify jailed FLQ members as “political prisoners,” indicating 
that “[t]he terrorists in jail in Quebec are criminals, arrested and tried on criminal charges,” and the FLQ’s 
attempts to accord them different descriptors illuminated only the “distortion in the minds of today’s 
fanatics.”546 
     After Laporte’s abduction the Central Canadian newspapers deepened their denunciation of the FLQ. 
Editorials continued to frame the FLQ as “terrorists,” 547  “extremists,” 548  and “fanatics,” 549  but 
supplemented these descriptors with “lawless,”550 “outlaws,”551 “bandits,”552 “anarchists,” “nihilists,”553 
and  “desperadoes.”554 While the Globe and Mail reduced the FLQ’s activities to “raw gangsterism,”555 
the Montreal publications described the group as conducting “organized terror” 556  and “guerrilla 
crimes,”557 and exhibiting “wild and irrational behavior.”558 The Montreal Star dismissed the FLQ’s 
ideology, indicating that it possessed “a helter-skelter, erratic, irresponsible, outdated view of life and the 
world,”559 had presented itself through a manifesto that was wholly anachronistic and “filled with 
cliches,”560 and sought to create a government “out of despotism tempered by assassination.”561 Again 
attacking any effort to view the FLQ through rose-coloured glasses, the Toronto Daily Star maintained 
																																																								
545 “Ugly, but no surprise,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970. 
546 “The only choice,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970. 
547 “All Quebec held for ransom,” Gazette (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970; “Pierre Laporte,” Gazette (Montreal, 
QC), October 12, 1970; “There is no soft line,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970; “LAPORTE 
KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” Toronto Daily Star (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970; 
“FLQ ‘BANDITS’: Keeping apart crime and politics,” Toronto Daily Star (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970; “Not 
time to strike,” Gazette (Montreal, QC), October 15, 1970; “Use the law we have,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), 
October 15, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” Toronto Daily Star 
(Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970; “The basic challenge to today’s society,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 
17, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Must Canada suffer along with the FLQ?,” Toronto Daily Star (Toronto, ON), 
October 17, 1970. 
548 “The extremists,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 16, 1970. 
549 “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” Toronto Daily Star (Toronto, ON), 
October 12, 1970. 
550 “The basic challenge to today’s society,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970. 
551 “Not time to strike,” Gazette (Montreal, QC), October 15, 1970. 
552 “We are not divided,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970. 
553 “The terror tactics work against cause,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. 
554 “The terror tactics work against cause,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970; “FLQ ‘BANDITS’: 
Keeping apart crime and politics,” Toronto Daily Star (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970. 
555 “We are not divided,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970. 
556 “All Quebec held for ransom,” Gazette (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. 
557 “Pierre Laporte,” Gazette (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. 
558 “The terror tactics work against cause,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. 
559 “The terror tactics work against cause,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. 
560 “The terror tactics work against cause,” Montreal Star (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. 




that the FLQ were not “political prisoners” but “criminals, convicted of criminal acts.”562 An editorial on 
October 14 elaborated that Trudeau had been correct in refusing to label them as such, when they were 
“bandits or worse.” These men, the Star intoned, were not imprisoned because of their beliefs, but for 
criminal acts. It was “falsehood and flattery,” offering “an unearned dignity,” to define such bombers, 
gunmen, and terrorists as “political prisoners.”563 Other editorials emphasized the clear danger that the 
group posed, with the Toronto Daily Star indicating that Laporte’s abduction had constituted “an 
alarming revelation of the terrorists’ conspiratorial strength and audacity.”564 
     Following Laporte’s murder, editorials continued to frame the group as “terrorists,”565 “extremists,”566 
and “fanatics,”567 but the enmity heightened with their employment of such terms as “murderers,”568 “vile 
criminals,”569 “madmen,” and “lunatic killers.”570 The murder had exposed the group as ruthless,571 
cowardly, villainous,572 vicious,573 dangerous,574 murderous,575 and “a determined and fanatical enemy.”576 
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The Montreal Star insisted that the FLQ possessed an “unreasoned terrorist mentality,” and “sick minds,” 
since “[o]nly perverted men could plan [such] a cold-blooded execution.”577 The papers thus condemned 
Laporte’s death as a “black deed,”578 “cold-blooded murder,”579 “crime of brutality and infamy,”580 
“brutal, contemptible act,”581 and a response which was “savage and diabolical” and illustrative only of 
“horror and depravity.”582 
     The Montreal Gazette and Globe and Mail (similar to the Edmonton Journal) framed the FLQ as a 
group with which Canadians were at war. While the former warned that the FLQ had “declared war on all 
Quebecers,”583 the Toronto paper framed provincial and national institutions as “in a state of siege.”584 
Otherwise, Central Canadian papers prominently framed the FLQ as a cancer or ailment with which 
Quebec and Canada were afflicted. The Montreal Gazette described the group’s “cancerous FLQ cells” as 
infecting “the body politic,”585 and for the Toronto Daily Star, Trudeau’s comparison of the FLQ “to a 
cancer in the nation’s body” was held up as a “true” analogy.586 The Globe and Mail indicated that a 
premier metaphor for the FLQ would “present Canada as a ... body contending with a cancer cell,” 
capable of “the destruction of the whole” and necessitating “medicine’s most powerful weapons” to 
combat it.587 Overall, the Central Canadian editorials painted the FLQ in similar terms to those used in 
other national papers, framing the group as terrorists, extremists, fanatics, criminals, a “cancer” requiring 
excision, and a legitimate and ruthless foe with whom the entire nation was at war. 
 
Framing the FLQ as an affront and challenge to Canadian society and democracy 
     Central Canadian papers depicted the FLQ as dangerous because it posed a threat not merely to the 
hostages, or even to Montrealers, but to Quebec, Canada, and their entire social and political systems. 
Democracy itself was at stake. The Montreal Gazette decried the FLQ as endangering and seeking to 
destroy “[e]very democratic institution,” in violating “every civilized tradition” and “every precept of a 
free and civilized society” as it challenged “duly elected authority and every decent human impulse.”588 
The Montreal Star warned that the FLQ’s extortion attempts threatened democracy’s “most basic 
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     The FLQ also imperilled the broader social and political order. “Justice and order in Quebec, and the 
integrity of Canada itself, are in jeopardy,” the Toronto Daily Star cautioned, and “law and justice are 
plainly in grave danger in Quebec, as terrorism prospers.”590 The Montreal Gazette iterated that the FLQ 
was assaulting “[t]he whole fabric of law and order,”591 imperilling the “political and social unit of 
Canada,”592 seeking to undermine its societal foundations,593 and menacing the “rule of law.”594 For the 
Montreal Star, such activities reflected the FLQ’s intent to “create the type of social collapse which is 
needed to justify their kind of action.”595 Moreover, the Globe and Mail framed the FLQ as seeking to 
deploy violence in order “to destroy our society,”596 and intent on “bringing down the Government and 
society by force” and supplanting it with “a brutal and absolute tyranny.”597 Comparably, the Toronto 
Daily Star condemned Laporte’s murder as a “critical assault on the foundation of our country, on the 
security and freedom of each of us,”598 while the Montreal Gazette emphasized the threat against national 
unity specifically, noting that the FLQ sought to “break up this country” through its violence.599 Overall, 
in a framing comparable to other Canadian regions, the Ontarian and Quebec publications characterized 
the FLQ as posing a distinct, tangible, and concerted threat to the province and nation’s democratic 
system, rule by law and order, broader political and social order, and national unity. 
 
Framing the victims as innocent martyrs 
     Emphasizing the villainy and repugnance of the FLQ, the Central Canadian papers (like those 
elsewhere in Canada) highlighted the innocence and exemplary virtues of the victims of terrorism. 
Descriptions of Cross and Laporte characterized them as “helpless,”600 “innocent,”601 or “harmless” 
victims, clearly undeserving of their plight.602 The Toronto Daily Star mourned that Laporte represented 
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“the most noble human side of the turbulent changes in Quebec over the past three decades.” He had 
exhibited a deep conviction and devotion to his people, province, and country, which had propelled him 
from legal study, to a career in journalism exposing “the corruption and repression” of the Duplessis 
regime, to a political career as “a crusader for action” against the province’s ills.603 The Globe and Mail 
similarly depicted Laporte as “one of the group of Quebecers who first sincerely tried to correct the 
injustices in Quebec.” Echoing the Daily Star, the Globe and Mail highlighted that Laporte had been “one 
of the few journalists who dared to cross swords” with the “despot[ic]” Duplessis, and later, in the Liberal 
government, had demonstrated a strong devotion to reducing the inequities of Quebec through political, 
professional, and social reform.604 His virtue as a civil servant concerned with Quebeckers’ rights, his 
belief in democracy and liberalism, and his humanitarian efforts against societal disparities had elicited 
comparisons in the Montreal Star to the Kennedys and to Martin Luther King. Having similarly sought to 
“clean up” political and social injustices, and been “in the midst of striving for answers to many of his 
nation’s, and the world’s, perplexities,” Laporte’s murder had been comparably “shocking,” “savage and 
diabolical.”605 
     In a solemn front-page editorial, the Montreal Gazette explicitly sought to martyrize Laporte. It 
described a nation mourning a man in whom his colleagues and compatriots had recognized “the essence 
of all they held dear.” Laporte had been “an exemplary family man, warm and outgoing, possessed of a 
deep sense of compassion” who, in his public life, was “a fierce and determined enemy of tyranny.” His 
“foul” murder, and “his martyrdom” for “the cause of freedom” for which he had been such a strong 
advocate, had demonstrated the necessity to crush the FLQ.606 The Toronto Daily Star did not agree, 
casting Laporte as “a victim, not a martyr,” not “someone who fell in a heroic struggle but as a plain, 
hardworking man who was innocent of any crime.” That rendered his death “all the more terrible,” the 
Toronto publication intoned, since his murder “strikes us the most insupportable death of all” for how 
“[w]hat happened to him could have happened to anyone.”607 Regardless of whether editorials portrayed 
Laporte as a martyr, they emphasized the victims’ innocence and accorded focus to describing Laporte as 
a virtuous man seized too soon by vile criminals. 
 
Framing a nation in fear of further escalation 
     With the exception of the Montreal Star, which fixated on the events of October 1970, the Central 
Canadian papers expressed anxiety regarding how the crisis could escalate further. In this respect, the 
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papers were comparable to others across the nation. One concern arose regarding the potential for the 
crisis to devolve into further revolutionary violence, with the Toronto Daily Star warning that “[t]he 
advance tremors of revolutionary upheaval are with us.”608 The Montreal Gazette warned that each 
Quebecker was now vulnerable to “being snatched from his home by armed thugs” or victimized by a 
dynamite attack. 609  Until the FLQ terrorists were apprehended, the Globe and Mail warned that 
“[e]veryone in the country” with an “anti-revolutionary” attitude or stance “is jeopardized,”610 since the 
FLQ “has stated readiness to seize more” hostages.611 Accordingly, the Toronto Daily Star approved of 
the precautions adopted in Ottawa’s Rockcliffe suburb (filled with senior civil servants and foreign 
diplomats) where authorities recommended that parents keep their children at home during Halloween 
rather than risk encountering “dangerously real demons.”612 
     Reminiscent of the Eastern Canadian concern that the crisis would erupt into a civil war, the Globe 
and Mail, Toronto Daily Star, and Montreal Gazette expressed unease that the FLQ’s program of terror 
would invite broader and more widespread conflict. The Globe and Mail indicated that Quebeckers’ 
impatience for social justice accorded groups like the FLQ a risk “magnified a thousand times” for their 
capacity “to drive the rest of us into opposing camps.”613 The Toronto Daily Star voiced concern about 
the FLQ’s capacity to draw more Quebeckers into its grasp, noting that terrorism could prosper and elicit 
“sympathy or acceptance among large sections of the population that are either politically illiterate or 
morally blind.”614 For the Montreal Gazette, fear of an expanding crisis revolved around the possibility of 
terrorist acts inviting counter-terrorism. A plethora of “loose talk of individual retaliation” gave rise to 
such worries, although the Gazette warned that it “must be avoided at all costs,” for no individual was 
justified in seizing the law in their own hands.615 
     From the start of the crisis, newspapers worried about the hostages’ fates. The Toronto Daily Star had 
initially supported negotiations as the sole means by which to ensure Cross and Laporte survived their 
ordeal.616 Lamenting that Cross’ fate remained unclear, the Gazette indicated on October 8 that Montreal 
“can only hope that respect for human life will prevail” and that Cross would “be returned safely to his 
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family.”617 The Globe and Mail emphasized six days later that two lives were in danger,618 and the 
following day reiterated that both men were held “on the threat of death.”619 Following Laporte’s murder, 
this concern fixated on Cross’ safety.620 
     Like the Edmonton Journal and Halifax Chronicle Herald, the Toronto Daily Star was distressed that 
the tensions in Quebec would further harm an already struggling Quebec economy. The paper wearily 
predicted that Cross’ abduction and its suggestion of political instability would jeopardize efforts to 
attract foreign investment into Quebec, and thus hinder attempts to increase employment.621 Alongside the 
anxieties about the hostages’ well-being, the potential for further revolutionary violence and abductions, 
and the prospect that the crisis could expand to draw further Canadians into the fray, the papers 
demonstrated considerable angst about the potential for the crisis to degenerate further. 
 
Framing the government as facing a dilemma 
     Reminiscent of the tendency of the Eastern and, to a lesser extent, Western Canadian editorials to 
depict the governments as facing a dilemma regarding whether to accede to terrorist demands, two of the 
four Central Canadian papers briefly adopted such a framing. The Montreal Star portrayed the 
government as facing “a massive dilemma.” Juxtaposing the need to ensure Cross’ safety were the “moral 
or ethnical” complications of “bowing to the kidnappers’ demands,” when capitulating would necessitate 
the release of the identity of an alleged FLQ informer. This would expose that informer’s life “to hazard” 
and represent the “trading of one man’s security for another, and who on this earth can make such an 
omnipotent decision?”622 On the same day, the Toronto Daily Star recognized the dilemma that Cross’ 
abduction presented, observing that refusing to capitulate would produce “every reason to fear that Mr. 
Cross will be killed, like the German ambassador to Guatemala and an American representative in 
Uruguay earlier this year.” Acceding to ransom demands, however, would “make a mockery of Canadian 
justice,” release “desperate men who are all too likely to commit further crimes,” and encourage further 
abductions for subsequent releases. Nevertheless, the paper urged the government to negotiate for Cross’ 
release.623 This certainty about the most appropriate response continued in its October 12 editorial, where 
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the paper acknowledged that authorities faced a “cruel dilemma” but persisted in urging the government 
to capitulate to FLQ demands.624 
     Only the Montreal Star and the Toronto Daily Star framed the governments as facing a dilemma due 
to the FLQ’s activities.625  The Montreal Star was most reminiscent of Eastern Canadian framing, 
delineating arguments for and against negotiations without making an explicit recommendation of action. 
The Daily Star’s approach to the dilemma was more akin to that of the Western Canadian papers, with 
their tendency to nominally frame the crisis as a dilemma while offering an assessment as to the most 
suitable course of action. Appearing in only three editorials between two papers, however, this framing 
was not as prominent in Central Canadian depictions of the crisis as it was elsewhere in the country. 
 
Framing negotiations as a necessity 
     The Toronto Daily Star’s recommendation that the government negotiate with and make concessions 
to the FLQ represented a frame unique to the two Toronto publications, which each contained two 
editorials (published prior to the invocation of the WMA) urging the government to negotiate for the 
hostages’ release. In both papers, this pro-negotiation posturing was the dominant initial framing of the 
crisis prior to the proclamation of the WMA, unaccompanied by any recommendations that the 
government should promptly approach the FLQ with a hard-line, tough-on-crime stance. 
     The Toronto Daily Star directly advocated for negotiations with the FLQ. Although cognizant of the 
government’s dilemma, its first editorial on the crisis on October 6 explained “we believe that the 
government should - after bargaining for a reduced ransom - meet the kidnapper’s demands.” Diplomats 
like Cross were “under Canada’s protection,” and securing his release was both a priority and “an 
obligation of honor.” A hard line against the FLQ would only be warranted after his safe return, at which 
point a “massive police drive by both federal and provincial authorities to smash this pestilent 
organization” would be necessary.626 Hence, the editorial staff’s stance on the government’s courses of 
action favoured immediate negotiations to effect Cross’ safe return, followed by a hard-line stance to 
crush the organization. This support for negotiations persisted after Laporte’s abduction. An October 12 
editorial asserted that assuring the hostages’ survival would “almost certainly” require some bargaining 
with the FLQ. “We believe that is the right course,” the paper indicated, because any alternate action 
would likely lead to the murder of either or both of the hostages. Although conceding that it was “all too 
probable” that this course of action would invite further extortion, no greater safety existed in “standing 
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adamantly on principle” when the government’s refusal to negotiate for Cross triggered Laporte’s 
abduction. “Public safety from these fanatics can only be won by smashing the FLQ with tough and 
thorough police work,” it argued, and the released hostages would be able to share details about their 
experiences in captivity. To achieve this end, the paper suggested that the government should offer to 
release into exile some of the FLQ’s so-called “political prisoners.”627 
     The Globe and Mail also favoured negotiations. Its October 7 editorial suggested “Ottawa and Quebec 
have no other course open to them,” when “Canada’s overriding obligation is to protect foreign diplomats 
and must be met - although all efforts should be bent to minimizing the cost.”628 After Laporte’s 
abduction, the October 12 editorial maintained that the government faced two alternatives regarding 
freeing the prisoners: “to allow them to escape the charges that face them or the penalties” imposed upon 
them, or refusing to release them and “accept[ing] the forfeit of Mr. Cross’ life should the kidnappers 
carry out their threat.” Between these options, the editors opined that “we would have chosen a deal on 
the release of at least some of the prisoners.” Canada had an “obligation to protect the representatives of 
other countries who come to do business in our midst,” which required Canada “to accept whatever 
humiliations lie in the way of reasonable rescue.” Failing to do so would have “grave consequences in our 
diplomatic community.”629 
     The only other suggestion of a pro-negotiation stance in Central Canada appeared in the Montreal 
Gazette editorial on October 13, in which the paper reflected upon Bourassa’s October 11 statement about 
“carefully keeping open the possibility for negotiation” with the FLQ. The paper indicated that the 
government was “quite properly ... thoroughly committed to making every effort within its power to 
protect the victims.”630 The editorial was vague whether the paper supported the government acceding to 
the FLQ’s demands, or supported the appearance of negotiations to occupy and delay the FLQ while the 
police conducted their investigations. Accordingly, the Montreal paper did not explicitly recommend 
acceding to FLQ demands like the two Toronto publications, which prioritized the humanitarian and 
political obligation components of the crisis. 
 
Framing the government’s hard-line response as the most appropriate course of action 
     The pro-negotiations stance in the Toronto papers stood in near diametrical contrast to the two 
Montreal papers. Among the Montreal Gazette’s twenty-four editorials on the crisis, twelve assumed 
some attitudinal stance on the appropriateness of hard-line measures, nine contained support for the 
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government’s stern opposition to terror and/or the invocation of the WMA, and only four invoked some 
measure of concern. Even prior to the WMA’s proclamation, the Gazette had supported emergency 
measures. In light of the FLQ’s threat to the democratic system, “civilized tradition,” and safety of 
Quebeckers, the paper argued that “[t]he government should not hesitate to assume whatever powers it 
requires” to destroy the terrorist organization. Though the powers would be arbitrary, and “repugnant to a 
free society,” they were preferable to remaining vulnerable to individuals seeking to destroy democracy. 
Nor should the courts be lenient, “as they sometimes have been in the past,” but punish such criminals to 
the law’s full extent and “rid ourselves” of the FLQ “as quickly as we can.”631 The Gazette indicated its 
advance support of whatever law-and-order measures the government deemed necessary to crush the 
FLQ, and the most severe punishment of its members that the law allowed. 
     With the proclamation of the WMA, the Gazette’s support for the firm line remained staunch. It 
argued that the WMA was entirely justifiable in the nation’s war against the FLQ. On October 17, the 
paper affirmed that when “the unpunished use of violence” constituted the most severe “danger to 
liberty,” the FLQ’s long reign of terror, threat of further abductions, and possession of thousands of stolen 
dynamite sticks justified the extraordinary powers wielded by the federal government under the WMA. 
Terrorists “cannot be stopped unless the society in which they operate shows that it will not yield to 
threats and intimidation,” and the Gazette insisted that there was “no question” that authorities needed 
WMA powers to crush terrorism “if society is to be freed of the threat of continuing terrorism.” Not only 
was the WMA justified given the threat of further terror in Quebec, but also the possibility that 
insurrection would spread across Canada. When Canadians resided under “the same system of criminal 
law and justice,” the editorial argued, successful attempts to subvert that system in one region would 
encourage dissident groups to adopt similar tactics in other regions.632 Thus, the Gazette echoed the 
Edmonton, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Charlottetown, St. John’s, and Saint John papers by insisting that the 
WMA was defensible to prevent further anarchy and terrorism in Canada. 
     Otherwise, the Gazette framed the WMA and broader harsh response to terror as necessary to protect 
Canadian freedoms and laws. Laporte’s murder had illuminated the extent to which the FLQ was 
threatening the freedom of all Canadians, and had illustrated that the “calculated use of terror must be 
ruthlessly suppressed.”633 The paper defended the WMA as an effort to preserve a “rule of law” under 
assault from “enemies who are prepared to go to any extreme to spread fear and undermine confidence in 
legitimate government” in order to impose their own regime.634 When all citizens’ “rights and liberties 
stem from the rule of law,” the WMA presented “the guarantee of the retention of those rights and 
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liberties for the majority against threat from a minority committed to the use of terror.”635 Simply stated, 
the editors framed the WMA as the protector, rather than the detractor or suspender, of civil liberties. 
     For the Montreal Gazette, like several of its counterparts elsewhere in Canada, the WMA’s 
proclamation was defensible because there were no alternatives to manage the crisis. On October 20, the 
Gazette asserted that the measures were necessary on account of unique challenges posed by urban life 
and liberalism. Terrorists thrived in a liberal society under the shelter of “the very civilities which they 
have undertaken to destroy,” with urbanity further offering advantages in its anonymity, plethora of 
hiding locations, readily available transportation and communication, and convenient access to clothing, 
arms, food, and shelter. Although the WMA could not restrict the benefits which the large urban 
atmosphere offered to terrorists, authorities had no choice but to “resort to arbitrary measures of arrest 
and detention,” and to impose restrictions in a liberal society that enabled terrorists, “if terrorism is to be 
stamped out.”636 The enduring challenges that police faced in apprehending the FLQ illustrated that even 
if the WMA was “too strong, there is nevertheless no other statute that is strong enough to cope with this 
problem.”637 
     Overall, the Montreal Gazette maintained a firm support of authorities’ rigid opposition to terror and 
the WMA. Due to the extent of the FLQ’s threat to the Quebec populace and its institutions, and the 
necessity to quash the organization as rapidly as possible, the paper insisted that it was imperative to 
pursue the perpetrators with the full weight of the justice system. It endorsed the WMA, arguing that the 
measures were necessary due to the dangers to Canadian civil liberties if governments did not punish 
violence, end the FLQ’s long reign of terror, and prevent the spread and escalation of terrorism. 
     The Montreal Star also demonstrated an enduring endorsement of the government’s hard-line response 
to the crisis and proclamation of the WMA. In a comparable ratio to the Gazette’s nine editorials 
supporting a hard line and four voicing some degree of concern, the Montreal Star offered eleven 
editorials endorsing the stern response and six illustrating some measure of concern. Considered among 
the paper’s total twenty-two editorials, thirteen of which assumed a notable stance on the crisis, it is 
apparent that, quantitatively, the pro-hard-line and pro-WMA stance dominated the Montreal Star’s 
evaluations of the crisis of October 1970. 
     In the immediate wake of Cross’ abduction, the Star sternly opposed the FLQ. Early editorial 
assessments of the government’s communications with the FLQ revealed the paper’s opposition to 
capitulation, classifying the FLQ’s demands as being “virtually impossible to meet”638 and insisting that 
the government had “no choice” but to reject them. No government, the paper intoned, “could permit 
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itself to be blackmailed in this fashion,” or allow the majority to fall under the command of a minority. In 
its refusal to yield to extortion that “would threaten the most basic principles of democratic rule,” the 
federal and provincial governments had “properly” approached the issue “in a sharp and hard light.”639 In 
its firm opposition to capitulation to demands it perceived as “irrational” and “unrealistic,” the Montreal 
Star promoted a firm and unyielding approach to the FLQ. 
     The paper’s opposition to any negotiation with the terrorists hardened with Laporte’s abduction. The 
October 12 editorial indicated that a modern democratic society shouldered the duty “to fight back any 
attempt at wild and irrational behavior designed to undermine its foundations.” The government could not 
capitulate, despite the lives on the line, because doing so would “open the door to future blackmail of this 
kind” and thereby propel society down “the slippery slope of anarchy.”640 This echoed the Montreal 
Gazette and most other English-Canadian newspapers that endorsed a steely response to terror to forestall 
further anarchy, violence, and terror. 
     The Montreal Star immediately pledged its support for the government’s implementation of the 
WMA. In an October 16 editorial, the paper characterized the invocation of emergency measures as 
“inevitable,” given the FLQ’s terrorist program’s steady progression from bombings to hostages and 
threats of murder. Allaying concerns about the WMA’s endangerment to Canadian civil liberties, the Star 
assured that the emergency powers were “subject to scrutiny by Parliament and presents no long-range 
threat to individual rights.” As such, “[o]ur response now is in large measure a vote of confidence in legal 
government.”641 Throughout the month, the paper defended the measures because “no lawless group 
should be allowed to throw constitutional order into disarray,”642 insisting that the perverted and cold-
blooded murder of Laporte had laid to rest any doubts about the necessity of emergency powers.643 The 
Star indicated on October 22 that “[w]e do not dispute the need ... for sweeping police powers,”644 and 
affirmed two days later that the WMA had been “necessary” to facilitate the police investigation and 
prevent the spread of terror.645 
     Comparable to the Montreal Gazette and other papers, the Montreal Star endorsed the WMA on the 
grounds that the government lacked alternatives. The Criminal Code could not contain the situation. 
Debating emergency measures prior to their implementation might have seemed ideal, but the Star 
acknowledged that such discussions would have deprived authorities of “the speed and element of 
surprise they needed in their hunt for the abductors.” Thus, the WMA had been justifiable due to the 
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unparalleled speed with which it could be invoked. It also represented the federal government’s only 
option, given the Quebec government’s demand for such measures. Since Quebec had requested Ottawa’s 
aid, “Ottawa had no alternative but to accede to the request,” because disregarding the “appeal would 
have shattered the foundation of confederation.”646 This defence continued into the month’s final days, 
when the Star affirmed that the WMA had been defensible “for the adequate reason that no other 
instrument lay to hand,” and both Montreal and Quebec had requested its invocation.647 
     Comparable to the Charlottetown, Halifax, Edmonton, and Vancouver papers, the Montreal Star 
supported strong federal action to maintain popular faith in the government. The Star urged Canadians to 
accept that the government invoked the WMA “on the basis of knowledge which it has accumulated,” 
even if those details were not yet available to the public.648 Since Trudeau was a renowned civil 
libertarian, the Star assured Canadians that he had inevitably conducted significant “soul-searching and 
analyzing before consenting” to the WMA. Accordingly, the nation need not fear the act when it was 
being wielded in sure and trustworthy hands.649 
     Like the Montreal Gazette, the Montreal Star positioned itself as a staunch advocate of and ally to the 
government. From the onset of the crisis, editorials framed a firm response to terror as essential. With 
Laporte’s death, the paper argued that the government had a duty to repel subversive efforts, when 
capitulation would send the nation upon a “slippery slope” toward further terror. The Star affirmed its 
support for the WMA, describing the measures as inevitable, necessary, without alternative, posing no 
long-standing threats to civil freedoms, and deserving only of the populace’s faith in the government. 
     Compared to the Montreal newspapers, the two Toronto publications were substantially less 
supportive of the government’s tough stance on terror. Following its initial advocacy for negotiations with 
the FLQ (itself a departure from the Montreal papers’ consistent opposition to such yielding), the Toronto 
Daily Star produced only six editorials indicating support for a hard-line approach and/or WMA (half of 
the twelve editorials assuming some stance on the crisis). In contrast, ten editorials expressed some 
degree of concern or disapproval about the government’s response to the FLQ (or all twelve, if one 
includes the two editorials advocating for negotiations). Clearly, the Toronto Daily Star was not nearly as 
unequivocal or devoted in its support for the law-and-order stance on terror and the WMA as its Montreal 
counterparts, offering instead a dialogue reminiscent of the two historiographical approaches to the crisis 
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that have followed since 1970. 
     The Toronto Daily Star approved some elements of the hard-line stance against terror. The paper 
advocated on October 6 for “a massive police drive by both federal and provincial authorities to smash 
this pestilent organization once and for all, and to put its members behind bars,” to occur after 
negotiations had netted Cross’ return.650 This stance persisted following Laporte’s abduction, with the 
paper indicating that, once negotiations had secured the hostages, “public safety from these fanatics can 
only be won by smashing the FLQ with tough and thorough police work.”651 The paper’s initial stance on 
the crisis, through supporting the immediate necessity of negotiations, did situate the law-and-order 
pursuit of the criminals as a necessary, albeit secondary, step. 
     The Daily Star’s stance appeared to shift with Laporte’s murder, recognizing the undesirability of 
negotiations and suggesting tenuous tolerance of the WMA. Since Laporte’s murder had revealed a 
stronger FLQ than the paper had hitherto expected, to release a single “FLQ criminal” in exchange for the 
hostages would have been “interpreted - and therefore would [have] be[en] - a great victory for the FLQ,” 
inviting “chaos in Quebec and its separation from Canada.”652 In addition to reversing its initial stance on 
the favourability of negotiations, Laporte’s murder convinced the Daily Star that “almost any measure is 
justified” to “rid the country of these lunatic killers,” and thereby demonstrated that the WMA “may well 
have been necessary.”653 Although the WMA was unsuitable for the crisis, having been designed for a 
broad-scale and protracted war rather than a minute “secret society,” an October 23 editorial suggested 
that the government could “hardly be condemned” for invoking the act when “[i]t was the only 
emergency legislation on the books.”654 In short, the WMA was justifiable due to the lack of alternatives. 
     Although not the Daily Star’s most dominant approach to the WMA, the paper defended some 
elements of the government’s response to the conflict. Its initial reaction to the crisis had affirmed the 
necessity of a law-and-order opposition to the FLQ, only following negotiations to secure the hostages’ 
release. After Laporte’s murder, the paper recognized the downfalls of negotiations, the justifiability of 
measures to rid of ruthless individuals, and the lack of legislative alternatives to the WMA. The paper’s 
support was more tenuous and less dominant than in the newspapers from Western or Atlantic Canada, or 
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from Montreal. Its presence, however, suggests a clear dialogue within the paper respecting the 
appropriateness of approaching the FLQ with a hard-line and the WMA. 
     Comparable to the Toronto Daily Star, yet unlike the publications from Montreal and elsewhere in 
Canada, the Globe and Mail framed the government’s decision to firmly approach the FLQ in generally 
doubtful if not negative terms. Among the paper’s eighteen editorials taking a stance upon the most 
suitable means to redress the tensions, six articulated approval for the government’s response, and sixteen 
elucidated doubts or criticisms regarding that response (seventeen if one includes those editorials initially 
demanding the government negotiate with the FLQ). Clearly, while a dialogue did exist in the Globe and 
Mail as to the suitability of the government’s response to the FLQ, the paper was dominantly critical of 
the government. 
     The only support arose from six brief passages in the editorials. After supporting negotiations in its 
October 7 and 12 editions, the Globe and Mail appeared to warm itself − albeit slightly − to a law-and-
order stance against the FLQ. On October 15, the paper supported the use of the law against the terrorists, 
when it criticized Trudeau’s government for not deploying the laws of treason and sedition to “br[ing] 
under the law” those FLQ apologists and supporters who, in their public declarations, were inflaming and 
exacerbating the situation.655 Immediately after the WMA’s proclamation, the paper indicated that the 
“drastic and dangerous” powers could only be tolerated “if we can believe that the Government has 
evidence that the FLQ is strong enough and sufficiently armed to escalate the violence that it has 
spawned.” The paper accepted “the Government’s assurance that it has such evidence.”656 
     Laporte’s murder somewhat convinced the Globe and Mail of the WMA’s necessity. On October 19, 
the paper indicated that in light of the slaying, there would be few Canadians − presumably including the 
paper’s editors − “who would have the Government now go one inch further to meet the [FLQ’s] 
demands.”657 The following day, the paper noted that while “[w]e do not agree with” the NDP members 
who voted in opposition to the WMA, “we do respect them” for exhibiting the “courage to act according 
to their conscience.”658 On October 23, the Globe and Mail framed the WMA as a “necessary but 
extraordinary move against the vile criminals,”659 and later characterized itself as “among” those who 
supported the government’s response and proclamation of the WMA.660 
     These brief offerings of support represent the totality of the Globe and Mail’s approval of the 
government’s response to the crisis. In its early criticism of the government for not deploying the 
available laws, the paper appeared supportive of a law-and-order confrontation of FLQ supporters. Later, 
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when the paper conveyed its acceptance that the WMA had been necessary and disagreement with the 
NDP’s opposition to the measures, the Globe and Mail positioned itself as supportive of the WMA. 
However, the brief and often unelaborated nature of this support, and its appearance in merely six 
editorials, illustrate that the Globe and Mail’s dominant approach to the crisis was one of concern and 
doubt, as is demonstrated below. 
     The Montreal Gazette, Montreal Star, and Toronto Daily Star all supported the government’s decision 
to deploy the army in an aid to the civil power role. One editorial in each paper defended the military’s 
role in the current crisis. The Montreal Star quickly implied its approval, noting that the soldiers had 
assumed guard duties to relieve the “overworked police” and enable them to perform their regular 
duties.661 The Toronto Daily Star was more explicit in supporting the soldiers’ deployment, describing it 
as necessary “to relieve the strain on the overworked police” and arguing that they had minimized “the 
danger that irresponsible left-wingers might stir up riots among Montreal students.”662 For the Montreal 
Gazette, its support echoed that voiced in Winnipeg and Halifax, by suggesting the unsuitability of 
reducing the military’s numerical strength when the army would continue to be necessary to address 
threats to the internal order. This was a time when “[t]he politics of confrontation and, unfortunately, of 
violence are becoming part of the Canadian way of life,” and when it would be “foolhardy to believe that 
bombings, kidnappings and other violent crimes for so-called political motives will not be attempted 
again.” Consequently, the Gazette perceived any decline “in the number of trained and combat-ready men 
capable of defence against internal disorder” to be “a reckless undertaking.”663 
     Overall, the Toronto papers clearly diverged from the Montreal publications, and from those across 
Canada. While the Montreal Gazette and Montreal Star were comparable to the Western and Eastern 
Canadian publications in supporting the government’s firm response to terrorism and invocation of the 
WMA, the Toronto Daily Star and Globe and Mail − while containing elements of that framing − 
privileged criticisms of the government. Both Toronto papers initially endorsed negotiations to ensure the 
hostages’ release, shifting with Laporte’s murder to nominally support the WMA while, as evidenced 
below, expressing a dominant concern regarding the government’s conduct. 
 
Framing the governmental response as ineffectual and inappropriate 
     The Toronto and Montreal papers demonstrated varying concerns regarding the WMA’s effectiveness 
and appropriateness as a response to terror. This critical framing was more prominent in the Toronto 
papers, in which sixteen of the Globe and Mail’s eighteen stance-taking editorials expressed concern or 
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doubt about the measures (seventeen if one includes those editorials advocating for negotiations), and ten 
of the Toronto Daily Star’s twelve editorials did the same (all twelve, if one includes the pro-negotiations 
editorials). In contrast, the Montreal Gazette and Montreal Star respectively voiced such concerns in only 
four of the twelve, and six of the thirteen, editorials that situated themselves on either side of the debate. 
Both cities’ publications touched upon the themes of police ineptitude, civil liberties concerns, and the 
government’s necessity to disclose a broader picture of the crisis to Canadians. However, the Toronto 
papers showed qualitatively more concern about the WMA, directly opposed the WMA, blamed the 
government for the crisis’ escalation, and placed greater emphasis on civil liberties concerns and the 
police’s failure to utilize the measures with any success. 
     Reminiscent of the Sun and Leader-Post, the Globe and Mail blamed authorities for contributing to 
and enabling the crisis’ development.664 “The Government had not prepared itself, as it should have,” the 
paper intoned, “to protect its people” against a group whose destructive nature was clear from its seven 
years of robbing, bombing, killing, and pronounced intent to overthrow the government.665 Admitting no 
security system could entirely prevent an abduction, the paper was firm that “God knows we should be 
able to do a better job.” The discovery of the plot against an American diplomat should have incited a 
plan to guard consular and public officials, and Cross’ abduction should have inspired measures that 
would have protected Laporte.666 Thus, the paper chided the government for its “failure, in the face of 
more than adequate warning, to provide even the flimsiest kind of protection.”667 Although not testifying 
to the Globe and Mail’s stance on the defensibility of the government’s hard-line measures, these excerpts 
are notable for their attribution of responsibility to the government for the abductions, insisting that, in 
failing to act with haste to documented threats, the government had contributed to the crisis’ development 
and escalation. 
      Unparalleled in other papers, the Toronto publications explicitly argued in opposition to the WMA. 
Responding on October 16 to speculation that the government was considering invoking the measures, the 
Globe and Mail attacked the prospect as “[d]rastic and dangerous” for how it would enable the 
government to do “[a]lmost anything” it desired, “pass almost any laws restricting” liberties, and send the 
nation careening towards a police state.668 In the wake of the WMA’s invocation, the Toronto Daily Star 
chided the government because while “the FLQ has to be crushed ... we believe this could have been done 
without abrogating all of our civil liberties.” The government had bypassed the democratic process and 
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“ignored” Parliament by invoking the WMA without prior consultation, and the WMA had “reversed the 
traditional process of justice, which assumes that a person is innocent until he is proven guilty.”669 
     The WMA furthermore evoked substantial concerns for the Toronto papers about the condition of civil 
liberties in Canada. Such concerns were evident in their characterization of the WMA as occasioning 
“massive threats to freedom,”670 as “drastic and dangerous,” and “a denial of the very rights which Mr. 
Trudeau once wanted to enshrine in the Constitution.”671 More specific anxieties regarding threats to 
certain civil liberties also indicated the papers’ concern. The Globe and Mail demanded the publication of 
the names of those detained under the act and why they were detained, citing concerns that the WMA 
would be abused “to settle old scores not related to the FLQ manhunt”672 or “hamper legitimate political 
opposition.”673 Its demands for a body to ensure prisoners’ welfare spoke to its concerns about the 
detainees’ treatment,674 and the editors feared that authorities would use the measures to target all 
governmental opposition, including unions, youth, and the poor.675 The paper’s cautioning that the WMA 
could be used to curtail freedom of the press, despite the need for “unfettered reporting,” reflected unease 
as to how the measures could spiral into further civil liberties infringements.676 Such apprehension was 
not unfounded when the detainment of hundreds of Quebeckers incommunicado, denied their legal ability 
to access legal counsel, had produced “anxious moments” for family and friends.677 
     The Toronto Daily Star voiced similar concerns about how the WMA enabled the abrogation of civil 
liberties. Its editors spoke of the WMA as granting the government “virtually dictatorial powers,”678 and 
subjecting citizens’ “dearly purchased rights” to the state’s arbitrary decisions.679 Deeming the WMA “a 
suspension of civil liberties” and “of all legal procedures,” the Daily Star intoned that it enabled “the 
arbitrary decisions of policemen and minor government officials” to supplant “the statutes of Parliament 
and the decisions of the courts as the law of the land.”680 Even as the nation reeled from Laporte’s loss, 
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the Daily Star reiterated that the government’s powers “arouse our uncertainty, for our civil liberties ... 
cannot be lightly surrendered.”681 Comparable to the Globe and Mail, it urged reviews of all arrests and 
detainments under the WMA and the publishing of the names of those detained to ensure authorities were 
being “careful and discriminating” in applying the act.682 
     Moreover, the Toronto papers were concerned about how regional authorities were abusing the 
emergency situation. The Globe and Mail denounced as unreasonable the proposition of Toronto Board of 
Education trustee Herbert Barnes to effect the dismissal of all instructors advocating terrorist overthrows 
of government. That proposition, and the British Columbian government’s similar resolution, were 
ignorant of the law, since advocating such overthrow was criminalized in Section 60 of the Criminal 
Code. They were also “dangerous,” since the instructors would be fired without any hearing and the 
employee would bear the onus to demonstrate their innocence.683 The Daily Star similarly characterized 
Barnes’ motion as “unnecessary” when the WMA already subjected such teachers to punishment, and 
“potentially dangerous” in how it could mimic McCarthyism by freezing education with its witch-
hunts.684 
     For the Toronto editors, the police’s apparent ineptitude in conducting its manhunt raised further 
doubts regarding the WMA’s wisdom, necessity, and effectiveness. For the Globe and Mail, this concern 
appeared simply in an editorial on the October 24 robbing of $120,000 in banknotes at Montreal 
International Airport, suggesting that the perpetrators’ “unreal” escape called into question the 
effectiveness of the police’s dragnet.685 The Toronto Daily Star was more consistently critical of the 
police’s conduct under the WMA. “Ottawa must be embarrassed,” it commented, “by the apparently 
meagre results of the police sweep,” for they had failed to capture the abductors or any significant 
members.686 On October 23, its editors observed that “it is becoming questionable,” when the arrests had 
succeeded only in detaining “seemingly respectable people,” whether the measures “have really 
helped.”687 Once it was revealed that no charges had been placed against any of the 397 individuals 
detained under the WMA, the Daily Star criticized that the police’s lack of success was exacerbating 
“doubts over official policy in the Quebec crisis.” While such a mass round-up produced the inevitability 
that “some innocent people” would be swept up, it was “astonishing that two weeks’ interrogation and 
searching did not turn up enough information to support charges before this.” The entire police manhunt 
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had appeared to be “aimless,” directionless, and a failure when the manhunt had seemingly not “broken or 
crippled the FLQ,” Cross remained a hostage, and the abductors prevailed at large.688 
     The final area of concern voiced in the Toronto papers was the constant discontent with authorities’ 
failure to be completely transparent with Canadians regarding the true extent of the crisis. The Daily Star 
first voiced this concern − and its doubts as to the WMA’s necessity − on October 16, when it urged the 
government to further justify the WMA since “a request by these governments [of Quebec and Montreal] 
is not, in itself, sufficient justification.”689 Its editors urged Trudeau “to take the public into his confidence 
and clearly establish the need for the drastic measures,” warning his support would evaporate if he failed 
to demonstrate why the measures had been requisite.690 On October 22, the Daily Star reaffirmed that the 
government owed Canadians “some solid, documented justification” for the WMA,691 a demand that 
persisted in its October 30 lament that it was imperative the government offer “a much more complete 
and candid statement about the Quebec crisis than they [Canadians] have been given.” Since the WMA 
had been the “most drastic action ever undertaken by a Canadian government in peacetime,” the rumours 
of a plot to establish a provisional government were “too important a matter to be left in doubt and 
suspense,” and demanded an urgent statement on their role in the WMA’s proclamation.692  
     The Globe and Mail similarly attacked the government for its refusal to loosen its tight lips respecting 
the crisis’ severity. The paper chided the government for how its “secrecy on specifics” was exacerbating 
the rumours swirling through the populace, and demanded Trudeau “clear the atmosphere by presenting 
the facts.”693 His refusal to expand upon the reports of a provisional government “or confirm ... or deny 
them” was only fuelling such rumours.694 Combined with the papers’ blaming of the crisis’ development 
upon the government’s lack of action, and the concerns for civil liberties, regional repression, and police 
ineptitude, these demands for further information portrayed the Toronto papers as critical of the 
government’s response to an extent unseen in any other paper examined. 
     Such criticisms of the government’s response and emergency measures were less prominent in the 
Montreal papers, which remained favourable to the government’s handling of the crisis. Though not 
blaming the government for the crisis’ escalation or arguing against the WMA as the Toronto papers had 
done, the Montreal publications still expressed concerns about civil liberties, the manhunt’s lack of 
success, and the government’s failure to disclose sufficient details to the populace. 
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     The Montreal editors’ concerns for civil liberties were more sporadic, and less frequent, than those of 
the Toronto publications, emerging prominently in only three editorials. The Montreal Gazette’s concerns 
were limited to one editorial, which indicated that the WMA − in permitting police to conduct arrests and 
detentions on mere suspicion − created vast opportunity for abuse, when Quebec Justice Minister Jérôme 
Choquette could not “always know of abuses when they do occur.”695 In the Montreal Star, all civil 
liberties concerns were bookended with reaffirmations that the WMA was necessary. After reiterating that 
the WMA had constituted the most effective mechanism to suppress terror, the Star cautioned that its 
enabling of “arrest without warrant” was dangerous, for how it deprived liberty “without prior judicial 
sanction” and without requiring “reasonable grounds” to believe an offence had occurred. Dangerous too 
was “detention without arraignment,” for how it left detainees at the “mercy” of police, unable to appeal 
to counsel or the magistrate. Reports had arisen that detainees had been “unacceptabl[y]” denied counsel 
for days, and thus the editors urged that police be subjected to “careful scrutiny and ... exacting judicial 
supervision.”696 The Star later reiterated that civil rights abuses had occurred under the WMA, despite its 
justifiability, again focusing on how prisoners were being detained incommunicado for days, “stripped ... 
of the right to counsel” due to so-called “administrative difficulties.” Like the Western and Eastern 
Canadian editorials, the Star blamed the WMA rather than the government for such infringements, noting 
that the measures did not explicitly provide for public or judicial surveillance of their enactment.697 
     In addition to this minimal focus on civil liberties concerns, the Montreal papers also accorded 
relatively little attention to the police’s failed manhunt. Compared to that theme’s prominence in the 
Toronto papers, and appearance too in the Western and Eastern Canadian publications, this discontent 
appeared only once in the Montreal Gazette. Though not directly chastising the police, the Gazette 
admitted that the FLQ and its stolen weapons remained “at large,” due to a “lack of police success” which 
was exacerbating the public’s doubts as to what the WMA had accomplished.698 
     The Montreal editors’ primary criticism of the government revolved around its restrictions on the flow 
of information to Canadians. On October 24 the Montreal Gazette indicated that, as the public could only 
“wonder and ... speculate” at the rumours of a provisional government and the FLQ’s infiltration of 
“every strategic place” in Quebec, there existed “[a]n absolute need” for Trudeau “to give the country a 
fuller description of the emergency” that had provoked the WMA. Addressing the rumours was 
imperative to ensure they “are given as little scope as possible.”699 While the WMA was “an extremely 
harsh statute whose use must be justified with the most cogent explanations,” the paper criticized Trudeau 
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for “giving his critics the brush-off in the House of Commons.” Instead, the prime minister should have 
utilized the opportunities to document the extent of the threat in Quebec. In so doing, he could have 
responded to criticism that the WMA had been unnecessary, and stemmed the “series of leaks and 
rumors” and the confusion they were perpetuating. 700  Since the “absence of official and reliable 
information” only heightened these rumours and turmoil, the Gazette urged Trudeau to reveal more of the 
evidence that had compelled the government to invoke the WMA.701 
     The Montreal Star was not concerned about the lack of information available to the public, but about 
misinformation and rumour mongering. The paper chastised the authorities for making statements “that 
only tend to continue tension or to cause a suspicion that perhaps Ottawa is trying to justify the severity of 
its measures.”702 The public deserved to be informed, “either now or in the future,” whether and to what 
extent a plot existed for some takeover of governmental authority. In the meantime, it was essential that 
officials cease their inappropriate warnings that the true reasons for the WMA would never be revealed.703 
The Star castigated Drapeau for his unsupported and vague comments about the provisional government 
rumour, arguing that he “owes it to the federal and provincial governments, and the general community, 
to share” any information he had about such a plot.704 This discontent at the government’s lack of 
transparency was the Montreal editors’ dominant criticism of the government, while the police failure and 
the WMA’s civil rights concerns elicited minimal attention. Its stance upon the government’s response 
remained favourable, in contrast with the Toronto papers’ criticism and doubt of the government. 
 
Framing Canadians as supportive of the government’s stance 
     In eighteen editorials, divided relatively evenly between the Toronto and Montreal publications, the 
Central Canadian papers framed the populace as supportive of the government’s unyielding approach to 
terror. As the Montreal Gazette expressed, the nation was willing to accept the government’s actions “on 
faith,”705 and had “fully accepted”706 its “tough policy without question.”707 Even the Toronto Daily Star 
and Globe and Mail, themselves critical of the government’s positioning, conceded that the populace 
endorsed the authorities’ response. As the Daily Star reviewed, Canadians approved of Trudeau’s “drive 
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to destroy the FLQ,”708 he possessed “widespread public support for the steps he has taken,”709 and the 
citizenry “as a whole” had accepted his explanation of the act’s necessity.710 The Globe and Mail 
conceded that few Canadians would oppose the government’s rejection of the FLQ’s demands,711 when 
the public supported the government’s contention that it required “wide authority to deal with whatever 
further menace existed.”712 
     As elsewhere in the nation, Drapeau’s victory in the Montreal election was presumed to be indicative 
of the populace’s support for the authorities during the crisis. The Montreal Gazette deemed the results of 
the election demonstrative of the populace’s desire for law and order,713  and endorsement of the 
governments’ “strong leadership” in the crisis.714 The Montreal Star described his success as illustrative 
of the public’s solidarity with the Civic Party and Drapeau, and its commitment to democracy.715 For the 
Daily Star, the sweep symbolized Montrealers’ rejection of “the separatists and FLQ sympathizers of the 
Front d’Action Politique,” and endorsement of the authorities’ “strong stand” against the FLQ.716 Such 
attention to framing the governmental stance as eliciting public support may be attributable to the crisis’ 
immediacy in Ontario and Quebec, and broader interest in assessing the public’s reaction to the events. 
 
Framing the nation’s need for unity 
     To a lesser extent than in Western or Eastern Canada, the Central Canadian publications − namely the 
Montreal Gazette and Toronto Daily Star − framed the crisis as necessitating the populace’s unity in a 
tumultuous time. For the Gazette, this need for unity rendered the medical specialists’ opposition to the 
government over its intent to introduce a medicare program inappropriate and inexcusable. The paper 
urged the specialists to culminate their strike, intoning that “[n]ow is the time for unity,” for citizens to 
“unite behind government and police” as they defended Quebec from “outlaws.”717 Otherwise, the papers 
focused on the need for a more national unity. The Gazette described such unity as necessary to allow 
society to surmount the crisis “without fatal damage,”718 while the Toronto Daily Star indicated that the 
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nation’s survival demanded that “English and French Canadians pull together” for their survival.719 Since 
this pro-unity framing emerged from only three editorials (two of which appeared in the Montreal 
Gazette), this theme was notably less prevalent than in Western or Eastern Canada, where ten and three 
editorials respectively trumpeted the essentiality of unity. 
 
Framing the October Crisis as the result of internal systemic factors 
     To an extent unseen in Western or Eastern Canada, the Central Canadian papers focused upon the 
internal and systemic roots of the October Crisis. While the Western and Eastern Canadian publications 
respectively offered six and three editorials exploring such a frame, the Ontario and Quebec papers 
provided a deeper interpretation of the crisis’ origins in sixteen editorials. Editors referred to the crisis as 
the result of “an internal conflict,”720 “disparities in our society,”721 “imbalances between Canada’s two 
founding cultures,”722 and “the injustices in Quebec” which the FLQ had sought to use to elicit support.723 
The Toronto Daily Star attributed tensions to intercultural conflict, noting that “[t]he existence of two 
vigorous cultures in a single state produces conflict” and that the current turbulence illuminated that “the 
Canadian experiment has not been wholly successful.”724 For the Montreal Star, the conflict boiled down 
to the flawed education system and the disaffected youth it produced. Schools accorded insufficient 
attention to “the complex issues in Canada’s current crisis.” This lack of honest and dedicated efforts to 
exploring the nation’s economic, social, and political issues had contributed to students’ pessimism, 
negativism, and drift towards Maoism, Marxism, and violence.725 Though varying, both papers spoke to a 
social element underlying the developing tensions in Quebec. 
     Most editorials examining the crisis’ roots did so from an economic perspective. The Toronto Daily 
Star argued that the tensions stemmed from the province’s “economic problems,” notably its mass 
unemployment,”726 and thus it was integral for the government “to hold out the pride, the jobs, the 
housing” which French-Canadians “desperately need.” It was the lack of those elements that had “allowed 
the FLQ to flourish.”727 Cautioning that poverty provided fertile soil in which terror could prosper, the 
Daily Star noted that such soil abounded in Quebec. The province had contained 41% of Canada’s 
unemployed in 1969, as well as an unemployment rate generally 50 to 100% higher than Ontario’s. In 
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particular, French-Canadians and youth under twenty-five suffered from high rates of unemployment. 
These issues allowed the FLQ to easily cultivate the belief that the fault lie in capitalism or “the English,” 
and find a sympathetic ear with its promises of socialism, equality, and provincial independence.728 The 
Globe and Mail, citing similar unemployment statistics and observing that Quebec’s unemployment rate 
was anticipated to reach 10 to 12% that winter, argued that “[o]ne of the underlying causes of disaffection 
in Quebec has been the economic disparities suffered.”729 For the Montreal Star, the FLQ had made 
“incisive points” regarding the urgency for unemployment and housing reform in Quebec, and had thus 
struck a chord with many Quebeckers.730  Its program had tapped into the “tremendous gaps and 
discrepancies” in the city, finding purchase in the 38% of Montrealers living “on or below the poverty 
line,” the 400% rise in welfare recipients over the decade, the 240,551 illiterate adults, and the high 
percentages of undernourished and emotionally or physically challenged slum youth.731 
     The Montreal Gazette took a different stance on the crisis’ roots, accrediting terrorism not to high 
unemployment, excessive poverty, and the need for economic growth, but to the fact that Quebec was “on 
the verge of beginning to move ahead.” Bourassa’s success in the Quebec election, commitment to 
generating 100,000 new jobs within a year, and promising developments on Quebec’s economic scene 732 
had prompted the FLQ to sense “they were beginning to lose what little support they had.” Consequently, 
they had launched their current activities to “reassert themselves.”733 The FLQ’s program was rooted not 
in the province’s economic woes but authorities’ success in addressing them. 
 
Framing the October Crisis as expected and of no surprise 
     The framing of the abductions as being a shock to Canadians was not as prevalent in Central Canada. 
This stance appeared only briefly in the Montreal Gazette’s description of Cross’ disappearance as 
“shocking,”734 and its portrayal of Laporte’s abduction as “a shock and an affront to the community.”735 
Instead, the Montreal Star and Globe and Mail described the crisis as having been expected or 
anticipated, suggesting a more thematic − rather than episodic − conceptualization of the crisis. For the 
Montreal Star, terrorism had been “bound to take this form here sooner or later” due to the use of such 
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tactics in other countries.736 The Globe and Mail argued that the crisis had been expected due to internal, 
rather than international, indications of its imminence. Earlier that year, the police had foiled FLQ plots to 
seize American diplomat Harrison Burgess and another diplomat for ultimatums nearly identical to those 
demanded for Cross and Laporte. Even without those prior schemes, “it should have been obvious” that 
an abduction was possible given how the FLQ’s terrorism had progressed through the 1960s.737 Whether 
due to the international malaise of violence, or internal indications of the FLQ’s escalation, the Globe and 
Mail and Montreal Star adopted the novel approach that the political abductions were foreseeable, rather 
than shocking. 
 
Framing terrorism as a construct and phenomenon foreign and alien to Canada 
     Despite this recognition of the internal, systemic factors which had contributed to the crisis’ 
development, all papers but the Globe and Mail abided by the broader tendency to frame the crisis as an 
“alien conspiracy.” For instance, several papers emphasized the foreignness of the FLQ’s tactics to 
Canada, and their origins in international terrorist practices. The Montreal Gazette described Cross’ 
abduction as a crime “unprecedented in our experience”738 and “foreign to Quebec.”739 The Toronto Daily 
Star framed Cross’ abduction within the creeping endemic of “violence and disorder ... around the globe,” 
depicting political abductions as “one of the most repulsive innovations of Latin American terrorists” 
which had been “naturalized” at home.740 Editorials on Laporte’s murder emphasized the alien nature of 
political assassinations. The Montreal Star observed that Laporte’s death constituted “the first political 
assassination in more than a century” in Canada,741 as did the Toronto Daily Star.742 
     The FLQ’s ideology was also foreign, having seemingly derived from international revolutionary 
movements and creeds. The Montreal Gazette proclaimed that “[t]he ideology of the FLQ is as foreign to 
Quebec as the tactics it employs,”743 which the Toronto Daily Star echoed in lamenting that Laporte had 
been killed “to satisfy the demands of a foreign ideology.”744 Connections were often made between the 
FLQ and foreign ideological movements, with the Montreal Star identifying the FLQ as “Maoists,” 
“nihilists,” and − due to its “end justifies the means” approach − comparable to Joseph Stalin.745 The 
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Daily Star described the FLQ as having drifted “into something like the Maoist version of communism,” 
thus representing a “larger lunacy” as opposed to anything “peculiarly French Canadian,” and even 
observed that the FLQ bore “international connections” with groups in Algeria, Cuba, and America.746 
     Otherwise, a handful of papers characterized the FLQ as representative of the international surge of 
revolutionary fervour. In addition to classifying the FLQ’s activities as indicative of a “larger lunacy,”747 
the Toronto Daily Star referred to a “violence and disorder” which had “spread around the globe,”748 and 
described the crisis as illustrating “that Canada is not free from the spreading infection of violence.”749 
For the Montreal Star, terrorism’s spread to Quebec had been inevitable when so many nations recently 
had “felt the mad and heartless acts of hijackers or abductors.” Indeed, “what we are witness to,” 
according to the Star, was not “an isolated act of Quebec fanatics” but a “manifestation of international 
anarchy,”750 with Laporte’s murder demonstrating to Canadians that “the world of violence has embraced 
us.”751 The framing of the FLQ as a cancer or ailment supported this “alien conspiracy” conceptualization 
of the group as an international endemic that had spread to and corrupted Quebec. Although this frame’s 
appearance in eleven of the region’s ninety-two editorials reveals it to be a dominant theme in Central 
Canada, it was nonetheless less prevalent than in Western and Eastern Canada, in which the “alien 
conspiracy” framing emerged in nine of fifty-seven, and ten of thirty-seven, editorials. 
 
Framing the FLQ as not reflective of Quebeckers more broadly 
     Despite their greater attention to the systemic factors contributing to the October Crisis, the Central 
Canadian papers reflected the same tendency as the other publications across Canada to frame the FLQ as 
a minority unrepresentative of Quebec. Comparable to the thirteen Western Canadian editorials 
containing such a theme, and greater than the four editorials in Eastern Canada, the Toronto and Montreal 
newspapers contained fourteen editorials constructing the FLQ as an unrepresentative minority. Ten of 
these appeared in the Montreal papers, unsurprising given that Montrealers and Quebeckers inevitably 
possessed a more vested interest in differentiating the FLQ from mainstream Quebec. 
     There was a concerted effort among Montreal and Toronto editors to frame the FLQ as a minority. The 
Toronto papers described the FLQ as “small,”752 a group composed of “a tiny fringe”753 and “criminal 
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few,”754 whose membership contained only “a few hundred.”755 Montreal editors described the FLQ as 
“small but determined”756 and a “minority,”757 comprising “a few men”758 and “a handful of fanatics.”759 
     In addition to representing a numerical minority, the Montreal papers explicitly differentiated and 
distanced the FLQ from the separatist movement. The Montreal Gazette argued that the outrage among 
the “overwhelming majority” of the Quebec populace − including most separatists − at the FLQ’s 
activities was indicative of “a difference between Quebec nationalism and the kind of thinking and feeling 
exemplified by the FLQ.” 760  The Montreal Star similarly marginalized the FLQ. They were not 
“separatists,” and not like such “responsible groups” as the PQ which sought to effect political change 
through “legitimate means.” Rather, the FLQ were “anarchists, Maoists, nihilists, or whatever current 
term one can apply to men who act ... at the expense of a cause” and who distorted separatism’s 
objectives to their own needs.761 
     The papers moreover attempted to establish the FLQ as a marginal “other” to the broader Quebec 
populace. The Montreal Gazette described the group as having “no place in Quebec,” and being “totally 
rejected by the vast majority of Quebecers.”762 For the Toronto Daily Star, Quebec’s election of the 
provincial Liberal party that year had illustrated that the FLQ could not be considered “representative of 
the Quebec people or of any substantial fraction of them.” Indeed, the PQ had garnered “only” 25% of the 
vote, and the FLQ represented “only a tiny fringe” of that party’s supporters.763 The Montreal Star 
affirmed that the FLQ’s violence found few sympathetic ears among Quebeckers, who had been “as 
shocked and sick at heart as the rest of the country.”764 In framing the FLQ as a minority unreflective of 
either the separatist movement or the broader Quebec populace, the Central Canadian newspapers, 
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Framing the nation’s next steps beyond the shock and grief of October 1970 
     Stemming from this greater recognition of the crisis’ internal roots, the Central Canadian papers 
offered more concerted efforts to recommending measures by which the government could address these 
grievances in the long-term. While the Western Canadian papers had contained only two editorials 
seeking to do so, and the Eastern Canadian publications three, Montreal and Toronto readers received ten 
editorials offering some recommendations on how to redress the underlying grievances. These efforts 
were concentrated in the Montreal Star and the two Toronto papers. 
     Reflective of the prominent assessment that Quebec’s economic woes had spawned the FLQ and the 
crisis, several papers indicated that the province’s tenuous economic situation should constitute the 
government’s primary concern moving forward. For the Montreal Star, it was imperative that social 
reform immediately follow the suppression of the FLQ, commencing with the concerns of deficient 
housing and excessive unemployment noted in the FLQ’s manifesto.765 A subsequent editorial indicated 
that “[w]e need programs of social and economic advancement,”766 recommending pressure on the 
Montreal government to address the high poverty rate, dependence on welfare, mass illiteracy, and 
inadequate housing and hygiene.767 
     The Toronto editors concurred with the need for economic and social reforms. The Globe and Mail 
suggested that if the government had any hope of retaining Canadian unity beyond the crisis, it was 
integral that it “move swiftly and dramatically to help solve the economic problems of Quebec,” including 
its high rate of unemployment.768 The paper urged Finance Minister Edgar Benson and Trudeau to 
remedy that crisis by accelerating efforts “to stimulate the economy,” or adjusting assistance programs to 
help unemployed and low income Quebeckers.769 The Toronto Daily Star agreed, advising the federal 
government “to hold out the pride, the jobs, the housing French-Canadians so desperately need” in order 
“to alleviate the causes which allowed the FLQ to flourish in the first place.”770 Once the crisis had been 
quelled, the editors indicated that “Premier Robert Bourassa’s most crucial task is the creation of 
thousands of new jobs in Quebec,” to resolve the unemployment rates and poverty from which terrorism 
had bloomed. To assist this effort, the Daily Star proposed that Trudeau’s government first “cushion 
hardship by raising unemployment insurance benefits,” then attack unemployment by “putting more 
federal money into housing; ... reviving the municipal winter works program ... ; and ... manipulating our 
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floating dollar to a somewhat lower level to make more exports and jobs for Canadians.”771 
     In addition to this economic reform, the Toronto Daily Star suggested an ideological or societal reform 
of the French-English relationship in Canada. To overcome the separatist impulse in Quebec, the paper 
demanded the promotion of “a real community of interest and goals” and a “joint purpose ... common to 
all Canadians.”772 Cognizant of how the FLQ had illuminated the gulf between the “two solitudes,” the 
Daily Star urged “that we pledge our energies to the renovation of our national community” to ease the 
conflict. This renovation would require educational reforms to better develop a “sense of nation” and 
redress the “sharply opposed” perceptions of Canadian history − and thereby divergent value systems − 
with which French and English students were inculcated.773 The Toronto Daily Star proposed further 
educational reforms, to remedy the lack of free discussion and debate that was contributing to youth 
pessimism and violence in Quebec. Educational institutions should “stimulate independent research and 
free discussion ... [,] encourage active participation in the political process as a means of effecting 
change,” and maintain an openness to all ideas that would “help restore the faith of young people in a free 
society.”774 These recommended reforms to the economy and French-English relationship suggest that the 




     The Central Canadian publications offered the most distinct interpretation of the October Crisis. In 
several respects, the Montreal Star, Montreal Gazette, Toronto Daily Star, and Globe and Mail echoed 
other regional papers (and each other). The editors framed the FLQ as a terrorist, fanatical, and criminal 
cancer, emphasizing their threat to the democratic system and villainizing them further by describing the 
victims’ innocence, helplessness, and virtue. Though not citing the same fear of selective assassinations 
as that described by Eastern and Western Canada editors, the Central Canadian papers recognized the 
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crisis’ potential to escalate further through additional abductions and violence, the hostages’ murder, the 
crisis’ economic impact, and the populace’s division. 
     Comparable to the other papers (although to a lesser extent than in Eastern Canada), a handful of 
Central Canadian editorials framed the crisis as presenting a dilemma for the government, even as most 
advocated some specific action. All papers depicted a public supportive of the government, and all but the 
Globe and Mail − which offered no comment − supported the army’s deployment to aid the civil power. 
When assessing the government’s response to the FLQ, Montreal editors adopted frames comparable to 
those utilized in Western and Eastern Canada. They immediately endorsed a stern approach to terror, and 
defended the WMA in light of the FLQ’s threat and history of terror, the lack of alternatives, and the 
necessity to halt the spread of terror and protect Canadian freedoms, thus confirming Cohen-Almagor, 
Siegel, and Hewitt’s findings. This dominant pro-WMA stance appeared in a discourse with the demands 
for fuller government disclosure as to the crisis’ extent (as had appeared in Holdrinet’s study), as well as 
the briefer concern for civil liberties and anxiety regarding the police’s failed manhunt.  
     The Toronto papers diverged from this otherwise national framing of the WMA and authorities’ 
response to the FLQ. Unlike any other paper, the Globe and Mail and Toronto Daily Star initially urged 
the government to negotiate with the FLQ for the hostages’ safe return, with the Daily Star only 
conceding to a hard-line stance once negotiations had secured their release. Although Laporte’s murder 
compelled the editors to nominally and briefly frame the hard-line response as tolerable, they blamed 
authorities for the crisis’ escalation, opposed the “dangerous” WMA, chastised the police’s apparent 
ineptitude, and persistently demanded safeguards to ensure the measures were not abused. Unlike the 
Montreal papers, whose concerns had been concentrated around the need for fuller disclosure and 
bookended by affirmations of the WMA’s necessity, the dominant discourse in Toronto entailed a sharp 
criticism of the measures. Thus, the Toronto Daily Star and Globe and Mail constituted the outliers to the 
more national framing of the crisis, which endorsed and urged a hard-line opposition to terror. This 
finding adds nuance to that of Cohen-Almagor’s study, which had observed in English media an approval 
of the WMA and dominant focus on law and order rather than civil liberties concerns. 
     In other respects, the Central Canadian editors’ approach to the crisis differed from their western and 
eastern counterparts. Although declarations of the need for unity appeared in the Central Canadian papers, 
reflecting Cohen-Almagor and Siegel’s studies, they did so with less frequency. Rather than reflecting the 
popular framing of the abductions as a “surprise” or “shock,” two editorials explicitly described the crisis 
as having been foreseeable in light of the international waves of violence and the FLQ’s previous 
activities. This represented only one indication of the Central Canadian papers’ overall deeper 
comprehension of the crisis. Analyses of the crisis’ internal and systemic origins assumed a prominence 




education system, economic grievances, and the increasing success of the province’s reformist impulse. 
Simultaneously, fewer analyses relied upon the “alien conspiracy” framework compared to in Western 
and Eastern Canada. This, combined with the papers’ unparalleled number of “Evaluation/Moral” 
editorials suggesting means by which to address the FLQ’s systemic grievances, indicated that the Central 
Canadian papers possessed a more thematic and comprehensive understanding of the crisis’ roots. It is 
ironic then that the papers, particularly in Montreal, still sought to marginalize and “other” the FLQ by 
emphasizing their minority and unrepresentative status in the province. While conforming to the “typical” 
national framing in several key respects, the Central Canadian newspapers (particularly the Toronto 





























ASSESSING AND CONCLUDING 
 
     The historiographical debate that has developed since the October Crisis of 1970 regarding whether 
the government’s uncompromising reaction to the tensions was an indefensible abuse of civil liberties, or 
a necessary effort to dismantle a dangerous terrorist group, was not invented by scholars. The 
historiography extends a debate that was already being presented to Canadians from coast to coast by the 
dominant English-language newspapers in October 1970. English-Canadian newspaper editorial discourse 
on the crisis and invocation of the WMA was generally supportive of the federal government’s firm 
stance against the FLQ. The Western Canadian, Eastern Canadian, and Montreal papers all opposed 
government negotiations with the terrorists and supported a hard-line response, with sentiment becoming 
even firmer after Laporte’s abduction and murder. Editors framed the WMA as a necessity to confront a 
menacing terrorist threat and prevent the proliferation of anarchy and terror, and (in Western and Eastern 
Canadian publications) as being an overdue response to mounting violence. For a handful of Atlantic and 
Western editorial staffs, the government’s hard-line response was insufficiently firm, with the crisis 
warranting a sterner response including the resumption of capital punishment. Together with the Montreal 
papers, they urged the populace to have faith in the government and emphasized the lack of legislative 
alternatives to the WMA. The papers also dismissed political opposition to the federal government and 
denied that the WMA constituted any severe or long-lasting infringement of civil liberties. Several of 
these defences would later appear in the historiographical endorsements of the WMA by Dan Loomis, 
Gérard Pelletier, William Tetley, Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, who defended the 
measures owing to the FLQ’s intent to overthrow Canada’s political, economic, and social structures.775 
Tetley reiterated the “no alternatives” theme in his defence of the WMA.776 The recurring expression of 
the need for national unity in such tenuous times − to protect democracy and offer meaning to Laporte’s 
death − is of particular interest. Reflecting Cohen-Almagor777 and Siegel’s778 findings of a similar theme 
in English newspapers during the crisis, the pervasiveness of this frame – particularly in Western Canada 
– raises questions about the extent to which that demand was influenced by, or alternatively influenced, 
the papers’ institutional stances upon the WMA. 
     Editors’ widespread endorsement of a firm government approach to the FLQ corresponds with the 
negative conceptualization of the FLQ amongst all publications under examination. Echoing what Arthur 
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Siegel and Christopher Hewitt observed to be the English media’s unqualified enmity of the FLQ,779 all 
publications in this study discussed the FLQ in condemnatory terms as a group of ruthless, savage, 
dangerous, and cruel terrorists, extremists, fanatics, and criminals. All dailies presented a nation besieged 
and barraged by terrorists intent on supplanting existing societal and political structures with their own 
dictatorship. In contrast to some historiographical commentators, who have condemned the WMA as an 
overreaction to a group not planning any “mass revolutionary uprising,”780 the publications clearly 
conceived of the FLQ’s intent to impose a mass program of insurrectionist upheaval that threatened 
Canada’s democratic, legal, and social institutions and structure. The FLQ victims were depicted as 
innocent men of laudable calibre, and Laporte a martyr for democracy. The editorials expressed the 
pervasive fear that the terrorist group would escalate the situation through further abductions, selective 
assassinations, the hostages’ murder, economic ramifications, and open terrorism and insurrection. 
Although David Charters would later analyze the FLQ’s ignorance of “revolutionary theory,” minimal 
discipline or instruction of cells and members, and amateur and impulsive conduct to argue that the WMA 
had been “overblown,”781 the English-language newspapers did not share this appraisal. Rather, the media 
perceived of the group as a dangerous and cruel conglomeration of terrorist criminals who had both 
committed the unforgiveable assault of esteemed men and who were capable of inflicting further untold 
damage in their efforts to dismantle Canada’s political and socio-economic structure. 
     While quantitatively and qualitatively the dominant discourse in Eastern Canadian, Western Canadian, 
and Montreal, some editorials opposed this pro-government stance. In Western Canada, Montreal, and the 
Atlantic provinces, editors’ initially staunch support for the government weakened slightly as wariness 
emerged regarding the WMA’s potential to enable civil liberties abuses such as witch-hunts, censorship, 
and the arrest of innocent civilians. These possibilities prompted several papers to demand the 
establishment of committees to review the arrests and conditions of detainment. The WMA’s potential for 
abuse appeared as a subject of concern particularly in Western Canada, centring around the British 
Columbian order-in-council and Vancouver mayor Campbell’s intent to deploy draconian measures 
against his own political foes. Editorials in each region raised doubts about the WMA’s effectiveness 
given the police’s failure to apprehend the criminals, criticized the government for being inappropriately 
secretive, and urged it to be more transparent about the tensions that had prompted the WMA’s 
invocation. These criticisms were often voiced in concert with affirmations that the WMA was necessary, 
and the number of editorials offering support far outweighed the number expressing concern about the 
government’s conduct. 
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     In contrast to this predominant support for the government across most of English Canada, the Toronto 
papers positioned themselves in support of negotiating with the FLQ and were later critical of the 
imposition of the WMA. Although concurring that the FLQ was a dangerous terrorist menace, the 
Toronto Daily Star initially indicated that it would only support the law-and-order pursuit of the FLQ 
once negotiations had secured the hostages’ release, with the Globe and Mail similarly advocating for 
negotiations. The Toronto Daily Star’s stance became firm when the government invoked the WMA, 
acceding that perhaps the legislation was a necessary step against terror. Nevertheless, it concurred with 
the Globe and Mail that the WMA was a drastic and dangerous measure enabling the abrogation of civil 
liberties, equipping authorities with excessive powers, and promoting a repressive spirit among provincial 
authorities. Echoing the concerns which had arisen in the other national papers, the Toronto publications 
chastised the WMA for failing to produce any substantive police successes. Several other editorials, also 
reflecting broader concerns nation-wide, voiced unease at how the government was justifying and 
defending the WMA, urging the government to dispel the secrecy surrounding the measures and keep the 
public more apprised of the situation in terms confirming the similar finding of Gérard Pierre 
Holdrinet. 782  In this respect, the editorials offered early iterations of several key features of the 
historiographical criticisms of the WMA. Denis Smith and Abraham Rotstein’s works would later 
challenge the governments’ reasoning of the WMA to argue that the crisis had not been sufficiently 
severe to justify the measures,783 and Smith would invoke similar criticisms of the government’s secrecy 
to demonstrate that its decision-making lacked “a reasoned ... careful calculation of alternatives.”784 The 
criticisms of the police anticipated the later arguments of Smith, as well as Ron Haggart and Aubrey 
Golden, that the police’s apprehending of the FLQ following ordinary police activity rather than the 
sweeps conducted under the measures proved the ineffectiveness of the WMA.785 Similarly anticipatory 
were developing concerns about the abrogation of civil liberties, which Haggart and Golden would later 
emphasize to conclude that the WMA enabled “abuse[s] of government power” and “arbitrary police 
power,”786 and on the basis of which Dominique Clément would condemn the measures.787 Clearly, a 
dialogue around evaluations of the necessity, justifiability, and effectiveness of the government’s 
response and emergency measures had commenced in October 1970. This discourse was present within 
the Montreal and Western and Eastern Canadian papers, in that their dominant support for the WMA 
increasingly faltered under the weight of the concerns that emerged near the end of October. The debate 
also was evident in the broader national dialogue on the crisis, in which the Toronto editors’ criticism of 
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the government’s conduct and response opposed the more dominant English-Canadian support for the 
government.  
     Newspapers displayed a broader tendency to frame the crisis as an alien conspiracy. Particularly in the 
Western and Eastern Canadian dailies, terrorism was constructed as not so much the result of internal or 
systemic issues but the corruption by an international revolutionary malaise. The publications in Western 
and Eastern Canada framed the crisis as an unexpected “shock” to Canada. Terrorism was something that 
occurred elsewhere. The FLQ appeared as an entity encouraged by or connected to international 
movements and an international revolutionary malaise, representing only a minority fringe of Quebeckers 
and separatists. Its tactics, structure, and ideology, the papers intoned, were foreign in origin. This alien 
conspiracy framing was furthered by the minimal attention in either region − with the exception of the 
Edmonton Journal − to the real social, economic, and political grievances behind the group’s creation and 
rise, and the tendency to classify the FLQ as a creeping “cancer” or “ailment.” Only Toronto and 
Montreal papers departed from this stance, as they did not depict the crisis as comparably “shocking” and 
accorded far more substantial attention to examining the crisis’ systemic and internal seeds. Even still, the 
Central Canadian papers − particularly in Montreal − reiterated that the FLQ was a minority not 
indicative of the broader Quebec, and reflected the same tendency to describe the group as a cancer fed by 
foreign tactics, ideologies, and revolutionary fervour (although not to the same extent as in Western or 
Eastern Canada). 
     This editorial discourse thus seemed to privilege what van Dijk classified as “Definition” editorials. 
Only Central Canadian papers accorded any concerted attention to interpreting the crisis through an 
“Explanation” or “Evaluation and Moral” lens, examining the systemic origins of the crisis. As such, the 
editorial discourse was largely episodic. Refraining from situating the FLQ and its activities within 
broader political, social, and economic concerns in Quebec, the Western and Eastern Canadian 
publications offered a thematic framing of the crisis only insofar as they sought to situate the FLQ within 
the worldwide revolutionary malaise. Cumulatively, this seems to promote an understanding of the crisis 
as an isolated phenomenon, reinforcing an image of the October Crisis as not indicative of any broader 
Quebec grievances but as restricted in scope to the FLQ and the two abductions and one murder it had 
perpetrated. Further promoting this image was the tendency to frame the FLQ in such psychological terms 
as “madmen,” “fanatics,” “maniacs,” and “lunatics,” which similarly promoted a restricted 
conceptualization of the crisis by implying that the group’s origins were psychological rather than 
sociological or systemic issues. Overall, this narrative frame suggested that Canadian society did not 
suffer from tensions stemming from its own flaws and faults, but rather from international revolutionary 




makers, such a conceptualization of the crisis could bear substantial impacts upon how the populace and 
its political representatives sought to confront and resolve the crisis, in the short and long terms. 
     Content analysis of the nation’s most widely circulated English-language newspapers in October 1970 
thus confirms several elements of broader analyses conducted by Siegel, Fitch, and Holdrinet. However, it 
simultaneously exposes a substantially more nuanced discourse between the “civil liberties” and 
“necessity of law and order” outlooks than has previous scholarship. Beyond the variations in how the 
French and English media approached the crisis, which have been subject to previous analysis by such 
scholars as Cohen-Almagor, Hewitt, and Siegel, this study reveals intralingual and provincial variations 
within the English-language media. While Cohen-Almagor observed the sparse attention to “civil rights 
issues” and “cautious approval” among English newspapers for the WMA,788 and both Siegel and Hewitt 
documented the broad support among English publications for a hard-line stance,789 the papers examined 
here revealed a more complex narrative. Indeed, the tendency (especially in Eastern Canada) to initially 
frame the crisis as a “dilemma,” the Toronto editors’ criticism of the government, and the civil liberties 
concerns raised throughout the nation (albeit to varying extents) suggest the occurrence of more debate 
and dialogue than previous studies have suggested. Furthermore, this study revealed unanticipated 
themes, such as the framing of terrorism as an alien conspiracy, and exposed regional variations in the 
extent to which this framing dominated the discourse. Although most of the publications conformed with 
Siegel’s finding of minimal interest in English media to the “historic and contemporary economic and 
social injustices experienced by French-Canadians,”790 this was not the case in all papers examined. The 
Ontario and Montreal publications, and even one notable editorial in the Edmonton Journal, offered 
deeper conceptualizations and interrogations of the crisis’ roots beyond the foreign malaise of 
revolution.791 Accordingly, the historiography examining the media during the October Crisis − such an 
integral area of study given the media’s capacity to impact the public and politicians’ understandings of 
and approaches to society and its issues − necessitates further nuancing. 
     Historical studies of the media also inform and test communications concepts and theories. When 
communications scholars have demonstrated the media’s capacity to influence public opinion, attitudes, 
and policies through agenda-setting, framing, and priming, exploring newspaper constructions of 
historical events allows scholars to interrogate how citizens experienced, understood, and interpreted 
them. Of course, it is beyond the breadth of this study to assess to what degree the newspapers’ coverage 
of the crisis possessed a practical and tangible influence upon the individual reader, the political arena, or 
the broader public opinion on and conceptualization of October 1970. Scholars have noted a variety of 
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factors which mediate the media’s effects upon a reader, including the degree to which arguments align 
with an individual’s own self-schema,792 the extent to which audiences discuss the issues with others,793 
the perceived credibility of the media, and the extent to which the issue’s salience is confirmed or refuted 
by “personal experience or other communication channels.”794 Frames have varying success depending 
upon the extent to which their language and ideas resonate with the culture, are advocated or endorsed 
publicly by other sponsors,795 and are repeated with stability over extended periods of time.796 Thus, 
despite the prevalence of certain frames in the media’s coverage of the October Crisis, it is difficult to 
assess the extent to which the newspapers practically influenced English-Canadian understandings of the 
crisis in October 1970. 
     However, there are indications that the impact of media effects would have been particularly notable in 
the environment that pervaded following Cross’ abduction. Communications scholars S. J. Ball-Rokeach 
and M. L. DeFleur note that the public’s dependency upon the media is elevated during periods of 
accelerated, increased, or widespread societal change, instability, and conflict. Such situations provoke an 
increased “ambiguity” among citizens regarding what a particular event “means or how to interpret it.”797 
Matthew D. Matsaganis and J. Gregory Payne expand upon this theory in their communications studies, 
arguing that the media is of particular relevance when the public experiences a “problematic environ,” 
leaving people less confident in their capacity to understand and react to their surroundings and thereby 
reliant upon political and media leadership for assurance and direction.798 The newspaper editorials 
illuminated a sense that the FLQ presented a concerted threat, and complaints about government secrecy 
suggest a populace reliant upon the media. In such a case, the lack of information available to the public 
for use in assessing the issue would, according to Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds, produce a 
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greater “need for orientation” among the populace. The greater an individual’s need for further details or 
directional cues to help orientate their approach to or understanding of an issue, the greater the likelihood 
of that individual “attend[ing] to the mass media agenda” in search of that orientation.799 McCombs and 
Reynolds explain that such media effects assume further strength with respect to “unobtrusive issues,” or 
“those issues that we know about only through the media” and not through any personal or daily 
experience.800 
     Given theoretical insights from communications studies, it is likely that editorial opinion on the FLQ 
crisis influenced the public’s conceptualization and understanding of the crisis, given the social and 
political climate of October 1970. This seems particularly likely given that so much of the crisis itself was 
played out through the news media, which developed into the channel or medium through which the 
opposing sides communicated with each other and with the public, drawing citizens “into the crisis in an 
intimate matter.”801 The twelve newspapers examined illustrate how English Canada’s leading newspaper 
editors constructed and interpreted the crisis for readers. In exploring how Canadians were prevailed upon 
to comprehend the tensions, and some of the discourses occurring in the public sphere among some of 
society’s premier shapers of public opinion, these publications offer another window into October, and 
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